Executive Summary

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies has been tracking South Korean public opinion on international affairs since 2010. The Institute has released a report called “South Koreans and Their Neighbors” annually since 2014. “South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2026” reveals South Korean views towards neighboring countries, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and U.S. forces in Korea, future relationships with the United States and North Korea, nuclear armament, prospects for U.S.-China competition, and South Korea’s strategic choices between the United States and China.

Since last year’s Asan annual survey in March 2025, the Republic of Korea had a transition of government in June with the election of President Lee Jae Myung from the progressive Democratic Party. On South Korea’s relations with the United States, the return of President Donald Trump to the White House led to tough trade and security negotiations. With Japan, regular leader-level shuttle diplomacy by President Lee with Japanese prime ministers Ishiba Shigeru and Takaichi Sanae helped to stabilize the relationship. With China, President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Korea in October and President Lee reciprocated with a visit to China in January 2026 as the two countries sought to manage bilateral tensions over China’s maritime incursions in the West Sea. With North Korea, inter-Korean dialogue remained frozen while North Korea continued its nuclear and missile build-up as well as military campaign in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

As South Koreans look out at a more uncertain and, in many respects, anarchic world, how do they feel about neighboring countries and leaders? How confident are they in the ROK-U.S. alliance? How concerned are they about the threat from North Korea? And how do they feel about nuclear deterrence?

This year’s survey reveals three major shifts in South Korean public opinion.

First, Japan’s image improved markedly. Favorability towards Japan reached its highest level, ranking as net positive for the first time. In addition, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi was ranked more favorably than U.S. President Trump. This is the first time a Japanese leader has been viewed more favorably than a U.S. leader in our survey.

Second, South Koreans continued to distinguish between President Trump and the United States as a country. Despite unfavorable sentiment towards President Trump, overall views of the United States (favorability: 5.9 out of 10) remain as strong as ever, including the ROK-U.S. alliance (97.1%), the U.S. military presence in Korea (82.3%), and preference for the United States (71.4%) over China (10.8%).

Third, support for stronger nuclear deterrence rose on multiple fronts. Even as there was a 10%p increase in confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitment to 59%, a record 80% (2025: 76.2%) of South Koreans supported acquiring an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.

We also include new survey results examining South Korean public opinion towards nuclear deterrence measures—indigenous nuclear armament and the re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons—under conditional scenarios. This builds on recent research, published as: Peter K. Lee and Chungku Kang, “Worth the Squeeze: A Conditions-based Analysis of South Korean Public Support for Nuclear Deterrence,” Asan Issue Brief (May 2025).

The most recent survey was conducted from February 7 to 11, 2026. The results are based on a representative, weighted sample of 1,000 respondents across South Korea.

Other findings are as follows:

Country favorability: The United States remained the most favored country (5.90, on the scale of 0 to 10, with 5 being neutral). Japan’s favorability rose to 5.11, surpassing the neutral midpoint for the first time and reaching its highest level on record. China (3.28) and North Korea (3.37) remained below neutral, and Russia (2.86) was the least favored country.

Leader favorability: Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi recorded the highest favorability (3.24), the first time a Japanese leader ranked first. U.S. President Trump dropped to 2.91, followed by Xi Jinping (2.29), Vladimir Putin (1.79), and Kim Jong Un (1.45).

Future relations: A majority (55.3%) thought relations with the United States would improve, an 8%p increase from 2025, when a majority of Koreans thought relations would worsen following President Trump’s return to office. The outlook for inter-Korean relations slightly improved, with 39.8% thinking ties would improve, up from 35.4% in 2025.

Partner importance: The United States remained South Korea’s most important economic partner (74.7%, unchanged from 2025 at 74.2%) and security partner (64%), a 10%p decrease from 2025 (74.4%). Those who thought China was more economically important fell to 19.7%.

ROK–U.S. alliance: This year recorded the highest support for the ROK–U.S. alliance (97.1%, previous highest was 96.4% in 2022) as well as the U.S. military presence in South Korea (82.3%, previous highest was 82.1% in 2022 and 2016). There was, however, a 13.8%p decrease to 46.8% in those who thought the U.S. military should continue to be stationed in South Korea following unification, marking its first fall below majority support since 2020.

Nuclear deterrence: Public confidence that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea rose 10.2%p to 59.1%, with a similar increase in confidence in the event of U.S. exposure to a potential attack. Support for indigenous nuclear armament reached an all-time high of 80%. Even when presented with potential costs—international sanctions (63%), withdrawal of USFK (52.2%), or domestic infrastructure burdens (54.1%)—support remained above majority thresholds.

Support for redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stood at 60.4%, with 24.4% opposed and 15.2% selecting “don’t know.” This was a slight change from 2025 when 66.3% expressed support and 33.7% were opposed, with an increase in those unsure. There was a 14.5%p decrease in support (45.9%) when respondents were asked to bear higher defense cost-sharing burdens and a 25%p decrease when asked to host nuclear weapons in their area of residence (35.4%).

U.S.–China competition: When asked whether the United States or China would be stronger in ten years, there was a 7.2%p decline in those who chose the United States, even though it was considered more likely by a 3:1 margin (46% vs 15.1%). There was an even sharper 14.4%p decrease to 71.4% in those who would side with the United States over China, but there was also a decrease in those choosing China from 14.2% in 2025 to only 10.8%.

Contents

·  Country Favorability 

·  Leader Favorability

·  South Korea’s Future Relationship with the United States 

·  South Korea’s Future Relationship with North Korea 

·  Most Important Country for South Korea’s Economy

·  Most Important Country for South Korea’s Security 

·  Necessity of ROK-U.S. Alliance and  U.S. Forces in South Korea 

·  Desirable Size of U.S. Forces in South Korea 

·  Public Confidence in U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence 

·  Attitudes Towards Developing Indigenous Nuclear Weapons 

·  Condition-Based Support for Indigenous Nuclear Weapons

·  Attitudes Towards Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

·  Condition-Based Support for Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons 

·  Future Superpower 

·  South Korea’s Future Partner