The major contents of the 19th revised constitution (hereafter the “New Constitution”), adopted by North Korea during the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly last March, have recently been disclosed. In the preamble to the New Constitution, North Korea advocates popular sovereignty through the phrase “a socialist state centered on the masses of the people.” At the same time, however, it emphasizes an “absolute leadership system,” thereby underscoring the transcendent and absolute status of the suryong.

Although the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission does not concurrently serve as a deputy to the Supreme People’s Assembly—the DPRK’s “highest organ of state power”—the chairman nonetheless possesses the authority, during parliamentary recesses, to appoint or dismiss major state officials, including the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the premier of the Cabinet. In other words, rather than maintaining even the nominal appearance of a divided power structure between the Supreme People’s Assembly and the State Affairs Commission, the New Constitution signals the emergence of a system in which legislative, executive, and judicial powers are all concentrated in the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. At the same time, the New Constitution advocates building a garrison state by developing powerful military capabilities. This suggests not the continuation of “military-first politics” (songun politics), but rather the use of the military as an instrument of “leader-first politics,” centered on the supreme leader. Simultaneously, it may also imply the regime’s awareness of potential instability in its system of social control. Furthermore, while the constitution legalizes the introduction of certain market-economic elements, it also suggests that regime-level control through nationalization and market intervention will, in fact, be strengthened even further.

Some observers have expressed hope that North Korea may adopt a more flexible approach toward inter-Korean relations, noting that the New Constitution does not explicitly define the two Koreas as in a “hostile two-state relationship.” However, the addition of a new territorial clause is more plausibly interpreted as a preparatory step for future inter-Korean boundary disputes. Moreover, provisions such as the newly added authority of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission to command nuclear forces, as well as references to “territorial integrity” and to “support and assistance for national liberation and class liberation,” could at any time be used as logical justifications for hostile policies or provocations against South Korea. Given these factors, any North Korea policy that places excessive expectations on improving inter-Korean relations or restoring dialogue at the present stage is likely to face inherent limitations. Accordingly, what is needed at this point is a balanced approach: one that pursues the peaceful resolution of inter-Korean issues while simultaneously emphasizing preparedness against North Korea; readiness for provocations intended to trigger boundary disputes; and coordination with the international community and like-minded states in order to increase the burden on North Korea of sustaining what may be described as the “normalization of abnormality.”

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2026-14).

(‘북한 新헌법의 의미: 김정은 유일 체제하 새로운 북한의 건설 의지 표명’)