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Welcome to the Asan Plenum 2016.

The Asan Plenum is Korea and East Asia’s premier international affairs conference. Over 300 renowned experts, scholars, policymakers, and members of the media will gather in Seoul to discuss the rising challenges of the “New Normal.”

At the dawn of the 21st century, “new” economic, technological, environmental, and security threats fundamentally transformed the nature of international relations. Yet even in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, the global economic downturn, and the near collapse of international financial markets, optimists still hoped that the world would move in the direction of a rational, liberal, and inclusive world order. Diplomatic breakthroughs alleviated global economic downturns, just as economic growth palliated worsening security situations. The rapid and extensive dissemination of information via social media connected people as never before and contributed to the advancement of democracy and human rights.

Such optimism has largely dissipated. With low economic growth rates spreading from the advanced economies to developing countries, no solutions to get the world economy back on track are in sight. Expansion of the postmodern EU has clashed with an increasingly assertive Russia. Intense and cruel civil wars and sectarian violence have replaced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the representative struggle of the Middle East. China’s assertiveness in the South and East China Sea along with North Korea’s relentless pursuit of a full nuclear operational capability contributes to heightened tensions in the region. Information technology that undermined repressive states has now
degenerated into a tool of authoritarian regimes that further suppress their people.

Anarchy, conflict, and war mark the international system, a condition that international relations theory characterizes as the “normal” interaction between nation states. We have entered an era of the “New Normal.”

Will we have to adjust to the “New Normal?” Who will take the lead in offering viable solutions? What is the role of global and regional institutions in this “new” environment? How will multilateral or bilateral alliances adjust and recalibrate? This plenum intends to address these very important questions.

Thank you for joining us.

Sincerely,

Hahm Chaibong
President
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
The *Asan Plenum* is a yearly gathering of the world’s leading experts and scholars. In addressing the most pressing challenges facing the world with expertise from around the globe, the *Asan Plenum* aims to impact the policy making process and enable the global community to better deal with the challenges it faces. The *Asan Plenum* is a two-day, multi-session conference organized by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.


In today’s world, there seem to be too many things that are not normal that are being accepted in the name of the “New Normal.” Even though many condemn and worry about the situation in Syria, ISIS inspired terrorism, the migration crisis in Europe, the Ukraine-Russia situation, the fraying of the EU, the South China Sea disputes, and the North Korean nuclear crisis, just to name a few, they are all increasingly viewed as “intractable,” amenable only to “long-term solutions,” and hence accepted as the “New Normal.”

Even though the slower economic growth in China is, indeed, a “New Normal” that must be accepted as it is, what the world needs to solve the other crises is inspired leadership from individual leaders and nations. The problem is that, given the election year in the U.S., the economic downturn in China, turmoil
in the EU, and near-crisis in Russia, continuing economic doldrums in Japan, etc., it is difficult to see where this needed global leadership and new vision will come from. This year’s *Asan Plenum* hopes to address these questions.

**Plenum Format**

The conversational format of the *Asan Plenum* is intended to maximize interaction among panelists and participants. Parallel Break-Out Sessions will provide further opportunity for in-depth discussion and networking. The *Asan Plenum* features four Plenary Sessions and twelve Parallel Break-Out Sessions. Each session is one hour and thirty minutes.
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies was founded with a mission to become an independent think tank that provides effective policy solutions to issues which are critical to Korea, East Asia, and the rest of the world.

The Institute aims to foster wide-ranging and in-depth public discussions, which are essential for a healthy society. By focusing on areas including foreign affairs, national security, public governance, energy, and the environment, it strives to address some of the major challenges that our society faces today.
The Institute addresses these challenges not only by supplying in-depth policy analysis, but also by endeavoring to promote a global and regional environment favorable to peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

In addition to policy analysis and research, the Institute undertakes the training of specialists in public diplomacy and related areas in an effort to contribute to Korea’s ability to creatively shape its own future.
Plenary Session I
The New Normal

Session 1
Whose Rule? Which Order?

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Demographic Crises

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Session 2
Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific?

What is the Middle East’s New Normal?

Can the EU Return to Normal?
Opening Ceremony

Date: April 26, 2016
Time: 09:30-10:25
Place: Grand Ballroom II
Distinguished guests and friends,

Good morning.

We gather at a critical time for Korea and the world.

Since the beginning of this year, North Korea has conducted its 4th nuclear test and launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Two days ago, North Korea tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). As one expert said, North Korea's SLBM capability “has gone from a joke to something very serious.” Many people predict a 5th nuclear test.

T.S. Eliot once said, “Humankind cannot bear very much reality.”

But this does not absolve our responsibility to face the reality.

Given the ever-increasing threat from North Korea, it is unnerving to hear some of the national security debates coming from the U.S. Some accuse South Korea of free-riding on the U.S.

I am afraid such statements reflect a recurring isolationist strain in the U.S. On the face of it, it may seem unfair that the U.S. is...
paying for another country’s defense. However, this is a superficial understanding of the reality.

The ROK-U.S. alliance was forged during the Korean War. The Korean War was not simply a war between the two Koreas. It was not a civil war, as some say.

In 1949, China became communist. In January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson left South Korea out of the “U.S. defense perimeter” in the Asia-Pacific. In June 1950, North Korea launched the invasion supported by the Soviet Union and China. The U.S. quickly responded by sending troops even before the UN Security Council resolution. However, the primary reason for the quick U.S. response was to prevent Japan from being communized.

The Korean War was a war between the great powers, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and China. It was a flash point in the global Cold War that was just beginning to emerge. The Korean people were the victims of big power rivalry.

At the height of the Korean War, I was born in Busan. If it had not been for the U.S., I would not be here today. South Korea’s prosperity has been built upon the security provided by the alliance. For this, Koreans are grateful.

South Korea is also proud to have played its part. We have made our share of sacrifices in sustaining this alliance. We are not free riders.

The ROK-U.S. alliance is an anchor for peace and stability in the region.

Six years ago, when I met Prime Minister Putin, we discussed how to sell Siberian gas to South Korea. Then Prime Minister Putin told me about a plan to build gas-liquefying plants in Vladivostok and then shipping the LNG to South Korea. I suggested that it would be better if Russia could build a gas pipeline through North Korea all the way to South Korea. He wondered whether we could trust North Korea. I told him that to lower the risks, Russia could send half of the gas through the pipeline and the rest could be shipped.

A project like this would have a transformative effect on the security situation in Northeast Asia.

My parents came from North Korea. In 1989, my father visited his home town in North Korea. It was his first homecoming in 60 years, since running away from home when he was 16. When he woke up in the middle of the night during his stay in his hometown, his cousin pulled a blanket over both of them and whispered, “Please don’t try to help, don’t ask anything. Just go back as soon as you can.”

I know that my father’s spirit is with us today. He would have been grateful for all your concerns
about North Korea. I thank you on his behalf.

Distinguished guests and friends,

They say it is darkest right before dawn.

We have come a long way. The Republic of Korea has emerged as a prosperous and democratic nation.

It is my sincere hope that the gathering of great minds here today will provide us with the wisdom to sustain peace and prosperity in this part of the world.

Thank you very much.
A Historical Guide to Navigating a Dangerous New World

First, let me congratulate the founder of the Asan Institute—The Honorable MJ Chung—and its dynamic President, Dr. Chaibong Hahm—for organizing this remarkable conference. I have been at CSIS for 16 years and we have produced a large number of conferences during this time. I know what it takes to put on a world-class conference like Asan Plenum 2016. You have put the Asan Institute on the world stage, and that causes me to have blend of emotions—respect, envy, and competitive fear. Congratulations to you for such splendid work.

You have entitled this conference “The New Normal.” Candidly, nothing feels normal these days. The leading Republican candidate in our presidential primary election process is openly questioning the value of our NATO alliance, and has stated that we negotiated unfavorable agreements with our Asian alliance partners, implying we should withdraw if they do not agree to more generous support of our forward deployments. Personally, I think that is absolutely crazy. I am struggling to find anything these days that feels normal.
You have given me a daunting assignment—to provide a framing address for the start of a very challenging conference. Over the next two days we will be covering a very wide range of topics as we search to answer this question, “What is the New Normal?” Such a large question requires a broadly-gauged perspective at the outset.

This spring at CSIS, we are concluding a big effort that we informally call “the history project.” Last year we established the Brzezinski Institute, which is dedicated to a systematic study of history and geography to inform strategic analysis. This history project centered on the question “What is the meaning of the 20th century for today?” We sought to study the history of the 20th century, not from an American-centric point of view, but
by asking historians to interpret the 20th century from their national perspective. We recruited historians from Germany, Turkey, India, China, Japan, and the United States. At the time we lacked the resources to include other countries, but we have decided to extend the project and will be building on it over the coming year.

We told each historian they had to reflect on the large developments that had global significance during the 20th century—the collapse of the empire system and World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War, and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Each needed to touch on these globe-spanning developments, but from a unique national perspective.
I am a political scientist, not a historian. So I will not do justice to their scholarship. But I would like to reflect on this history from the perspective of a political scientist. And I ask myself a key question: Why was the first half of the 20th century such a disaster, and the second half such a remarkable period of progress?

First, we need to reflect on the first half. I believe there were three very large forces that shaped the first half of the 20th century. None of them started promptly at midnight on January 1, 1900. Let me briefly discuss each.

First, from about 1885 until 1914, we witnessed the collapse of the international system that had dominated the world for 300 years. The Qing dynasty was imploding. The Romanovs were in advance decay. The Hapsburg Empire collapsed. We Americans finally destroyed the hapless Spanish Empire. The Ottoman Empire was called “the sick man of Europe.” The British and French empires were increasingly hollow. The vitality of the great empires that dominated the international system for 300 years was declining sharply. World War I effectively crushed that system.

The second major factor was the rise of popular leaders in the colonies of these empires who were challenging the legitimacy of the empires and articulating a narrative of national expression and destiny. In essence, the empires educated the elites who would rise up to break apart the empires. One feature of colonialism was the most promising children of elite families were given international educations and experiences, with a goal of indoctrinating them into the grandeur of the empire. But these elites began to develop a shared consciousness of the possibility of national independence.

The third force, however was crucial. During the last decades of the 19th century we saw a remarkable transformation caused by new technologies. Most important for this discussion is the development of steam-powered sea transport and the telegraph and under ocean telegraph cables. These technologies transformed political consciousness of elites. Developments in distant lands reinforced political imagination of rising nationalists. For example, Ataturk in Turkey was inspired to learn that Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese war. Steam-powered sea transport dramatically lowered the cost of international travel, so Sun Yat-sen could take an education in Hawaii and travel internationally. Because of the telegraph and undersea telegraph cables, newspapers could now publish events that occurred only days before in distant lands.

The rising popular nationalist elites became aware of the decay of the empires and the success of their counterparts. National elites started to develop a political consciousness by becoming aware of broader developments and ideas.

The 20th century started in the middle of this story of collapse and regeneration. World War I put an
exclamation point on these developments. The European empires were still sufficiently strong to dictate the political outcomes of the post war order, but those outcomes were hugely disappointing to the rising political elites around the world. The European foreign policy establishment did not comprehend the underlying changes in the world and fashioned a peace that simply set the stage for further decline.

The Great Depression ripped through economies around the world. The collapse of consumer demand in the United States caused a deep recession in Japan for example. Young and relatively immature governments around the world were forced to cope with the local impact of the depression, and deal with forces that extended beyond their sovereign reach.

All countries struggled. Some of them made bad decisions—very bad decisions. Fascism took root in Japan and in Germany, causing enormous damage and heartache for the world. The Soviet Union coped with it, but only through an astoundingly brutal collectivization process. The forces of fascism and communism took hold and propelled the world to the second great global war in only 20 years.

The first half of the 20th century was arguably the worst period in human history. The vast destruction of human life and material progress was unprecedented. For the first time in history, warfare was not localized and extended globally. Hundreds of millions of people died in the first half of the 20th century. It was a horrible time.

But the second half of the 20th century was equally remarkable. The second half of the 20th century witnessed the most astounding burst of prosperity and progress of any time in human history. We humans defeated and eliminated small pox—a disease that killed an estimated 300 million people in the 19th century. Engineers invented aircrafts that could take us half way around the world in less than a day. Billions of people who lived on the edge of starvation were brought into comfortable middle class standing. A decade that started with a telegraph ended with the internet.

The second half of the 20th century was just as positive and remarkable as the first half was discouraging and damaging.

To what can we attribute this remarkable transition? To my mind, the most important factor was the establishment of international institutions that emerged after World War II and shaped the second half of the century. We created international institutions designed to address problems that transcend the capabilities of any one country to manage, institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, etc. These formal institutions were augmented by less formal institutions, such as the G7, the G20, the wealth of regional coordination institutions here in
Asia. We created a network of institutions designed to create a shared venue to work on problems that extended beyond the reach of any one nation. And we grounded these institutions on a liberal international world view, with values such as “rule of law,” transparency, accountability of governments to citizens, an open and free press, etc. These values and these organizations profoundly changed the second half of the 20th century, and set the norms by which individual nations are judged by their actions.

We are now 16 years into the 21st century, but the second half of the 20th century was the starting point for our day. And here we are at the 2016 Asan Plenum to ask the question “What is the new normal?” What is the character of our time and what can we do to improve the trajectory of human life?

Permit me to enumerate a few of the larger forces today that give me concern.

First, technology is again transforming our collective consciousness. In the year 1900, the telegraph created global perceptions, but only among a small number of elite leaders. Today we are living through a time where social media is creating a profound change in political consciousness among vast populations. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski talks about this age as a vast awakening of political consciousness, creating conditions that are hard for governments to manage. A good example is the political impact of the so-called “Panama Papers” that show how elites on a global basis have created pathways for moving their private wealth away from control of sovereign tax authorities.
Second, this revolution in communication technology now creates an enormous challenge for individuals who have to lead institutions. Those institutions—whether they are governments, corporations, think tanks, or universities—exist within a legal framework of laws, obligations, and constraints that underpin their legitimacy, but also limit their speed of action. Those who have no institutions to defend can move quickly and with few external constraints on their action. People who lead institutions are burdened by many crosscurrents of obligation.

Democracies are especially vulnerable at a time like this. Democracies confront propaganda activities designed to unhinge domestic institutions. But they cannot respond until they have established the framework of truth and the range of plausible actions. The propagandists are not held to a standard of “truth.” Propagandists only have to live by a standard of “efficacy.”

Authoritarian governments have become far more effective in using social media for propaganda purposes because the messages they deliver do not have to be true. They only have to be effective.

Those who have to defend large institutions—either governmental or private sector institutions—have a web of considerations they must navigate before they can act. They are handicapped in this new era.

Third, technology developments of the past 30 years have had a profound impact on every nation. Globe spanning communications technology now means design laboratories can be thousands of miles away from production factories. The revolution of transport with the advent of container shipping and intermodal transfer means factories in distant lands can relatively quickly supply consumers a half-world away. Ebola can break out in West Africa and jet transport can bring the disease to America in days.

These new technologies have effectively erased the bureaucratic distinction between national security and homeland defense. Let us consider the refugee crisis gripping Europe. A war in Syria and continuing crises in Afghanistan have brought a domestic crisis to Europe that could break apart the European Union. Yet most democracies have a great divide between their military establishments and their domestic police authorities. This void contributed to the ease with which ISIS terrorists could bomb the airport in Brussels.

These new technologies and globe-spanning business practices are also straining domestic societies. Citizens feel threatened by global economic developments, and fear that their politicians are not protecting them adequately from these forces. We see considerable anxiety in almost every developed country about the viability of the social compact in each country.

Fourth, the Cold War thankfully ended without catastrophic violence. But the Cold War also left us with a terrible legacy. During this period we learned how to build nuclear weapons, and biological
weapons. We have around us vast quantities of dangerous things, and the knowledge to adapt them for vile purpose. Computational biology is now creating the capacity for people to build horrifying biological pathogens, no longer depending on sophisticated laboratories but within the reach of a family kitchen.

The old paradigm of nation states waging war in conventional ways is now distant. But the prospect of destabilizing actions by small groups of people—some with state sponsorship—is very real, and holds the prospect of unhinging entire nations.

Is this the “New Normal?” What can we do about this situation?

The problem comes down to a very simple reality—all of the genuinely complex problems in the world today are horizontal, and all the government structures are vertical. We collectively share a dangerous new world, and we lack the structures of coordination to manage these problems.

There is no uniform and universal solution to this problem. The United Nations is essential, but completely insufficient for the myriad of complex issues we face together. The World Bank and the IMF are essential, but so too are regional financial institutions such as the Asia Development Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. The World Health Organization is essential, but it is far too weak to manage the crises we face and needs revision and augmentation.

The “New Normal” feels very frightening. If there is one strategy for all of us to deal with this frightening “New Normal,” it is the imperative of rebuilding effective institutions of multilateral coordination and response.

At the end of World War II, America committed itself to be a leader of a new international system, one grounded on our shared core values of “rule of law,” accountability of governments to citizens, transparency, a premium on diplomacy, and due process. I continue to think that is the foundation that will carry us through this dangerous era.
I find it very disturbing to hear the leading Republican candidate for President to talk so disparagingly about allies and international obligations. Building a “beautiful wall” to separate America from Mexico is precisely the wrong formulation for our problems. This particular candidate has stated that we need to renegotiate our alliance with Korea and Japan, stating that we agreed to terms that were unfair to America.

I am offended by this. Alliances are not simple contracts. Alliances are obligations that we enter into with conviction and a national consensus. I believe one of the primary reasons why the second half of the 20th century was so much better is because America did not retreat into isolation after World War II, but instead took on alliance relationships and partnerships. America’s alliance with Korea is the foundation of America’s security. America is more safe and secure because Korea is free and prosperous. Allies like Korea have come to underpin the peaceful order we see today. Allies like Korea have started off as followers of America’s lead. But now Korea has gone on to become an international leader in providing public goods, in areas stretching from overseas development assistance, to clean energy development, to nuclear safety and security. There may be some Americans who think that we don’t need our allies. But the international order that sustains us today cannot continue without such allies.

America is at a cross roads. Many Americans would like to retreat from being a leader in this dangerous new world. I think that would be a tragic mistake. It is up to all of us to lead a wiser, more thoughtful debate to chart a way forward that is good for everyone in the world. We have to re-create a rational and effective “New Normal.” And it will take working with allies and with competitors to build this more rational and safe new world.

Thank you for inviting me to join you today, and again my congratulations to the Asan Institute for this very impressive conference.
Plenary Session 1, titled “The New Normal,” explored the complex issues redefining the rules of international relations in our time. The conversation ranged from China's role in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue to the upcoming U.S. presidential election and the return of geopolitics in shaping the actions of nation states. The moderator of the session, Dr. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, opened the session by welcoming the participants and thanking the Keynote Speaker, John Hamre, for setting the tone of the conference.

Dr. Han Sung Joo, Professor Emeritus at Korea University, began by illustrating the effects of North Korea's actions on “The New Normal.” Dr. Han claimed that, while North Korea used to be afraid of UN sanctions and sought to downplay their nuclear weapon capabilities, they now flaunt their weapons and actively threaten both South Korea and the United States. Although China had previously been more concerned about keeping the North Korean regime afloat than stopping their nuclear program, they are beginning to feel threatened by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and are stating their support for sanctions.

Next, Dr. Gilbert Rozman, Editor-in-Chief of The Asan Forum, claimed that U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear program is not in a positive phase, but rather represents a fundamental divergence of opinions. Dr. Rozman went on to assert that the answer to the problems the world faces is not just greater U.S. involvement, but a strengthening of commitment from its allies. Dr. Rozman claimed that states' reconstruction
of national identities is causing problems, and that today, challenges once again originate from the states themselves, especially in Northeast Asia.

Dr. Tanaka Akihiko, Professor at the University of Tokyo, offered a more optimistic assessment of “The New Normal” by pointing to some of the achievements of the 21st century, including the success of the Millennium Development Goals to halve the population living in extreme poverty.
Prof. Tanaka also stressed two factors that are creating the challenges in our time. The first is the emergence of new threats via 21st century technology as exploited by groups like ISIS. The second is the return of symptoms similar to those of the first half of the 21st century, including nationalism and disregard of international norms.

Finally, Prof. Zhu Chenghu, Professor at the National Defense University in China, delineated the threats faced by the world today. Low economic growth rates, an arms race between major powers, and the lack of effective institutions are but some of the challenges outlined by Prof. Zhu. Regarding North Korea, he emphasized the importance of negotiations instead of sanctions as the main pathway to denuclearization and stability on the peninsula. Prof. Zhu also stressed the need for active cooperation.
between the U.S. and China.

During the question and answer session, Prof. Zhu claimed that no one in East Asia should accept a nuclear armed North Korea, but acknowledged that denuclearization will be difficult to achieve, given the amount of time and resources they have spent. Prof. Tanaka responded to a question by stating that it is highly unlikely that Prime Minister Abe will change his security policy after the upcoming elections. Dr. Rozman talked about the possibility of Hillary Clinton winning the U.S. presidency and the possible effects on U.S. foreign policy. Dr. Han ended the debate with his view that, regardless who wins the U.S. presidency, U.S. foreign policy will change, in accordance with whether or not North Korea is seen as a core issue.
Session 1, titled “Whose Rule, Which Order?” was led by moderator Philip Stephens, Associate Editor and Chief Political Commentator of the *Financial Times*. Mr. Stephens opened the session by saying that the world needs to realign horizontal international problems with vertical structures of national states and its governments. Suggesting that the U.S.-designed international order seems unable to meet the needs of emerging powers, he asked whether it can be fixed to handle new challenges.

Prof. Chen Zhimin, Dean of Fudan University’s School of International Relations and Public Affairs and Professor of international relations, noted that the world is currently characterized by diffusion of power. From the Chinese side, however, it seems that the leading global powers are trying to continue to maintain or even strengthen Western dominance over world affairs, especially since the U.S. is unwilling to share rule-making power. Also, he pointed out that the Western world, which was once the engine for growth, has become the source of economic problems. Lastly, he noted that military intervention and adventurism of Western powers have produced many failed states, which have become sources of instability and terrorism.

Next, Prof. Miyake Kuni, President of the Foreign Policy Institute and Visiting Professor of Ritsumeikan University, observed that the widening gap between rich and poor is leading to isolationist tendencies in many countries. He emphasized that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not cease, and the Iran nuclear deal can be perceived as the beginning of that trend. He thought that the foreign policies of the U.S. and its allies are very
compartmentalized. He stressed the importance of coordinating policies among the allies.

Dr. Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, stated that the root of disagreement between Russia and the U.S. goes back to the end of the Cold War. He argued that non-Western powers should have been invited to be co-designers of the post-Cold War world order. In Dr. Suslov's view, great power rivalry at the global level has returned. Profound diversification and multiplication of methods and tools of confrontation has also brought the world to a state of total-war where the new rule is “no rule.” He saw these as preconditions for a new balance, and foresaw the creation of several regional orders.

Finally, Mr. Evans Revere, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Institute, insisted that rumors of the demise of the rules-based liberal international order are premature and that “the night has yet descended.” He also noted that the tough challenges we face today are not worse than what the world has experienced in the past. Mr. Revere assessed that the global international order has shown resilience and strength over the decades and demands for U.S. leadership is stronger than before. Nonetheless, the U.S. will have to reject its domestic isolationist impulse. The allies should also be ready to share more burdens, and the U.S. is going to have to work better with China and Russia.
Session 1, titled “When Growth Falters” discussed whether we are in a “New Normal” in terms of economic dimensions. The idea behind the discussion is that after the global economic downturn of 2008, the world has not seen growth and the period of high economic growth seems to be over. The question is, are we in a “New Normal” of low growth?

The moderator of the session, Mr. Martin Fackler of Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, began by providing an overview of the challenges of the global economy.

Mr. Steven Kargman, President of Kargman Associates, began by examining the case of emerging economies and what the “New Normal” mean for these economies. Major emerging economies
including the BRICs are experiencing slower growth and sharp downturns. Countries that have been heavily dependent on China have been hit hard. Oil exporting countries from Venezuela to Gulf countries have seen cut in growth rates. Countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa are no exception. The net result of plummeting commodity prices is major financial and economic strains. Thus, the question is what should the emerging economies do in the economic downturn? The emerging economies should use this period of economic slowdown for restructuring and diversifying the economy, which would help to lay a solid foundation for the future.

Next, Professor Lee Doowon of Yonsei University noted that the general answer to the question is that we are not yet in the “New Normal.” In Korea for instance, the “New Normal” has not fully materialized. Although Korea has weathered the 2008 global recession fairly well, the question remains whether Korea will follow the path of Japan. The only way we will not follow the path of Japan is to take advantage of the positive side of the Korean economy.

Professor T.J. Pempel from University of California, Berkeley stated that it is easy to fetishize economic growth. A rise in GDP does not necessarily indicate a plus, and a fall in GDP does not mean a minus, as evidenced by the case of Denmark and Canada. So instead of fetishizing growth, it is important to address the root cause of today’s slow growth as a problem of political reluctance and unwillingness to solve the problem. In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that the free market will not magically solve the problem. Sensible balance has to be struck, markets should accommodate creativity, and governments should provide regulations, checks, and safety nets. These political challenges are not easy to address but are necessary to long-term creativity and escaping from the “New Normal.”

Finally, Professor Zhang Jun from Fudan University explained that China is facing a downturn in economic growth, reflecting contracted demand. In the Chinese perspective, the slowing down of the Chinese economy is the “New Normal,” a natural phenomenon in which China is moving to the next phase of
modest growth, as its economy readjusts. He added that China cannot afford a conventional policy package, and thus the government must find new sources of growth. This is part of the reason behind the government’s encouragement of new businesses and service sectors that are domestically focused. This may have lowered the potential rate of growth, but it has made progress in rebalancing the imbalanced structure of the Chinese economy and facilitated the expansion of the service sector.

During the question and answer session, questions were asked whether countries have the toolkit to respond to the economic crisis and the concern that the slowing down of the economy is not due to lack of policies but political unwillingness.

Mr. Steven Kargman and Professor T.J. Pempel responded by saying that the emerging economies have knowledge of the tools but are reluctant to implement it. Structural bottlenecks, such as corruption and lack of “rule of law,” often prevent economic growth. Short term political oversight in handling long term problems is another obstacle. Furthermore, the trans-border nature of solutions makes it extremely difficult to deal with the fundamental problem. In conclusion, both the emerging economics and developed countries alike have to address the real challenges and tackle the fundamental problem that their economies face.
Session 1, titled “Demographic Crises” discussed population trends as a global crisis over the next few decades. The moderator of the session, Dr. Mo Jongryn, Dean of Yonsei GSIS, began by highlighting demographic changes that now impact social, economic, and security crises with equal urgency.

Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute, began with his presentation on the “Global Demographic Outlook to 2035: Implications for Geopolitics and World Economy.” Stating that demographics can provide a “fairly clear impression of a population profile in 20 years,” he highlighted three impending trends. Firstly, the world will not have the same growth, as manpower growth is expected to decline by 500 million people. China and India will no longer drive population growth; instead, more than half of the labor force will be from Sub-Saharan Africa in the next two decades. Secondly, the demographic fundamentals of emerging market economies are not as spectacular as what intelligence sources and governments have predicted. Thirdly, the demographics of the U.S. and “NAFTA-land” look generally optimistic.

Next, Professor Fukagawa Yukiko of the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University commented on demographic crises in East Asia. She noted that, in East Asia, a lot of money will be spent on pensions. Japan’s pensions cover almost 90% of its population, whereas China and South Korea both cover approximately 40%. Consequently, debt will significantly increase while labor input shrinks, saving rates will drop, and the fiscal balance will worsens. Learning from the
Japan example, East Asian countries can try to manage an aging society through longer labor hours, improving savings, and implementing fiscal reforms.

Finally, Mr. Stijn Hoorens, Associate Director of RAND Europe, commented on Europe’s demographic crisis. Europe is now facing a new demographic reality with an aging population and shrinking work force—people live longer and healthier, but are having fewer children at older ages. Migration patterns to the region will likely remain the same or increase. With the doubling of Africa and Asia’s labor force between 1990 and 2020, this youth bulge may increase pressure to other parts of the world that have more employment. Young, low skilled people hardest hit by the economic crisis are referred to as the “lost generation.” More than 14 million young people in the EU are NEETs (Not in Education, Employment, or Training). These conditions are fertile breeding ground for societal unrest and disengagement. Ultimately, certain households are more vulnerable than others to poverty. Households with more children and single mothers have particularly high risks of poverty. Public policy can help tackle these problems by contracting state and public sector reform. Education is key to helping underrepresented groups join the labor force.
During the question and answer session, Dr. Mo focused attention on Korea’s demographic crisis as one centered around low birth rates. Currently, Korea has the lowest birth rate among OECD countries. With examples from the U.S., Japan, and the EU, he examined policy options for the government to increase the national birthrate. Dr. Eberstadt pointed out that human agency is very important in influencing desired family size. In the U.S., increasing human resource quality is a central focus. For Japan, Professor Fukagawa emphasized that the Japanese government now has a greater focus to involve more women in the labor force. Mr. Hoorens spoke about how advanced Western Europe economies exhibit an inverse relationship between fertility rates and economic growth. Other topics raised included policy changes to reduce illiteracy, the role of technology, and competition between Japan and Korea to improve the labor participation of women.
The moderator of the session, Mr. David Sanger, National Security Correspondent of the *New York Times*, opened Plenary Session II titled “The New Normal and Regional Orders” by observing global trends of rising populism and increasing suspicion over post-war institutions.

Dr. Lee Chung Min, Professor at Yonsei University, stated that it is imperative to understand the other side of a rising Asia. Dr. Lee argued that conventional narratives of the region make it difficult to cooperate, and the growth pattern inherited from Meiji Japan to the “four tigers,” then to China and India, has come to an end. Dr. Lee regarded the Chinese transition as inevitable. The only issue at hand is how smooth the transition will be. The aging population of Japan and South Korea, the two most developed economies in the region, was mentioned. The two societies are not ready to pay for increasing social welfare expenditure, and this same phenomenon will appear in China soon. Regarding regional security, Dr. Lee reiterated political breakthroughs rather than multilateral institutions. He argued that U.S. alliances will remain at the core of the regional order as long as China continues to make neighboring countries uncomfortable about its maritime disputes and position on the DPRK nuclear issue.

Dr. Douglas Paal, Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that Asia needs to adjust to the “New Normal” of weak economies and cross trade agreements. Arguing that anti-trade is denying sources of growth, the pending legislative action in the U.S. is said to be
the result of failure of American leadership to explain benefits, such as growth of industry and job creation. Concerned that the four remaining U.S. presidential candidates are against the deal, Dr. Paal stated that the chances are low. However, once TPP is passed, momentum in Asia-Pacific and Europe will ensue the conclusion of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). For economic integration and growth in the region, the need for multilateral institutions and domestic reforms were highlighted. Taking instance of the failure of the Doha round of the
WTO talks, Dr. Paal argued that like-minded countries need to cooperate first to achieve multilateral trade deals.

Amb. Gerhard Sabathil, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea, stated that the region has never been normal and has continuously faced challenges. Despite the wave of populism and increasing resentment over migrants, Amb. Sabathil takes an optimistic view of the future of regional institutions. Europe has proved it can overcome crises throughout history and will maintain regional orders to develop the institutions further. As for the U.S. pivot to Asia, Amb. Sabathil did not think that the policy is neglecting the region as the EU still plays a role in security and soft security issues. However, Amb. Sabathil expressed concerns over U.S. hesitance in the Middle East, arguing that the region is more in crisis than East Asia. The U.S. should be urged to play a more influential regional role, eventually helping the EU resolve the migration issue.
Prof. Zhang Tuosheng, Chairman of the Academic Committee and Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies, noted that new organizations are needed in accordance to changing regional orders. For successful operation of regional institutions, the UN Security Council should continue to play a central role, regional multilateral forums should be further promoted, and major powers need to collaborate. In the security sphere, Prof. Zhang suggested the idea of transforming U.S. military alliances to deal with non-traditional issues and engage in talks with Russia and China. Trilateral talks were suggested as a way to bridge U.S. and China. As for territorial disputes, Prof. Zhang stated that China takes a two-track policy approach. Though open to multilateral efforts, it was reiterated that the issue can be fully resolved only through bilateral means.
Session 2, titled “Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific?” was moderated by Dr. Gilbert Rozman, Editor-in-Chief of The Asan Forum. Dr. Rozman asked the panelists about India’s role in the wider regional context and how regional players conceive the regional architecture. What are we talking about when we talk about regional frameworks? Is there some sense of community and common value in the discussion? By answering these questions, this session aimed to find what is central to understanding the Indo-Pacific region.
Amb. Doraiswami, the Ambassador of India to the Republic of Korea, stressed the importance of the evolution of Asian interests over the past century, which brought about a fusion of Pacific and Indian interests. Ideas, goods, and commodities flow between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, creating a connected space and establishing an Indo-Pacific community. Amb. Doraiswami, borrowing Rory Medcalf’s words, described this as a “maritime super highway.”

Next, Amb. William Paterson, the Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, said that the term “Indo-Pacific” perfectly describes Australia’s dependence on the two oceans. While Australia is often not considered as part of Asia, its trade with regional states is growing, with trade volume with India particularly strong. Amb. Paterson noted that economic connections are obvious. China is Australia’s biggest trading partner, followed by Japan and South Korea. Similar to Amb. Doraiswami, he described the Indo-Pacific trade route as “a power highway,” emphasizing the significance of energy trade among regional countries.

Dr. Daniel Twining, Director and Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, emphasized India’s geopolitical position. Dr. Twining described India as being located at the pivot of Asia. Also mentioning the fact that India attracted more foreign direct investment than China in 2015,
he asked the audience to imagine what India would look like in twenty years, especially taking into account where China stands now after twenty years of growth. He also insisted that India offers a different model of growth from China for developing countries to benchmark, and portrayed India as a swing state in the region, which contributes to sustaining an open, liberal order.

Finally, Prof. Zhu Feng, Executive Director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University, stressed that China had no intention of seeking dominance over the U.S.-controlled sea lanes of communication in the Indo-Pacific. He noted that the China-India relationship was once traumatized during the 1960s with the Chinese revolution and the impact from this has not yet fully dissipated. He insisted that China is now different and Beijing has consistently mentioned that it will treat Islamabad and New Delhi the same.
What is the Middle East’s New Normal?

Moderator

Karen House
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Speakers

Henri Barkey
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Reza Eslami-Somea
Shahid Beheshti University

Suat Kiniklioglu
Center for Strategic Communication, Turkey

Session 2, titled “What is the Middle East’s New Normal?” examined the political, economic, and security issues facing the Middle East today. Participants discussed the evolving role of governments in tackling these challenges, as well as how bottom-up movements could shape the policies of the future. The moderator of the session, Ms. Karen House, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, began by providing an overview of the “New Normal” in the Middle East, which she described as “chaos.”

Dr. Henri Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, began by analyzing the Middle East situation one hundred years after the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Dr. Barkey discussed the problems of national governments and suggested that the West focus their policies on states, rather than the regimes that govern them. To rebuild the Middle East, he argued, the state needs to be rebuilt. Not just the infrastructure, but the regimes themselves. Dr. Barkey also commented on the role of the Kurdish people and how their displacement will continue to be an important variable in regional politics.

Next, Prof. Reza Eslami-Somea, Associate Professor and Director of the Human Rights Department at Shahid Beheshti University, approached the “New Normal” from a human rights perspective. He claimed that, since the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, lack of a cohesive U.S. policy, government suppression, and extremist religious ideologies have hindered human rights development. Prof. Eslami-Somea emphasized the need to develop strong
institutions to empower the people, claiming that one of the reasons youths join extremist groups like Islamic State is because they come from underprivileged backgrounds.

Finally, Mr. Suat Kiniklioglu, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic Communication, stated that many of the problems in the Middle East stem from the delegitimization of the nation state. As conflicts continue, many people in the region feel that the government cannot provide for their security. Mr. Kiniklioglu discussed a crisis in political Islam, in which people are beginning to question whether religion and politics should be intertwined. He also suggested that the Middle East is searching for a new consensus on how governments should interact with their citizens, although whether this new consensus will be a form of liberal democracy is unknown.

During the question and answer session, Dr. Barkey emphasized that any bottom-up solution to the Middle East’s problems
will require an enormous international effort, but one that is not imposed from the outside. Prof. Eslami-Somea expressed his belief that capacity building will empower people and allow them to not have to choose between security and freedom. Mr. Kiniklioglu discussed the internal politics of Turkey and the necessity of stronger opposition to help stem the tide of authoritarianism.
Session 2, titled “Can the EU Return to Normal?” examined the current state of affairs in the EU vis-à-vis challenges faced given the specter of the financial crisis, political instability, and non-traditional security threats. As moderator, Ambassador Kim Chang-Beom from the Seoul Metropolitan government provided an overview of the security and demographic challenges EU citizens are currently facing, highlighting the recent suffering from terrorist attacks and the refugee crisis.

Dr. Steven Blockmans from the Centre for European Policy Studies kicked off the panel by emphasizing the pervasive anxiety over the EU’s future, given heightened security fears raised by terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the aftershocks of the sovereign debt crisis. The problem lies with the fact that solidarity between union states—once winning international praise for being the greatest political experiment—has begun to erode. For decades, the EU has pursued major integration projects, such as institutionalizing a single market and the euro. Now, EU officials are asking themselves whether integration is as irreversible as before. Dr. Blockmans argued that there is a need for a more collective response to Ukraine and Mediterranean security challenges. As the notion of an ever-closer union is being challenged, notably by the UK, a return to “normal” is not to be desired. Instead, prescriptive steps that need to be taken include defense planning, defense budgeting, and establishing a military headquarters in Brussels.

Next, Mr. Martin Heipertz from the Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany, continued the discussion by proposing that
today’s EU faces a “polycrisis” that ultimately stems from the sovereign debt crisis. This “polycrisis” involves the resurgence of the financial crisis with Greece and Italy, Brexit, migration issues, and confrontation with Russia. Mr. Heipertz stressed that the Greek and Italian financial crises are not a problem with the euro itself and not the same as currency crises, but was triggered by the banking crisis. There is a need to shore up the EU institutional landscape and find legal solutions. Nonetheless, not everything has to be done at once for regional integration.
Rather it would be better to move credibly towards a strategic goal in stages.

Mr. Vladimir Shopov, Founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Affairs, followed up by saying that, over the last few years, Europe has been “faced with the flip side of globalization.” The onslaught of recent crises coupled with a shift in European self-doubt and globalization has destabilized the overall EU integration model. Many European citizens have lost trust in governments when policies are not integrated horizontally. Regardless, Mr. Shopov pointed out that the euro crisis actually ended with greater integration. Although inter-connectedness makes national solutions impractical, short-term, and expensive, it is not unraveling the EU.
Mr. Philip Stephens, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, concluded by stating that, although the last 15 years have been unkind to the EU, he believes that it will return to normal. Yet, it will be necessary to recognize that this state will be a different kind of “normal.” The EU will have to wrestle with a number of existential threats as it reinvents itself in a new world order. First, slow growth and economic imbalances still threaten the legitimacy of the euro. Second, populist extremists are increasingly challenging the established political order. Third, the risk of Brexit. Fourth, uncontrolled migration from the Middle East and violent Islamist extremism. Fifth, Russia’s threat to the European security order. Despite these formidable challenges, Mr. Stephens is optimistic that a “New Normal” for Europe will be one that is more flexible in its integration model and more outward in its focus.
Plenary Session III
Non-Traditional Insecurity

Session 3
Living with Terrorism

Living with Climate Change

Living with Nuclear Insecurity

Session 4
The New Normal in Korea-Japan Relations
China between the Two Koreas

Jane Perlez  Cheng Xiaohe  Bonnie Glaser  Shin Jung-seung  Wang Dong

Next Chapter in Korea-U.S. Relations

Alastair Gale  Victor Cha  Edwin Feulner  Kim Sung-han  Yamaguchi Noboru

Plenary Session IV
Same Old New North Korea?

Christopher Nelson  Bessho Koro  Chun Yungwoo  Gary Samore  Yang Xiyu
Plenary Session 3, titled “Non-Traditional Insecurity,” explored the non-traditional threats and challenges facing the world in the era of the “New Normal.” Panelists discussed issues ranging from climate change to cyber security to nuclear proliferation. The moderator of the session, Martin Fackler, Research Fellow at the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, opened the session by emphasizing how nation states are struggling to keep up with changes in technology and cross border migration in an era of increasing uncertainty.

Prof. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, began by illustrating the connection between climate change and resource insecurity. As global temperatures rise and populations continue to explode, more people will compete for an increasingly limited supply of food and water. In Asia, the environment plays a large role in policy making, as it is a region particularly prone to natural disasters. Dr. Caballero-Anthony went on to discuss the role of states in dealing with pandemics and claimed that, since the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, governments have been forced to create a new framework of cooperation to prevent the spread of diseases.

Next, Amb. Yves Doutriaux, Counsellor of State in France, spoke about the myriad issues that now fall under the definition of non-traditional insecurity. He stressed that the biggest difference in security issues in the modern era is widespread
internet access, which could be harnessed by international institutions to create a global network of early warning signals for both natural and manmade disasters. Amb. Doutriaux also stressed the importance of civil society in policy making and recommended a more efficient decision making process for global affairs, including expanding the UN Security Council’s permanent members.
Finally, Mr. Robert Manning, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, spoke on the role of nonstate actors, including so-called “super-empowered individuals” to play a role in affecting non-traditional security issues, citing the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s work in eliminating malaria. Mr. Manning spoke at length about the security issues involved with North Korea’s nuclear program and the efforts of the Six-Party Talks to integrate North Korea into the regional architecture. He also warned that, while non-traditional security threats are rising, traditional war between nation states is still a possibility.

During the question and answer session, Amb. Doutriaux commented on the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, where he
believes the states are weak, but civil society groups are gaining momentum in certain countries. He recommended that regional institutions become stronger to help with development. Dr. Caballero-Anthony responded to a question on depletion of global fish stocks. She claimed that what began as a food security issue can quickly turn into a dispute over national boundaries, and to solve this, technology should be developed to increase fish farm productivity. Mr. Manning focused his remarks on how institutions need to evolve, claiming the G20 has the potential to tackle these issues of non-traditional insecurity.
Session 3, titled “Living with Terrorism” discussed the definition of international terrorism and whether acts of terrorism are at the heart of the “New Normal.” We are living in an era that is witnessing the rise of terrorist groups such as ISIS and state sponsored terrorism. It is no longer sufficient to deal with terrorism using traditional means. Mr. David Sanger, the moderator of the session, asked the following questions: What is the definition of terrorism? How can the international community contain or stop the cycle of terrorism? Can the international community offer an alternative model of societal order that reduces the appeal of terrorism?

Dr. Joseph Kéchichian from King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies stated that terrorism will continue and there is a “New Normal” that is creeping into our lives. So rephrasing the question, what can the international community do to contain terrorism? Is there a way to cope with challenges of terrorism? It is important to accept the dangers of terrorism because we are powerless in deterring people who are determined to sacrifice their own lives for terrorist acts. However, it is critical not to exaggerate the threats of terrorism. Can the international community offer an alternative model of social order? One approach is to reduce and abandon imperial conquests, torture, and meaningless drone assassinations. In other words, reducing brutality will help to end perpetual wars.

Dr. Alon Levkowitz from Bar-Ilan University mentioned several difficulties in the fight against terrorism. First is the disagreement surrounding the definition of terrorism. For instance, what is the
distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters? A second
difficulty is associated with the dual use of explosives. At present,
it is increasingly easy to make bombs from information found
on websites. Third, there is the issue of recruiting locals. Many
individuals, who have committed a terror attack, were recruited
from Europe or North America through the internet. This
relates to the fourth problem, when these individuals return to
their homelands and pose a threat to their own country. The
difficulties mentioned above in fighting terrorism render the
issue much more complex and difficult to solve.

Professor Ouyang Wei from the National Defense University
of the People’s Liberation Army in China, examined Chinese
perspective of terrorism and extremist ideology. He mentioned
the critics of China who argue that China has adopted the
language of terrorism by the international community and used it
to pursue a cleansing program against dissident groups. However,
terrorists pose threats to China as separatists and extremists seek
independence through terrorist acts and it should be dealt with
in two dimensions. First, it should be handled domestically to
prevent instability from secessionist movements. Second, China
should join the international community to counter international
terrorism.
Dr. James Przystup of the National Defense University in the U.S., emphasized terrorism, North Korea and the “New Normal.” He focused on state actors in terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism as evidenced by North Korea. Terrorist threats posed by North Korea fall in three categories. First, terrorist attacks directed against the North Korean people. The North Korean regime frequently commits human rights violations against its own people for submission. Second, terrorist attacks against the international community by evading sanctions and transferring nuclear technologies. Third, terrorist acts against South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. There have been attempts in the past to change the state’s internal dynamics but unfortunately, these efforts have not been very successful.
The moderator of the session, Prof. Kim Sang-Hyup, Visiting Professor at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) and Chairman of Coalition for Our Common Future, began the session titled “Living with Climate Change.” Explaining that severe draught was the dominant cause of the Syrian Civil War, which led to massive displacement, Prof. Kim reiterated that climate change is the biggest security challenge in our time. Mentioning the Paris Agreement, he stated that collective efforts to combat climate change have reached new levels and unprecedented challenges can be turned into new opportunities.

Prof. Christian Egenhofer, Associate Senior Research Fellow and Director of Energy Climate House at the Centre for European Policy Studies, stated that there is nothing new to report on climate change. It has been known for decades and even the Paris Agreement failed to achieve much. However, Prof. Egenhofer noted that the agreement made substantial achievements in terms of framework. The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was adopted and joint Chinese-U.S. leadership was founded in the process. Regarding the European Union, internal economic disruption was mentioned as a new feature. Technological improvements have led to fast, qualitative development on renewable energy reinforced by regulations and policies.

Next, Ms. Sarah Wade-Apicella, Programme Officer at the UNISDR, agreed that there is nothing new about the issue itself but raised new challenges to sustainable growth. The climate-
related natural disasters cause economic, social, health, cultural, and environmental losses by destroying unsustainable buildings, infrastructure and communities. Exposure of people and communities to natural disasters has increased faster than vulnerability has decreased. The loss is projected to increase to impede sustainable growth. But there are also positive signs. The increased exposure made people to take the issue more seriously and hold their government more accountable. Three major agreements were passed and are to be implemented: the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the Paris Agreement. Pointing out a people-centered, rights-based approach embedded in the three agreements, Ms. Apicella reiterates that it is important to coherently implement them both by developed and developing countries.
Finally, Mr. John Bruce Wells, the Program Director of USAID Low Emissions Asian Development (LEAD), noted cautious optimism as the “New Normal.” Mr. Wells distinguished the current era from the old of intensive political dialogues, scientific research and projections. The Paris Agreement succeeded in creating a virtuous cycle of commitment, reporting, and implementation. Once countries make a voluntary commitment, reporting is mandatory in the new framework. It is also noted that institutions are in place to encourage bilateral, regional, and global cooperation to improve each country’s capacity and to deliver its commitment. Mr. Wells found collective hope from the current framework and hoped it would be the beginning of advancing green growth all over the world.
Session 3, titled “Living with Nuclear Insecurity” explored the way the world is confronting, halting, and deterring nuclear technology proliferation. The moderator, Mr. William Tobey, Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, began with a reflection on the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine and the pros and cons of nuclear power. In the 21st century, nuclear energy inevitably runs society and the contemporary world.

Ambassador Abe Nobuyasu, Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission started off the discussion with the topic of nuclear terrorism. He noted that the four Nuclear Security Summit meetings have accomplished significant achievements. Specifically, there have been substantial efforts to reduce and contain nuclear bombs and fissile material throughout the world, minimizing the risk of nuclear terrorism. However, it is
necessary to remain cautious as nuclear threats are mounting. International efforts primarily focus on building legal frameworks against nuclear terrorism and reducing the amount of nuclear bomb and fissile materials available. In addition to these frameworks, it will be important to identify, control, and deter terrorists who pursue nuclear terrorism. Promoting international cooperation is crucial to tackling this highly challenging task. However, difficulties arise when differing views on who should be considered a terrorist obstructs international cooperation.

Dr. Park Jiyoung, Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, outlined two kinds of nuclear insecurity: military- or state-based nuclear insecurity and civil-based nuclear insecurity. Military-based nuclear threats arise when rogue states have a strong will for possessing nuclear weapons. Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is designed to block such efforts, Iran and North Korea’s recent activities have created doubts about its role and effectiveness. Civil-based nuclear insecurities arise due to the misuse of nuclear technology or materials, especially by terrorists. For both cases of nuclear insecurity, the most effective countermeasure will be to intervene at the stage of acquiring nuclear materials. Hence, Dr. Park recommended that the global security system should focus on detecting and managing nuclear materials. Another effective intervention could be the advancement of technology to restrict the transfer of sensitive information. However, this latter option merely delays the nuclear threat, rather than eliminating it.

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, suggested that the world has returned to a normalcy of chaos and instability, part of which involves getting used to increased nuclear threats. Warning signs of such a trend include Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear weapons and rejection of U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms reductions, China’s ambitious strategic modernization program and more assertive regional politics, North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear and missile programs, Pakistan and India’s actions to increase their fissile material stocks and missile capabilities, and rising interest in civil nuclear fuel cycle programs in Northeast Asia. The determined and concerted efforts of the international community will be
critical to preventing a world with increased nuclear insecurity and terrorism. Recommendations include having the U.S. and Russia pursue another bilateral agreement that reduces deployed strategic nuclear weapons, encouraging the international community to vigorously implement UN Security Council Resolution 2270 and convince North Korea to denuclearize, having the U.S. and China engage in strategic stability talks, and promoting key nuclear energy powers to consider safe approaches to meeting nuclear energy requirements without increasing nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.

During the question and answer session, panelists addressed what we have learned from the recent incident in Brussels and how we should address security issues internationally. Moreover, perspectives were shared on what should be the single highest nuclear security priority for nations, and the best mechanisms to achieve such objectives. The implications of Korea and Japan potentially both becoming threshold nuclear power states were also discussed.
Session 4, titled “The New Normal in Korea-Japan Relations,” discussed whether South Korea-Japan relations have finally arrived at a new level after the long-awaited summit meeting last November and the subsequent “comfort women” deal a month later. The panelists examined positive signs and factors to a rebounding ROK-Japan relationship, as well as potential obstacles to the bilateral relationship moving forward.

The moderator of the session, Ms. Anna Fifield, Tokyo Bureau Chief for The Washington Post, began by providing an overview of the recent developments in Korea-Japan relations, which has changed very much in the last six months. With the summit meeting and the “comfort women” deal giving green light to bureaucrats to work towards improving bilateral relations, the North Korean nuclear test acted as glue that brought the two nations closer regarding security cooperation. However, is this rosy situation the “New Normal” in ROK-Japan relationship, or is this just temporary?

Prof. Park Cheol Hee, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, noted that South Korea and Japan reaching the “comfort women” deal was a good sign, and implementation is now the issue. The U.S. constantly urging for a better bilateral relationship was also a positive factor, and the North Korean threat was indeed helping both states to discuss cooperation. In addition, people-to-people exchange has remained in good shape. He cautioned that there could be unexpected obstacles to implementing the deal properly and warned that it was a wrong move for Japan to be obsessed
with relocating the “comfort girl” statue. Also, now that the opposition party won the South Korean general election, Prof. Park said that we need to watch whether this result would work as a barrier to further improvements.

Next, Prof. Ren Xiao, Professor at Fudan University, agreed that the “comfort women” deal eliminated one obstacle to improved ROK-Japan relationship but we need to wait and see whether it will be fully implemented. He insisted that neighboring countries in the region are hoping to see Japan completely condemn its imperial past and its invasion campaign. If Japan can do so, Prof. Ren said that regional states would agree to leave history issues behind. He also stressed that Japanese politicians and the country as a whole should act more responsibly. Prof. Ren pointed out that the DPRK security threat and the presence of the U.S. are driving factors for enhanced ROK-Japan relationship.

Mr. Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow and Director of the program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, assessed that the ROK-Japan relationship has unfortunately changed from abnormal to old normal, not the “New Normal.” Progress to “New Normal” status, Mr. Snyder argued, depends on the implementation of the “comfort women” deal. He noted
that the majority of the Japanese people expects the deal will fail, but the South Korean view is divided along partisan lines. He also said that a good ROK-Japan relationship has become more important to the U.S. in the context of the rebalance, and the U.S. should also do more to foster a cooperative environment for bilateral cooperation as well as enhanced trilateralism.

Finally, Prof. Soeya Yoshihide, Professor at Keio University, noted that hypothetically the foundation of the “New Normal” in this bilateral relationship goes back to the 1990s. The “comfort women” issue was first officially raised, and there were efforts aimed at reconciliation between both governments during that period. He stressed that there are five levels in the complex structure of the ROK-Japan relationship. Fundamentalists, the public, practitioners and diplomats, the government, and politicians in South Korea and Japan were interacting with each other across the strait. For the national interest of both nations, as well as the regional and global order, Prof. Soeya emphasized that the ROK-Japan relationship is critical. He suggested that both governments should try once again to discuss and sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Concluding his comment, he stressed that Japan’s enhanced security role based on its right to self-defense should work as a plus to South Korea and the Korean Peninsula, but there is a chance that sections of the Japanese public and politicians might be reluctant to take on that positive role.
After President Park Geun-hye attended the 2015 Victory Day military parade in Beijing, many viewed it as a shift of Beijing’s policy towards the two Koreas. While the relations between China and South Korea have improved due to increasing economic and cultural ties, relations between China and North Korea have been strained with the new regime led by the young leader. In addition, China has been cooperating with the international community in imposing the UN Resolution 2270. Does this constitute a fundamental change in China’s policy towards the two Koreas or is it merely a strategic move to expand its influence in the region?

Professor Cheng Xiaohe from Renmin University of China stated that throughout history, China’s foreign policy towards the two Koreas has been a challenge. Although maintaining good relations with both Koreas is highly desirable, China has been swinging between the two, amid confrontations. Sino-North Korean relations has been strained in recent years due to North Korea’s continuous pursuit of nuclear weapons. Sino-South Korean relations have relatively improved as leaders between the two countries built good personal relationships. However, the relationship still remains uncertain and would depend on several factors, including the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and how the North Korean nuclear program evolves.

Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, mentioned that there have been changes in foreign policy towards the two Koreas. However,
China will remain cooperative with the international community to the extent that the UN sanctions or other measures do not cause instability. She added that, although China is between the two Koreas, it has made a clear choice. China has increasingly been viewing North Korea as a liability rather than an asset. Imposing new sanctions illustrate a great deal of frustration of China with North Korea. China would like to see North Korea make fundamental changes in its national strategy but its policy of stability as a precondition has not and will not change.

Professor Shin Jung-seung of Donseo University explained that South Korea and China have shown some kind of trust. However, the relations between the two countries should not be exaggerated. The improvement in ties seems to be based primarily on interests rather than affinity. If the two have observed any changes in policy, it is a technical one confined to the nuclear issue. China continues to maintain its policy towards North Korea and Prof. Shin is not yet confident that China will fully implement the sanctions of Resolution 2270.
Responding to the criticism of China’s enforcement of sanctions, Professor Wang Dong from Peking University stated that China has two intertwined goals: denuclearization and stability. These goals have featured consistently in China’s policy and China has been strictly enforcing sanctions. However, disagreements exist because China views the collapse of North Korea differently from its U.S. and South Korean counterparts. In his view, South Korea and the U.S. seem to underestimate the negative consequences of collapse, whereas China takes a more cautious approach.
ASAN PLENUM 2016

SESSION 4

Date  | April 27, 2016
Time  | 13:30-15:00
Place | Grand Ballroom III

Next Chapter in Korea-U.S. Relations

Moderator
Alastair Gale
The Wall Street Journal

Speakers
Victor Cha
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Edwin Feulner
The Heritage Foundation
Kim Sung-han
Korea University
Yamaguchi Noboru
International University of Japan

The moderator of the session, Mr. Alastair Gale, Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal in Seoul, opened Session 4, titled “Next Chapter in Korea-U.S. Relations” by providing an overview on developments of the bilateral relationship in the economic and security spheres. Mr. Gale asked the speakers what should and can be done to develop the relationship further.

Dr. Victor Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, began by stating two views of the alliance. One is transactional, measuring its utility by benefits to security. The other way is to see it as an institution with halo effects. Hence, the utility of the alliance is measured in non-security aspects. The benefits can be both exclusive like, the FTA and inclusive, like development assistance, Peace Corps operations, and non-proliferation. Dr. Cha argued that the ROK-U.S. alliance should be developed in the latter way. Regarding the next phase of the relationship, Dr. Cha highlighted the importance of fostering individuals to function as an organic piece of the relationship and cooperating on new security areas like cyber space in the post 9/11 era. Regarding the implications of elections, though domestic politics are the biggest variable that can change the alliance, Dr. Cha remained optimistic on finding common ground on the DPRK following the example of coordination between the Roh and Bush administrations.

Next, Dr. Edwin Feulner, Chairman of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, noted that the two countries have made remarkable achievements in the economic sphere since they signed the KORUS FTA. As for the upcoming election in
Washington, Congress was brought to attention. 46 senators were newly elected in the last six years, from 2008 to 2014. Compared to those elected in the previous term from 2002 to 2008, they are less aware of international politics, as their campaign focus has moved to the size of government expenditure for national security right after 9/11. Regarding the presidential election, though contentious claims are being made, Dr. Feulner expected more serious discussion on policies after July.

Prof. Kim Sung-han, Professor and Director of Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, stated that the bilateral relationship has been evolving into a strategic alliance, broadening in scope. Two schools of thought in Seoul were introduced
regarding increasing regional rivalries with China. One was the “Concert of Asia,” and the other was “U.S.-led Asia Order.” The Park administration chose the latter, putting the highest priority on the ROK-U.S. alliance. Looking beyond reunification of the peninsula, Prof. Kim expected a huge power vacuum in the region with U.S. forces withdrawn. To advance the relationship in the long term, the U.S. needs to manage the alliance to prevent a power transition to China.

Finally, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Yamaguchi Noboru, Professor at the International University of Japan, noted that South Korea should play a more prominent role for a number of reasons: 1) its developed economy; 2) advanced military capabilities; and 3) unique international position based on close relationship both with the U.S. and China and full support from Japan for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul also has the higher moral ground over DPRK with a matured democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech. The alliance can play an essential role in the following areas: 1) securing peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula; 2) achieving a nuclear free peninsula; 3) conducting international operations; and 4) preparing for various scenarios of reunification.
Plenary Session 4, titled “Same Old New North Korea?” explored the challenges of dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, as well as the larger security challenges in Northeast Asia. The moderator of the session, Mr. Christopher Nelson, Sr. Vice President and Editor at Samuels International Associates, began by asserting that the North Korean situation has persisted for many years with no substantial solutions in sight. He opened the discussion with the question of whether a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests is possible, if that means accepting them as a nuclear power.

Ambassador Bessho Koro of Japan contrasted with North Korea today versus where it was in the 1990s. The difference now, he argued, is that there is no ambivalence on the North Korean position, thus making it easier for the international community to respond to any belligerent actions. Yet while some people argue for negotiations, there first needs to be a collective vision on where those negotiations should lead. Amb. Bessho also recalled the agreement between Kim Jong-il and Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002 and claimed that, while North Korea has broken nearly all of those promises, Japan still hopes to hold them to their claims.

Next, Amb. Chun Yungwoo, Senior Advisor at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, stressed that North Korea’s strategic calculations must change if denuclearization is to be achieved. In order to do this, the sanctions regime needs to be expanded to include all state owned companies, not just ones exporting coal or minerals. The U.S. should also use secondary boycotts to strengthen financial
measures against the North in order to cut them off from the international banking system. Concerning South Korea’s missile defense system, Amb. Chun argued in favor of strengthening it, claiming that a stronger missile defense system would allow South Korea to not have to depend on a preemptive strike for defense.

Dr. Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, emphasized that sanctions take a long time to reach their full effect. For
Iran, sanctions took years before negotiations became possible. The first priority now has to be further implementation of the sanctions regime to bring North Korea to the negotiation table. Acceptable terms for negotiations cannot include accepting North Korea as a nuclear state. Dr. Samore argued that North Korea does not have the credibility to threaten the United States with an ICBM, but further deterrence is needed to prevent conventional threats against South Korea.

Finally, Mr. Yang Xiyu, Senior Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, argued that China has put forth a list of restricted items banned from being exported to the DPRK. He claimed that China-North Korea relations have reached a low
point because North Korea has threatened the peace in Northeast Asia with their provocative actions. However, he argued against the efficacy of a missile defense system in South Korea. What North Korea really wants, he argued, is economic development.

During the question and answer session, Dr. Samore stated that any freezing of fissile material production would have to involve international inspections of secret North Korean facilities. Amb. Chun ended the session by stating that he hoped it was possible to change North Korean behavior without changing the regime, but he was not optimistic for such an outcome. If North Korea continues its current behavior, regime change may become the only viable option.
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### Speakers by Country in 2016 (number of persons)

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### Speakers by Country in 2016 (%)

- USA: (32.8)
- Korea: (19.4)
- China: (14.9)
- Europe + Russia: (14.9)
- Japan: (10.4)
- Middle East: (4.5)
- Southeast Asia: (3.0)
- Others: (7.5)

### Speakers by Category in 2016 (number of persons)

- Business/Private Organization: 45
- Government/Embassy: 3
- Asan: 7
- Think Tank/Research Institute: 22
- University: 10

### Total Participation in 2016 (%)

- Asan: (4.9)
- Overseas Observer: (0.7)
- Speaker: (13.9)
- Press: (20.3)
- Public: (60.1)