NEW WORLD DISORDER

Proceedings
April 30 - May 1, 2013

THE ASAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
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Greetings from the President

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the Asan Plenum 2013.

This year’s Plenum, titled “New World Disorder,” brings together more than 200 leading experts, policymakers, scholars, and members of the media for two days to share their insights into the future of the international order.

Our time is characterized by unprecedented instability and uncertainty. North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions threaten regional security and the global nonproliferation regime. The political upheaval of the Arab Spring has precipitated conflicts from Syria to Mali.

The Eurozone crisis, America’s debt crisis, and Japan’s decades-long decline have left the old financial order in tatters while highlighting democracy’s shortcomings in managing economic challenges. Authoritarian governments increasingly espouse the virtues of “state capitalism” while new mechanisms of global governance, from the BRICS to the G20, proliferate.

This year’s Plenum will examine the cause and nature of the new world disorder while attempting to glimpse the shape of a newly emerging international order.

Thank you for joining us and we look forward to your intellectual contribution and fellowship throughout the Plenum.

Sincerely,

Hahn Chaibong
President
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
The Asan Plenum is a yearly gathering of the world’s leading experts and scholars to discuss the pressing challenges facing the world. The plenum is a multi-day, multi-session conference organized by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. In addressing the most pressing challenges facing the world with expertise from around the globe, the Asan Plenum aims to impact the policy making process enabling the global community to better deal with the challenges it faces.

Asan Plenum 2013: “New World Disorder”

At the end of the first Gulf War, United States President George H. W. Bush famously declared that the international community was on the cusp of a “new world order.” Freed from the hostilities and anachronisms of the Cold War, the twenty-first century promised to usher in a new era of global cooperation and prosperity. Yet even as some scholars proclaimed the ‘End of History’ and the triumph of a liberal international order, others were already forecasting the chaos and instability that they believed was to come.

The world today has changed much since President Bush uttered those hopeful words. Indeed, open great power conflict has almost become a relic of the twentieth-century. Many countries, perhaps none more so than Korea, have prospered under the liberal free-market economic order of the past twenty years. Economic integration has given us the European Union as well as countless multilateral free trade agreements. And technological progress has transformed the world, producing remarkable innovations in every field of research, and improving the lives of billions of people. In many regards, the world has never been freer, safer, or more prosperous.

Yet, this new world order is also characterized by unprecedented instability and uncertainty. The American unipolar moment has long since given way to the dramatic rise of China and newly-emerging great powers. This generation’s greatest financial crisis continues to stifle global economic recovery while the old economic centers of Europe and Japan appear to be in irreversible decline. The Middle East and North Africa is in the midst of the greatest political upheaval and change since the end of colonialism. And, most significantly, at a time when many are increasingly questioning the very future of the current international order, the world appears leaderless. This is a time when real leadership and visionary ideas are most needed.

The 2013 Plenum will bring together distinguished experts and scholars to share their insights into the nature and implications of the current world order and prospects for the emergence of a new one.
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies was founded with a mission to become an independent think tank that provides effective policy solutions to issues which are critical to Korea, East Asia, and the rest of the world.

The Institute aims to foster wide-ranging and in-depth public discussions which are essential for a healthy society. By focusing on areas including foreign affairs, national security, public governance, energy, and the environment, it strives to address some of the major challenges that our society faces today.

The Institute addresses these challenges not only by supplying in-depth policy analysis but also by endeavoring to promote a global and regional environment favorable to peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

In addition to policy analysis and research, the Institute undertakes the training of specialists in public diplomacy and related areas in an effort to contribute to Korea’s ability to creatively shape its own future.
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Opening Ceremony
Date: April 30, 2013
Time: 09:30-10:10
Place: Regency Room
Opening Remarks
by Dr. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute

Good morning everyone. Welcome to the 2013 Asan Plenum. My name is Hahm Chaibong, the president of the Institute. It’s great to have all of you here today. Sorry for ruining the morning with this video about the disorder that we face currently in the world. When we decided on this title a year ago, actually, the world seemed pretty disorderly then. I am sorry to say that it doesn’t look all that much orderly a year hence, and again, I think the world bore out our belief that we are in very difficult times. I think the sense of disorder, you will appreciate—especially for those of us living in this part of the world—has only increased in recent days and years. So I really do hope and believe with the incredible experience and brainpower gathered here today and tomorrow, that we will be able to seriously tackle some of these issues and perhaps come up with some creative solutions for the disorder that is bedeviling us for such a long time now.

Now I have the honor and privilege of introducing the speaker for the opening remarks. He is none other than Dr. Chung Mong Joon, the founder of our Institute and the honorary chairman of the Institute as well. For those of you who know him well, I will just go through some of his achievements. He is a seven-term member of the National Assembly. That makes him the most senior member—I hate to use that word, it has many implications, but again, not age-wise, but he is the most often elected member of the National Assembly as a seven-term assemblyman. He is a student of international politics; he has a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins SAIS. We have some SAIS mafia members here today as I understand. He was the vice president of FIFA for 17 years. He brought the World Cup to South Korea, the 2002 World Cup. But, as I also like to say, his greatest achievement is establishing the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. I am eternally grateful to him for that. So, would you please join me in warmly welcoming Dr. Chung Mong Joon.
This morning, please allow me to tell you why democracy looks vulnerable to economic and security crises. Unable or unwilling to undertake the necessary but painful reforms, leading economies of the world are adopting beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Stringent austerity measures imposed on less-developed countries in the name of market discipline do not seem to apply to the advanced countries. However, I believe that the inability of the global economy to lift itself out of the current crisis and the inability of democracy to undertake fundamental reforms are only temporary glitches in the system. They are not signs of fundamental flaws in the market economy and liberal democracy.

These days some of us also worry that in times of national security crisis, limitations of liberal democracy become even more apparent. So, Sir Halford Mackinder, the founding father of geopolitics, said, “Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so.” He also lamented that instead of reckoning with reality, the democrat too often thinks in principles, ideas, and morality. However, once democracy decides to act, it does so with a sense of purpose.

South Korea has been slow to respond to the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. North Korea may mistake our inaction for weakness. However, our democracy has the strength to rouse itself to action, to show our will and resolve, and to defeat the existential threat to our cherished values of liberal democracy. In order to prevent the unthinkable situation developed on the Korean Peninsula, we need to think the unthinkable. I hope that the deliberations of the Asan Plenum will help us discover ways to overcome the disorder and the crises. Thank you very much.

고맙습니다.

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Keynote Speech
by Dr. Stephen Krasner,
Graham H. Stuart Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

The clarity of the Cold War with its neat division between the communist and capitalist worlds, and not so neat addition of the non-aligned or third world is over. There will be no grand strategy that guides the behavior of the United States or any other great power. Different strategies will be followed across different issue areas. There may be a global disruption, but if it occurs it will not be because of structural factors, deep underlying causes that could not be managed. If disorder does occur it will be the result of a black swan, a concatenation of low probability events with high impact that could not be predicted in advance with any confidence.

The stability of the global order and the prosperity of its individual member states will be determined by how well three basic sets of issues are addressed: first, the changing power distribution in the international system; second, the provision of global governance; and third the ability of actors with limited underlying resources—malevolent states, states with limited governance capacity, and transnational terrorist organizations—to use weapons of mass destruction to threaten entities with much greater resources. The first issues, most clearly reflected in the rise of China, can be managed. The second can, in most instances, be addressed through a series of agreements among coalitions of the willing. The third poses the greatest risks to the stability of the international order. A black swan could appear out of the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and perverse or weak political systems. [...]
**Gala Dinner**

Date: April 30, 2013  
Time: 19:00-21:00  
Place: Grand Ballroom II
New World Disorder

Moderator: Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Speakers: Jia Qingguo, Peking University
Douglas Paal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
James Steinberg, Syracuse University
Tanaka Akihiko, Japan International Cooperation Agency
Rapporteur: Victoria Tuke, Tokyo Foundation

The first plenary session addressed the central theme of the Asan Plenum 2013: “New World Disorder.” At a time when the world appears at once freer, safer and more prosperous than ever before in history, instability and uncertainty continue to present state leaders and citizens with causes for concern. The world can often appear leaderless, just when visionary direction and ideas are urgently needed. With this in mind, Hahm Chaibong, president of the Asan Institute, posed such questions as: “How durable is the Liberal Democratic Order?” “Are we entering a unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or indeed non-polar world?” and “What are the greatest challenges to the future of international peace and security in the next decade?”

To begin the plenary session, Jia Qingguo, professor and associate dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, took a relatively optimistic perspective in response to the above questions, stating that the world is always in some form of “disorder.” Professor Jia noted the fact that with no large-scale war, either hot or cold, and the gradual spread of shared values such as free markets and human rights, we are not currently living in a “disorderly world.” Despite realists predicting trouble, the United States and China are increasingly seeking common ground and, if looked at from a long-term perspective, the gap between the rising power of China and established hegemon, the United States, is narrowing. China has embraced the existing world order, increasingly aware that cybersecurity, for example, is an important issue. Meanwhile, the United States has not launched a policy of “containment.”

Nevertheless, there are many serious challenges that also characterize the current world order, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), climate change, and domestic power transitions in states such as China, which face “dual identities”: being both a developed and developing country, an ordinary as well as a superpower. China is facing challenges in how to operate a coherent policy in such fields as climate change as at the same time economic growth is slowing. This complicates how China interacts with the outside world and requires, according to Professor Jia, the international community to be patient as China negotiates its future global role. Domestic politics dominate the focus of China’s leaders so tackling global issues has not been considered a priority.

In addition to China, the United States and Japan, the world’s first and third largest economies respectively, face challenges. The United States remains mired in domestic political issues and the question of history continues to plague Japanese foreign policy, according to Professor Jia. There is therefore, a “leadership deficit.” Professor Jia concluded his remarks by confirming the durability of the US-led liberal-democratic order and maintenance of a unipolar world system, at least in the short-run. He stressed the importance of US leadership, noting that it will be some time before we can discuss true systemic change. He voiced the need for China to act with caution, appreciating the limits of its power and the imperative of further trust-building through successful cooperation.

Douglas Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, continued the largely optimistic outlook, noting the improvement in Sino-US relations from late-2010. When Xi Jinping...
These varieties of disorder are characterized by 1) movements beyond sovereignty, 2) interaction among traditional sovereigns, and 3) conditions lacking effective sovereignty. The European crisis for example, has been spurred by poor management of the monetary union and division of responsibility among sovereign states for the health of the union as a whole. Despite continued improvisation and “muddling through” by states, Dr. Tanaka noted that the prospect of a “United States of Europe” has not been entirely disbanded and many uncertainties remain. For example, how will the German people respond to further calls for financial bailouts by other Eurozone countries, how will relations develop in the long-run between the Eurozone bloc and other European Union members, and will the United Kingdom remain in the EU? Regarding inter-state relations in Asia, territorial disputes are raising tensions and the potential conflict between states. And in the case of the “dry region” from Afghanistan to the Sahel in Africa, transnational extremists are penetrating and striking out from areas where there is no order.

During the discussion between panelists and the audience, in response to a question from the floor regarding the cause of the recent convergence in US-China relations, North Korea was identified as key. As Professor Jia explained, whilst previously Sino-North Korea relations rested on shared ideology, a common enemy (the United States) and North Korea’s geographic position as a useful strategic buffer zone, over time these arguments have become less convincing. China hoped the successor to Kim Jong-il would be more responsible but has in fact found North Korea’s behavior more provocative and unpredictable.

Dr. Hahm concluded from the views of the panelists that there are no easy solutions to today’s “new
US Pivot to Asia

Christopher Nelson, senior vice president of Samuels International Associates, Inc., argued that there has been too much emphasis on establishing the pivot as a theory, when in actuality it is a policy meant to shift US psychology to where the future and growth potential would be determined.

Shen Dingli, professor and associate dean at Fudan University, explained that China welcomes US rebalancing, when such an effort facilitates peace and stability. He argued that even before the term was coined, the US enacted a “rebalance” when it deployed the USS George Washington to the Yellow Sea in the wake of the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. This arguably deterred North Korea from launching another attack amid rising tensions and stabilized the situation on the peninsula. In this way, not all US rebalancing is negative or adverse to Chinese interests. However there is still uncertainty in China regarding what the term means. China is focused on changes in the East Asia security architecture that is against Chinese interests. The United States maintains that these developments are not aimed against China. However there is a great deal of skepticism in Beijing about this claim and so the country is building its capacity to hedge against the destabilizing effect of the rebalance or pivot. Professor Shen also explained that the US drawdown in the Middle East made more resources available for East Asia, where new circumstances are emerging. Though the United States is claiming a Chinese resurgence in the South China Sea, China has from 1947 made claims over all the disputed rocks. Whereas China considers these rocks part of its territory and views the actions of the Philippines and Vietnam as encroachment, the United States seems to align against Chinese interests on this matter.

Walter Lohman, director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, argued that US policy toward Asia is generally a bipartisan issue and that the pivot is an expression of commitment to the region.
The Bush administration also made many statements about the importance of the region and made frequent visits. Mr. Lohman noted however that the Asia pivot is under-resourced. A disconnect is already evident with regard to the US shipbuilding budget and the Navy’s longstanding goal of getting to 300 ships. Shipbuilding has declined in the past few years and in the long term is likely to fall short of the Navy’s goal. Furthermore, although the United States will sustain its ability to make good on its commitments to South Korea during a war on the Korean Peninsula, the sequester makes it difficult for the US to engage in multi-front conflicts. In this way, the Obama policy is truly a pivot because assets will be pulled from other regions to be committed to Asia. Whether the United States will actually pull assets from the Persian Gulf and place them in the western Pacific however is still questionable. Mr. Lohman then disagreed with the position that the pivot is overly focused on the military. The reason some incorrectly perceive the policy as such is because changes in the military are easiest to grasp. The Obama administration is focused on trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), however trade agreements require much longer lead times than shifts in military posture. Furthermore, significant efforts have been made diplomatically to advance US relationships with Southeast Asia and to build a regional architecture. Finally, another misperception of the Asia pivot is that it is all about China. As the TPP demonstrates, the trade component is aimed elsewhere. Mr. Lohman admitted however that although the policy is not entirely about China, it is in part a response to Chinese actions in the region, which the United States considers provocative.

James M. Lindsay, vice president and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained that the rebalance remains a work in progress. And there is a risk that it may get derailed. He noted five broad challenges to the policy. First, there is a fundamental vagueness about the concept. Although the policy highlights where US focus should be placed, it does not define what the United States should try to achieve. Not only is there a lack of consensus on what the US policy should seek with respect to China’s role in the region, it is also uncertain whether countries in the region will share this vision. The second challenge is that although Washington may want to deemphasize the Middle East in US foreign policy, the region may not be inclined to let go of the United States. Oil remains a significant interest and terrorism a prime threat. The US may have to remain engaged in this region, which will prohibit it from investing more resources in Asia. A third challenge is that the rebalance is misaligned with US budgetary and domestic political realities. Although the administration is right to emphasize that the rebalance is a political and economic concept, much of US political power is founded on its military strength. US spending on defense at best will remain flat, but is more likely to decrease. Citizens are unlikely to give up social programs for greater defense spending. The fourth challenge to the Asia pivot is the historical animosity among US allies. Shifting from a focus on bilateral to multilateral cooperation is difficult as US allies in the region lack a history of working together. It is unlikely that South Korea-Japan relations will improve in the short term. Finally, a fifth challenge will be a nuanced Chinese diplomacy that may compound the difficulties the United States faces in advancing this policy. Despite these obstacles, Dr. Lindsay noted that questions regarding US ability to follow through on its Asia policy has obscured the reality that the United States maintains a massive military strength and that its gross domestic product remains astonishing. The imbalance between the existing US power and the rest of the world is huge.

Chung Jae Ho, professor of international relations at Seoul National University, noted that since the notion of “axis of evil,” no other concept has been more controversial in the region than the Asia pivot. From South Korea’s perspective, this is particularly true because of China’s significance in the policy. Dr. Chung argued that there is a wide range of areas where the stage has been set for US-Sino confrontation. There is obvious dissonance in the rhetoric, military development, and normative values of the two countries. China continues to declare a peaceful rise as if the US rebalance is unnecessary. Militarily however China has been reinforcing its anti-access and area denial capabilities while the US has advanced the concept of air-sea battle. The US Marine deployment to Darwin, naval visits to Singapore, improvement in relations with Southeast Asian countries, and redistribution of naval forces from a 50-50 to 60-40 split in favor of the Pacific versus Atlantic oceans represents a military dimension to the pivot or rebalances that is also seen as setting the stage for US-Sino conflict. Dr. Chung does not attribute the potential for conflict entirely to the pivot. He noted discourse on China’s march west, new Silk Road, and a Chinese pivot to the Middle East as contributing to unease in the region, and that an action-reaction cycle between the two countries is creating an alarming picture. Countries in the region question how long the United States will be able to deny, delay, or deter China’s complete control of the area, and whether the Asia pivot is making a potential threat into a real enemy. In this way, while the policy is reassuring, it may also enhance the likelihood of conflict.

Kurt M. Campbell, chairman and CEO of the Asia Group, explained that language around the pivot or rebalance has been a source of great anxiety for US government officials. Terminology aside, the overall approach of President Obama and Secretary Clinton was inspired by a profound recognition that Asia would determine the world’s future and that the United States needed to adjust its policy accordingly. It was a recognition that the twenty-first century would be more about the Asia-Pacific than any other
region of the world, but that the US remained in a very expensive detour. The administration understood
that the US needed to reposition itself strategically and exert more effort in Asia. Dr. Campbell also
noted that much of the pivot and rebalance had unintended consequences and inspired misinterpretations.
There exists a combination of both true and purposeful misunderstanding in US-Sino relations. The US
is neither vacating the Middle East, nor diminishing the importance of cooperation with Europe. Finally,
although the pivot may be perceived as primarily involving the military, it is a strategy that is over-
whelmingly diplomatic.

Moderator Joseph Sternberg, editorial page writer for the
Wall Street Journal Asia, set the tone of the
discussion by highlighting the importance of understanding the 2008 financial crisis, a predominantly
“Western” phenomenon, from the perspective of Asia. The panelists spoke of the impact of the 2008
financial crisis on Asia, each representing a different country.

Yang Xuedong, deputy director and senior research fellow at the Center for Global Governance and
Development, CCTB, led off the panel with a Chinese perspective, stating, “We [the Chinese] are not
capitalists, we are socialists … [but] socialists with capitalist characteristics.” Though China has a
socialist predisposition, Dr. Yang was keen to emphasize that the country, as a whole, has come to recog-
nize the positive correlation between economic growth and capital and entrepreneurship. According to
Dr. Yang, in the last 30 years, such traits have been mobilized by three pillars of the country: capitalists,
the state, and society. He elaborated on the changes to the three pillars since the crisis.

Since 2008, many capitalists, for want of product demand and better streams of capital, have left China.
The state has tried to adjust to capital flight through revenue and tax reforms; however, according to Dr.
Yang, it was the local (state) governments that had real success in attracting capitalists back. As for
society, there was less of a sudden change and more of an intensification of civil society’s call for better
working conditions. After 30 years of reform, new issues, other than economic matters, have risen to the
surface: inequality, labor rights, and the like. Advocates of some of these issues are fundamentally opposed
to the capitalist system. Furthermore, Dr. Yang added, public protests are on the rise and social unrest
has increased.

However, despite capitalism and its discontents at the national level, there is a new and quite different
type of capitalist emerging in China: local capitalists. These new capitalists, Dr. Yang emphasized, have good relationships with, and a solid understanding of, local society. This has precipitated a larger movement of “homeward capitalist flight.” And with “the return of capitalists to their hometowns,” noted Dr. Yang, “a new capital base” has been created. Thus, he reasoned, “The state will need to pay closer attention to local demands.”

Natalia Soebagjo, executive director of the University of Indonesia’s Centre for the Study of Governance, pointed out from the beginning of her speech that crisis is nothing new to Indonesia. The reform measures adopted following the crisis in 1997 allowed Indonesia to respond quickly in 2008, with little harm to the national economy. Ms. Soebagjo also indicated that Indonesia’s separation from the American economy, which was different from other highly connected countries in East Asia, softened the impact of the crisis.

But instead of focusing only on 1997 and 2008, Ms. Soebagjo took the opportunity to point out Indonesia’s post-Suharto micro-crisis. At the macro-level, she was keen to stress, Indonesia’s economy is doing splendidly. But beneath the surface, corrupt local elites, an unfavorable business environment, and a struggling public sector prevent Indonesia from consolidating its democracy and implementing more market-friendly economic policies. Fifteen years after Suharto’s fall, noted Ms. Soebagjo, “we are still facing immense challenges.” She continued, “Though we have tried to fight corruption, our CPI [corruption index] has stagnated … our HDI is below average, and there have been only minor improvements in the public sector.” Despite efforts to improve the business environment, there has been little progress.

Ms. Soebagjo contrasted two overarching viewpoints: one positive and one negative. The optimistic view understands the changes as natural growing pains in the process of democratic consolidation. “[If] you are taking the optimistic view,” she noted, then “the scope of participation and the cleaning up of politics is underway.” On the contrary, “if you are looking at Indonesia from the perspective of the glass half empty, then you are seeing an oligarchic democracy. With corruption so deep, there can be no improving of the situation.” The pessimistic perspective sees pervasive collusion, an inept government, a faltering bureaucracy and negative prospects for future growth. Ms. Soebagjo concluded that above all, Indonesians are worried that they “are moving away from liberal democracy and free market system towards [a system wherein] power is concentrated with local elites.” If true, this phenomenon “is bad for democracy and is weakening the state.”

Jennifer Oh, assistant professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans University, speaking about the post-2008 political and social environment in Japan, emphasized one factor above others: continuity. Professor Oh pointed to the gap between public rhetoric and actual policy, political promises and what citizens are actually demanding. Using the political science concept of “distributive differentiated politics have prevented significant economic or political reform in Japan. She emphasized that, minor changes notwithstanding, “there is little evidence suggesting Japan will move away from a heavy emphasis on distributive politics.”

Recent changes mostly represent a difference in rhetoric. Before the crisis, there was much talk of market reform, such as big bang financial reforms and reform of the postal service. After the crisis, rhetoric has focused on putting “people’s lives first,” said Professor Oh. Both parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), have emphasized increases in welfare services. Though the rhetoric may change, the government’s strategy has remained constant: heavy government spending. For example, in 2009, the DPJ government’s budget reached a historic high.

Overall, one would be hard pressed to find significant differences in the spending structures of the LDP and the DPJ, Professor Oh stressed. For example, the 2009 campaign strategies for the two parties were very similar. The reluctance of both parties to increase the consumption tax is a clear illustration of a lack of party differentiation. Thus, Professor Oh pointed out, “irrespective of whether the government pushes for reform, it maintains a high level of spending.” Distributive politics is to blame here, she added. Moreover, “unless Japanese political leaders are willing to go against traditional interest sectors, there can be little structural change. Japanese capitalism is very resilient.”

Professor Oh ended by noting that despite the better efforts of Shinzo Abe, and his reform platform known colloquially as “Abenomics,” political parties have continued to support the funneling of funds to uncompetitive industries and special interests groups (e.g., agriculture and construction) whilst politicians, responding to the demands of voters, continue to ensure that no structural adjustments are made to Japan’s welfare state.

Lastly, Mo Jongryn, senior research fellow at the Asan Institute and vice president for international
affairs at Yonsei University, focusing on his native Korea, spoke of an economic blast from the past. Despite the pro-liberalization policies and disposition of the Lee Myung-bak government, Professor Mo detects a significant, and highly progressive/populist, shift in the orientiation of the new government under Park Geun-hye. Park’s economic agenda is, according to Professor Mo, “a radical departure from Lee’s economic policies of free trade, deregulation, privatization, and classic market reforms.” Professor Mo noted that “analysts may wonder what happened to the conservative party,” and why “Lee and Park seem as if they come from different parties.” But looking at the situation as such is a poor reading of South Korean politics, according to Professor Mo. “I argue that Korea hasn’t changed since the 1960s. If you look at conservative politicians, you cannot find anyone who supports free market reforms.” What accounts for this faulty reading is the “shift towards what has been traditionally understood as progressive economics and politics.”

Pointing to Korea’s culture-based antipathy towards free market principles, Professor Mo explained that the public’s call, and the government’s support, for a transition to a European-like welfare model should not be all that surprising. Despite the current trend, Professor Mo is confident that the need to maintain export-competitiveness, “the only thing Koreans know how to do,” will soon induce renewed support for free-market policies and the American model more generally, despite the government’s anti-free market policy predisposition.

During the Q&A session, Dr. Eberstadt asked whether the ongoing discussion of the OECD welfare state problem has informed people on the issue in East Asia. To his inquiry, Professor Mo responded that as far as Korea is concerned, it does not matter much, because, “once Korean industries start falling behind, there will be a call for a return to export-lead, free-market supporting policies.”

Another member from the audience raised the issue of social effects. He voiced concern about the trend of “convergence in accepting and implementing neoliberal policies.” These policies, according to the gentleman making the point, “argue that when the state wants to reform they must spend less on public sectors, reduce taxes on the rich, increase taxes on the poor, privatize, and so forth.” He then asked whether or not this is the price to pay for the “greater good.”

To the inquiry about the social effects of neoliberal policies, Professor Oh responded that she is not so sure Japan is following the convergence model. The problem in Japan, she added, is “political parties battling to dole out more money.” Ms. Soebagjo added that in Indonesia government subsidy policies are a consistent point of discussion. “The government and basically all academics are united in the belief that fuel subsidies should be reconsidered,” a position that the public, especially the poor and middle class, strongly oppose. She noted that the government, instead of making a rational decision, bends to the gust of popular feeling, because the state is relatively weak.

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**SESSION 1**

**Date:** April 30, 2013  
**Time:** 12:30-13:45  
**Place:** Grand Ballroom III

**East Asian Economic Regionalism**

**Moderator:**  
Lee Chang Jae, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

**Speakers:**
  - Ahn Dukgeun, Seoul National University
  - Nakajima Tomoyoshi, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia
  - Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University
  - Zhao Quansheng, American University

**Rapporteur:**  
Kyle Cassily, Seoul National University

Economic regionalism in East Asia has entered a new era with new rounds of talks putting emphasis on two different frameworks for cooperation. The rise of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) frameworks has signaled recent improvements in the region’s economic integration, while bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) talks have increased, including those between China and Korea. Lee Chang Jae, visiting fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, noted that the importance of the TPP has risen recently with Japan’s announcement that it will join negotiations. He then asked the panel for their opinions regarding the potential for cooperation or competition between the two frameworks and the prospects for each in the near future.

Ahn Dukgeun, adjunct professor at Seoul National University School of Law, opened by stating that economists had only recently concluded that a significant portion of East Asia economic integration was realized in the global supply chain, when suddenly the region had “two mega-FTAs” competing in RCEP and TPP. In the past several years, the region has seen an explosion of proposals for various kinds of economic integration, including efforts by ASEAN to conclude FTAs with six countries. ASEAN has been working toward moving under one umbrella of FTAs, which Dr. Ahn believed would help make progress toward broader integration. With the rise of the various FTA talks, economic integration has turned into a chess game that will ultimately determine the feasibility of the idea.

Dr. Ahn stressed that a key consideration of the RCEP versus TPP debate is that its members overlap, thus making a two-track approach seem nonsensical. “TPP is serious economic integration, setting a new model for the coming future,” he said. RCEP’s aim toward integration, however, has been lower. Dr. Ahn argued that broad economic integration faces significant challenges from strategic rivalries, such as the current impasse between Korea and Japan that has tempered talks of a trilateral Northeast Asia FTA.
One key to success will be the fate of China-Korea FTA talks, which could alter how other countries view the way forward. Dr. Ahn concluded with a bit of optimism. He put East Asian economic regionalism in historical context, reminding the audience that only five years ago the idea was just a theory.

Nakajima Tomoyoshi, senior research fellow in the Research Division at the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, delineated the key differences between the RCEP and TPP, calling the latter “a 21st-century FTA” that extends beyond trade of goods in services, investments, intellectual property rights, and reform. The advanced aspects of the TPP make it impossible for China to presently enter negotiations, which causes it to emphasize the RCEP, which is focused on trade goods alone. He stressed the importance of Chinese inclusion, although noting that Japan is amenable to both frameworks. One problem area, however, is the current state of China-Japan relations, which have floundered over territorial disputes, leading to the cancellation of key summits in the past few years. The importance of FTAs to China, though, was shown in its desire to continue minister-level meetings between the two nations on FTA issues, while other kinds of working-level meetings were cancelled due to the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands dispute.

Referencing his 2004 book *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism*, Gilbert Rozman, Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, said that he has become more pessimistic about economic regionalism in the past few years. Professor Rozman argued that East Asian regionalism must be looked at in the broader context of economics, security, and culture or identity. Economists have argued that economics can be conducted separately from the other two factors with significant progress toward regionalism. But Professor Rozman explained history has shown that it is impossible to keep economics separate. He cited the US insistence in the 1990s that most-favored-nation status should be linked to human rights. And China has been increasingly linking economics to other issues, such as its suspension of rare-earth minerals trade to Japan in 2010 as punishment. China has been increasingly willing to use its economic clout to achieve its goals, a tactic to which South Korea was introduced with two battles over garlic trade. “Koreans know how intense Chinese pressure can be when you act against Chinese interests,” Professor Rozman said.

While he noted the difficulties, Professor Rozman concluded that the TPP’s prospects were not low due to US emphasis on economic issues in its rebalancing toward Asia. The US rebalance has a significant economic portion that will push Chinese development toward economic reform. It will also champion efforts for transparency in China, less protection of state enterprises, and a reduction in the theft of intellectual property. “There’s a new sense of the importance of the TPP as a strategy to reshape economic ties with an Asia-Pacific component and bring China along in stages,” he said. Professor Rozman was not optimistic about cooperation between TPP and RCEP as they are now in a period of increased competition, but the rivalry will engender success on one side or both.

Bringing attention to the dynamic economics of East Asia at the present, Zhao Quansheng, professor of international relations and director of the Center for Asian Studies at American University, said that it is finally time to address the significant issue of economic regionalism. He posited that, based on Europe’s experience with regionalism when France and Germany took the lead, it would be beneficial for China and Japan to serve similar roles in Northeast Asia. But US strength in the region, however, has created a dual-leadership framework with China. The United States can remain the dominant power in security issues, while China will increasingly take the helm as the leading regional economic power. “China has become a powerhouse,” Dr. Zhao said. He noted, however, the increased competition between the two powers over the US-led TPP, which China views as a way for the United States to increase its regional power. Finally, he concluded that he is unsure if this competition is positive or negative, but China and the United States need to find a way to accommodate each other.

Dr. Lee then drew on Dr. Zhao’s remarks to direct the panelists toward a debate about the competition between the US-led TPP and the ASEAN-led RCEP—one that also has significant Chinese interests behind it. Dr. Zhao explained that TPP was indeed viewed in the Chinese government as a competition for leadership with the United States, in which the US has a hidden agenda under economic means to gain back its regional leadership. Professor Rozman took a comparative approach to the structural aspects of the two proposals, concluding that the TPP discussions were far more advanced than RCEP. The TPP nations hold 40 percent of the world’s economy and have clear leaders, while RCEP talks for progress may fall victim to other ASEAN priorities, such as South China Sea issues. He concluded that TPP has the current edge, and its outcome may determine the future of RCEP. Dr. Ahn stated that RCEP may be easier to implement because its aims are not as high as those of TPP. The key for RCEP is to achieve real value during its negotiations beyond gathering in one location and signing a series of documents.

Dr. Lee then opened the panel up for questions from the floor, fielding a question regarding the reactions of Asian nations to Japan’s recent aggressive currency policy. Mr. Nakajima challenged the notion that Japan’s currency policy were manipulative of exchange rates to take advantage of the electronics and automobile markets, arguing that Japan was trying to stimulate domestic economic growth. Dr. Ahn illustrated the surprise of many nations to suddenly realize that Japan had been manipulating exchange rates.
He feared that if the situation was not resolved soon, then the United States will lose the ability to criticize China for its exchange rate policies—a key economic goal for the United States. Professor Rozman acknowledged that the change in value of the yen has worried the American auto industry, which has in turn pressured Congress to be careful going forward with Japan in the TPP—a potential stumbling block in the negotiations.

Dr. Zhao cited Chinese fears that Japanese policy was a short-term effort to create results prior to the July 2013 elections and questioned its sustainability. China does not want to see another slowdown in Japan’s economy. Dr. Lee was concerned over the side effects of doubling a nation’s monetary mass within a span of two years. If that occurs, then a large amount of that new money will go abroad with the potential to provoke other nations. At first, the large amounts of Japanese yen will help emerging economies through investment, but sooner or later the money must come out, thereby destabilizing those emerging economies.

While new technologies have presented new ways for governments to protect their national interests, the recent cyberattacks demonstrate the dangers these technological advancements pose to national security. As governments have increasingly developed their cybersecurity capabilities, the need for rules to govern cyberspace and responses to cyberattacks loom large in the discourse of cybersecurity. Moderator Eneken Tikk-Ringas, senior fellow for cybersecurity at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, opened the session with a discussion of the significance of cybersecurity and its implications for antiterrorism and homeland security. However, despite the salience of the issue at hand, an international solution remains elusive.
From the US perspective, this issue is largely about China. Richard Falkenrath, principal at the Chertoff Group and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, points to the predominant view of the US intelligence community that strategic, military, and economic hacking of a systemic and persistent nature is carried out by China on an industrial scale, and in many cases, such activities are sanctioned by the Chinese government. The United States, however, lacks a coherent national strategy to address cybersecurity. Dr. Falkenrath maintained that policy relating to cybersecurity has been compartmentalized and fragmented with different government agencies carrying out their own activities, making it difficult to synthesize into one coherent strategy for the government as a whole. Nevertheless, Dr. Falkenrath pointed out that the US cybersecurity policy is comprised of six pillars. The first emphasizes the hands-off approach. The government’s main concern revolves around safeguarding Internet freedom. Pillar number two is concerned with the protection of the US government’s IT systems; the protection of “.gov” and “.mil” websites. The third pillar relates to the US government’s use of cyberespionage. These activities, Dr. Falkenrath maintains, are not related to any industrial policy, and carried out not to benefit US-chartered businesses, but for purely strategic purposes. Pillar four, though not necessarily a pillar, revolves around the protection of the “.gov” and “.mil” domains, which includes private enterprises and educational institutions. As a consequence, the members of the private sector have increasingly taken it upon themselves to protect their own domains and to respond to cyberattacks. For example, Dr. Falkenrath noted that a handful of high-risk, well-funded enterprises have experimented with techniques called “hack-back” which is a privatized counter-offense. This according to Dr. Falkenrath is believed to continue into the future, unless the US government will devise ways to help them. The fifth pillar is manifested in the Obama administration’s response to cyberintrusions that are directly related to China. Dr. Falkenrath made clear that naming and directly associating China with its activity is something that has never been publicly done before. The last pillar reflects the growing impact these activities have on Chinese businesses that are trying to break into the US market. Owing to the lack of trust and confidence, Dr. Falkenrath pointed out that some Chinese enterprises have succumbed to the hurdles and given up on their efforts to make it in the US market.

Across the Atlantic, the EU has recently published its cybersecurity strategy. Released in February this year, the strategy takes the form of a non-binding instrument which aims to set out policies in three main areas: law enforcement and cooperation, improvement of network and information protection measures both in the public and private sector, and military and defense cybersecurity capabilities. Neil Robinson, research leader at RAND Europe, views the measure as being ambitious because it endeavors to bring together policy areas that have predominantly been treated separately. More importantly, this measure, as Mr. Robinson noted, presents a consistent and harmonized approach aimed at addressing one of the sources of insecurity in this new world disorder. Through the measure, the EU demonstrates at the international stage its position on issues such as internet freedom and cybercrime. On law enforcement and cooperation, the strategy sets out to establish an EU cybercrime center under the auspices of the Europol in The Hague. The center is expected to be the main vehicle to integrate various law enforcement capa-

ilities across the continent. While important in addressing cybercrime in a consistent, coordinated manner, Mr. Robinson noted that the sheer size of the EU and the asymmetry in capabilities among law enforce-
ment units presents one of the key challenges on this domain. Moreover, on improving network and information security (NIS), the strategy outlines a number of initiatives such as requiring member states to have a competent authority or a single point of contact at the national level specifically tasked to address cybercrime issues. These competent authorities will essentially emerge from the national and government-
mental computer emergency response teams (CERT). Similar to marked differences of capabilities among law enforce-
ment units, Mr. Robinson pointed out that the differences in mandates and strategies will pose a challenge on this domain. The third domain revolves around improving cyberdefense. Similar to the US, a number of European states have sought to improve their cybersecurity, but with less emphasis placed on the offensive side and more on the defensive capabilities. Mr. Robinson articulated that this pillar of the strategy is nothing new, and that the strategy is primarily to harmonize and produce a coherent EU policy on cybersecurity. He noted however that due to the nature of the EU policy machinery, the possi-
bility of institutional rivalry is high and could potentially compromise the effectiveness of the strategy.

Needless to say, the success of the strategy is also highly contingent on arriving at a common understand-
ing on the application of the strategy among agencies.

Since the current discourse on cybersecurity predominantly revolves around its novelty and on finding new approaches in order to respond to the potential threats from cyberspace, James Steinberg, dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, argued in favor of looking into the past for possible answers. Mr. Steinberg maintained that, although modern day cyberattacks involve the use of high technology and operations have become sophisticated, the phenomenon surrounding cybersecurity (i.e. espionage/theft and sabotage) are problems that are fundamentally old. By looking at the issue from non-data, non-cyber perspectives, governments can build upon the strategies that have been successful in addressing acts of espionage or sabotage in the past. For instance, Mr. Steinberg pointed to existing international norms and measures such as the principles of war—jus ad bellum and jus in bello—as plausible frameworks to guide state responses in the event of offensive cyber operations. A reflection on existing and past strategies can be helpful for the international community in developing a set of rules and norms to guide the use of cyberspace and related technologies. Furthermore, a survey of previous strategies can also provide an opportunity for governments to identify areas that needs adapta-
tion. Whereas most literature and discussion paints a rather bleak picture of the problem, Mr. Steinberg is cautiously optimistic on the possibility of broader US-China cooperation on cybersecurity. He takes China’s commitment to enforcing the non-proliferation treaty rules and related export controls as a sign of the Chinese government’s appreciation of the importance of cooperation in the protection of its strategic interests. There is an opportunity for both countries to craft common rules and norms on appropriate actions relating to cybersecurity and on the appropriate measures to deal with abuses, particularly by non-state actors. The sea of change evident over the years, said Mr. Steinberg, gives hope for the possi-
bility for broader collaboration and cooperation between the two countries on cybersecurity.
The ensuing discussion during the question-and-answer session revealed that while there is a growing recognition of the gravity of the problem, states have not been necessarily keen on finding an international solution. The apparent divergence of national understandings and policies on cybersecurity in particular and the Internet in general are seen to have contributed to this apparent lack of a coherent international strategy. Mr. Robinson for instance notes that in the EU, a common definition of what constitutes cyber-attacks or definitions of cybersecurity is yet to materialize. As it stands, Britain and the Netherlands, according to Mr. Robinson, are so far the only states in Europe that have been relatively successful in developing threat models to qualify cybersecurity threats. Dr. Falkenrath posited that the United States lacks a coherent national strategy on cybersecurity and that the different issues surrounding the use of cyberspace such as Internet freedom, human rights, and economic interests constrains the executive branch’s capacity to fully institutionalize cybersecurity into its policies.

Moreover, questions over the appropriate response to cyberattacks were also raised. From the US perspective, the decision over how to respond to cyberattacks is largely the president’s prerogative as the commander-in-chief. Mr. Steinberg, however, posited that there is a broad acceptance among the lawyers and policymakers within the US government that the basic principles of the laws of war and self-defense apply on cybersecurity. He further argued that governments should look at the context (i.e. the motivations behind the attacks and the perpetrators) in order to craft an appropriate response.

With the lack of a common understanding on cybersecurity, the realization of an international strategy will continue to be one of the major issues in this new world disorder.
the capacity to detonate nuclear explosive devices, Dr. Weitz points out three key differences to which we must be attuned.

First, Pyongyang either has, or soon will have, the capacity to launch a nuclear warhead to reach US soil. It will also soon have the capacity to launch a nuclear warhead against South Korea and Japan. Secondly, while the South Korean leadership in 2010 took time to respond to the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong, the 2013 South Korean administration promptly claimed it would respond to future attacks with equivalent damage. Park Geun-hye’s administration made suggestions that were a village shelled again, South Korea would strike back by attacking symbolic statues in Pyongyang. Rather than being merely a reactive situation, Dr. Weitz sees incentives for either party to get in a first strike. Thirdly, there is the possibility of North Korea and Iran sharing nuclear technology. Though there is no evidence that this took place, Dr. Weitz points to recent Iranian rocket launches and suggested that Iran’s sharing nuclear warhead design with North Korea is a plausible explanation for the difference between the failed April launch and the successful December launch.

The implications of a nuclear North Korea, Dr. Weitz said, are not limited to South Korea and Japan, but also affect the United States, China, and Russia. Despite the importance of effective cooperation by these parties, their cooperation is quite low on this issue, he said. The recent change in Chinese leadership may have produced some interesting statements that reveal some dissatisfaction regarding North Korea’s action, but there has not been a major change in China’s policy toward North Korea.

Despite US efforts to offer North Korea rapprochement vis-à-vis the Leap Day Agreement in 2012, the missile launch negated that accord. With the rhetoric in print, including encouraging foreign embassies in Pyongyang to evacuate and the closing of Kaesong in late April, Dr. Weitz expressed pessimism for the difference between the failed April launch and the successful December launch.

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, began by warning that dismissing North Korea’s pattern of behavior as circular would be a mistake. Looking at what actions North Korea has taken over the past year, Mr. Klingner pointed out that North Korea has violated UN Security Council resolutions, reneged on agreements not to pursue nuclear weaponry, threatened strategic nuclear annihilation and tactical attacks, and rebuffed South Korean and US attempts at dialogue. Mr. Klingner said that we should avoid justifying North Korea’s speech and actions by “explaining away” their foreign actions with domestic factors such as a search for aid and establishing domestic legitimacy for the regime. “We need to focus on behavior rather than possible reasons for the behavior, and form policies accordingly,” Mr. Klingner said.

Regarding China’s role in handling North Korea, Mr. Klingner was apprehensive of any real change in policy. “The editor of a Chinese communist party publication who wrote an article in a journal that was critical of North Korea was seen as a harbinger of change, until he was fired for it,” Mr. Klingner said. “It’s a debate that will take some time to resolve. I tend to be fairly skeptical.” As far as nuclearization is concerned, on the peninsula the United States has already pulled out its nuclear weapons, South Korea does not have any, and Japan does not have any. Responsibility for a nuclear weapons-free zone is then put on China, Russia, and North Korea.

The US administration would take a lot of criticism if they were to try another Leap Day-type deal, so it seems to have been passed along to South Korean leadership to try, Mr. Klingner said. He brought attention to the “very pragmatic” three-pronged policy of the South Korean Park Geun-hye administration, which includes building a strong military deterrent; trust-building followed by humanitarian and developmental assistance in the context of proper behavior; and aiming at eventual unification.

Mr. Klingner saw benefit in dialogue, but called into question how Six-Party Talks could currently be enticing to North Korea as China already provides them with what they seek. “Dialogue is great, but it’s really hard when North Korea severs communications,” Mr. Klingner said. “I would put the onus on North Korea’s words and actions.”

Jun Bong-Geun, professor and director-general of the Department of National Security and Unification Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, began by making a distinction between past and current errors in approaching the issue of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear proliferation. Past attitudes might be characterized as underestimating Pyongyang’s desire and capability to acquire nuclear weapons; nowadays, Professor Jun said, the mistake is in somewhat overestimating nuclear capabilities. After North Korea’s nuclear test this year—its third since 2006—many now see the threat as real. In the past, we made the error of underestimating North Korea’s desire and capability to acquire nuclear weapons; nowadays, we’re somewhat overestimating nuclear capabilities and giving up on working with them. “We shouldn’t give in to this pessimism. We can’t live with a nuclear North Korea,” Professor Jun said.
In Professor Jun’s estimation, there are still paths to try in order to deal with North Korea. To face the task of denuclearizing North Korea, Professor Jun suggested that the posture of the South Korean reaction must address three fronts: military preparations, including a Korea-specific missile defense; sanctions, in which China will play an important role; and diplomacy. In order to reverse North Korea’s path to nuclearization, a “Korean-specific denuclearization solution” must be developed. Certainly, one of the problems is North Korea’s acceptance of the policy; even if Pyongyang is forced to accept a policy, they may change their mind and break the agreement, as what happened with the Leap Day Agreement. It is important to have a carrot and a stick, Professor Jun said, and we need incentives and repercussions that are both significant and tangible.

Professor Jun warned against applying models from other cases, such as Libya, in which the circumstances were very different. In cases where regime change appears imminent, or regime transformation is internally recognized as necessary, leaders are willing to negotiate. With North Korea, however, “we should be ready to face a very high price or a very strong line.” The key is to focus on a sustainable policy backed by domestic consensus and international support over a long period of time.

Professor Jun said that there are high stakes involved with nuclear power in South Korea; in order to run a peaceful nuclear program including exporting nuclear power plant facilities, South Korea must be a very responsible state.

China must work with South Korea on this issue. “We often have high expectations on China. But, we don’t expect them to intervene on something they don’t want to do,” he said. While in the past China has acted as either a bystander or a mediator, the Chinese military posture is adapting to the existence of a North Korean nuclear program that make threats more real.

With North Korea, we see a different type of nuclear weapons state. “The use of nuclear weapons lies solely on the DPRK military commander,” Professor Jun said. That makes Kim Jong-un, a young leader with no experience, the sole responsible person. “The problem with this is [it is] the only place in the world that has nuclear weapons but are not responsible to its people,” Professor Jun said.
notable issue is the ongoing, irrational deforestation in North Korea. The resulting topsoil erosion yields uncontrollable mudslides during the rainy season, meaning a high percentage of arable lands are destroyed by flooding. Mismanagement of environmental resources also exacerbates food insecurity. Even though there are vast kelp forests surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which should be harvested and distributed to the people in order to prevent iron deficiencies, a large number of pregnant North Korean women have iron deficiencies that result in anemia. One-third of North Korean children are malnourished, leading to dangerously weakened immune systems. North Koreans also suffer from infectious diseases, and drug resistant forms of tuberculosis are forming inside the country.

Mr. Scarlatiou stated that another important aspect of human security is personal security, which emphasizes protection against violence from state and non-state actors, individual predators, and domestic abuse. The North Korean government systematically employs unlawful violence against its people, which includes an “astounding” rate of executing 15.2 per 100,000 people. Within a vast network of prison camps, numerous North Korean refugees have reported widespread atrocities committed by the North Korean authorities, including reports of infanticide and forced abortion from women who were impregnated by Chinese men. The prison guards apparently don’t want to waste food on children from foreign fathers. Although North Korea has actually ratified UN declarations on human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights, in reality they don’t follow these conventions.

Raelyn Campbell, senior officer of the Asia-Pacific Region at Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, surprised many in the audience by stating that “relative to other countries, the health situation is not that bad in North Korea.” She called the North Korean health system “dysfunctionally functional,” and cited WHO statistics revealing high vaccination rates, dramatic reductions in infectious diseases, decreasing child mortality rates, a reduction of malaria from hundreds of thousands of infections a decade ago to less than 10,000 infections today, and several other positive health indicators based on WHO data. Many health indicators in North Korea are relatively good, even when compared to countries with higher GDPs, such as Pakistan and Nigeria. There are also 300,000 healthcare workers in North Korea, meaning access to healthcare in North Korea is better than in many countries. From the audience, American Enterprise Institute scholar Nicholas Eberstadt warned us not to completely trust data and statistics coming from North Korea. North Korea has only directed two national population counts, in 1993 and 2008, and they were both full of inconsistencies and internal contradictions. The North Korean survival rates in 1993 were comparable to the survival rates in Somalia, which was one of the lowest in the world. North Korea has conducted its own nutritional surveys, which Dr. Eberstadt believes are full of manipulated and doctored information. He suggests that outside partners working with North Korea should insist on new, independently collected data.

To improve healthcare in North Korea, Ms. Campbell suggests that governments should increase multilateral efforts to supplement domestic funding inside North Korea in order to improve what has already been achieved. Ms. Campbell’s organization, the Gates Foundation, advocates a partnership approach with other organizations that have a presence on the ground in North Korea. The Gates Foundation has supported the Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization (GAVI), where donors pool money and lower prices from vaccine manufacturers. Through these efforts, North Korea has received US$28 million in support for vaccines and strengthening its healthcare system. The international community must continue to strengthen multilateral efforts to improve health in North Korea.

Baek Buhm-Suk, research fellow in the International Law and Conflict Resolution Center at the Asan Institute, noted that the concept of human rights must include improving human standards of living, and this should extend beyond passive protections. However, there are no clear solutions to the human rights problems in North Korea, especially since human rights monitors and international aid organizations have limited access to the people, and have often been frustrated by the restrictions imposed by North Korean authorities. These limitations have hindered efforts by concerned members of the international community. Without substantial changes from the North Korean regime, there is little that the international community can do to improve the human rights conditions of the North Korean people. Nevertheless, we should not assume that the collapse of the North Korean system is necessary to bring about positive changes in North Korea. The North Korean regime is the main perpetrator of human rights abuses, but absent a collapse of the system, the North Korean authorities are also the main actors who can improve the human rights situation under the right conditions.

If the living standards of the North Korean people are to improve, there also needs to be a bottom-up approach coming from the North Korean people, which should be assisted by the international community. Civil society in North Korea is virtually non-existent; thus, external actors need to support the expansion of civil society groups and mobilize them inside the country. Yet for the past two decades, certain actors in the international community have been working on changing North Korea from the outside, primarily through sanctions and humanitarian aid. Human rights are too often used as a political tool designed to hasten the collapse of the North Korean regime, and in the future these issues must be sepa-
rated from political issues. In the long-term, we need to find a balance between smart sanctions targeted against decision-making elites, and comprehensive engagement strategies, including family reunions and cultural exchanges.

Since North Korea deliberately seeks to abuse its people, Dr. Kim thinks it is difficult for external actors to achieve long-term structural improvements in human security. Some policies that are needed to improve human security in North Korea can contradict other geopolitical objectives. For example, North Korea’s foreign trade bank is the last foreign exchange bank in the country, and it is used to facilitate international payments for the World Food Programme and international NGOs operating in North Korea. However, this bank has also been the target of sanctions, so there have been instances when officials from international NGOs have gone into Pyongyang with suitcases full of cash in order to carry out their operations. Furthermore, when members of the international community attempt to promote human security in North Korea through various support mechanisms, they may actually be perpetuating a system that needs to be brought down or changed.

South Korea’s role in promoting human security in North Korea can be seen as contradictory to the goals of the North Korean regime. South Korea could potentially spearhead certain aid programs that would improve human security, but the North and South are competing for legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, allowing South Korea to have a visible lead in improving human security would be seen as a capitulation in North Korea, meaning Juche and Songun had failed. South Korea is also dealing with its own social welfare issues, but South Korea should note the lessons from German unification: In the eyes of West Germany, every German was a German, so West Germany felt that it was required to provide social welfare to the East Germans. South Korea has a constitutional mandate to take care of all the Korean people, whether they are North Koreans or South Koreans.

This year commemorates the 60th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance. Over that time interests and priorities have overlapped, forging a strong bond between the two nations. Yet in his opening remarks Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and moderator of the panel, referenced a research finding that over the past 200 years two-country alliances have experienced an average duration of a little over a decade. Based on the anomalous nature of the ROK-US alliance, it is important to understand why it has been particularly durable and what it will look like moving forward.

Although political developments in both Seoul and Washington provide plenty of discussion fodder based on current events, Mr. Snyder guided the panel to focus on broader issues that better serve to lay a foundational basis for analyzing the future of the ROK-US alliance. Specifically, he referenced five key areas of challenges to the ROK-US alliance for the panelists to address: its sustainability, its scope, the common purpose that holds it together, potential limits due to diverging domestic interests, and limits due to China’s rise.

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, highlighted that one of the biggest reasons for the current challenges to the ROK-US alliance grows out of good news, namely that South Korea has rapidly emerged as a global economic player. Particularly in relation to North Korea, the South is dramatically superior in terms of economics, population, technology, international relationships, and more. There is no longer a need for a guarantee. That shift, however, leads policymakers to reconsider the balance of power and evaluate the necessity and benefit of a heavy US hand in South Korean affairs, especially since South Korea can arguably afford to defend itself.
Victor Cha, Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, set the tone for his remarks by discussing the history of alliances and demonstrating that the ROK-US alliance has evolved to a degree of cooperation rarely seen in practice.

In outlining the remarkable evolution, Dr. Cha explained three stages of alliances. For the first 40 years, the United States and South Korea had little in common but were united by mutual security concerns. The relationship during these years fit the mold of an instrumental alliance, the most common historical partnership structure, by which states accrete power by joining forces to deal with an external threat.

This changed after the Cold War, as the nations became aligned on mutual values, evidenced by the partnership structure, by which states accrete power by joining forces to deal with an external threat.

The strength of the alliance, international development, and security would allow for the development of stronger regional institutions. As these challenges to the ROK-US alliance grow in coming years, it is important to consider what may rise to take their place. Alternatives, or at least supplements to the current alliance, include greater cooperation between democratic states in the region, regional institutions that involve but also provide a check against China, and increased spending on military by individual countries.

Additional sources of tension on the alliance derive from both Korean and American domestic perspectives. Development has brought a generational shift in domestic culture and values in South Korea. Younger Koreans do not feel as strong of an affinity for the US alliance as older generations did after the war, particularly as other policy pursuits seem more desirable. In the United States, Americans face economic hardship of their own, so as welfare programs start feeling the pain there will be less willingness among US citizens for sending money abroad.

But a less involved United States may not be unwelcome news to Korea. The role Korea plays in US plans is quite different than it once was, and thus incentives have shifted. For instance, Mr. Bandow explained that one reason the United States may seek to stay involved in South Korea is to hedge against a rising China. However, that causes China to be understandably reluctant for Korean unification because that will put an aligned ROK-US on its border, pitting the alliance against a policy goal South Korea has expressed since the peninsula was divided.

As each nation comes to terms with its own national priorities, each will face tradeoffs and the relationship between the two will evolve. Thus far the alliance has provided a shield that has fostered Korean development and growth, serving an incubatory role that now allows South Korea to plot its own future. The strength of the alliance, international development, and security would allow for the development of stronger regional institutions. As these challenges to the ROK-US alliance grow in coming years, it is important to consider what may rise to take their place. Alternatives, or at least supplements to the current alliance, include greater cooperation between democratic states in the region, regional institutions that involve but also provide a check against China, and increased spending on military by individual countries.

In recent years, however, as the countries have grown closer together economically, they have grown further apart in their domestic politics, a theme that ran through several panelists’ remarks. As Koreans become more developed, they are developing policy tastes and preferences of their own, which are at times at odds with US policy goals. The view has shifted from what the two parties aim to prevent to what each individual nation aims to pursue. The silver lining is that North Korea will unlikely be an area of division, and may in fact prove to be the mutual interest that continues to hold the alliance together, as the United States will oblige to accommodate South Korea’s approach to the North in order to maintain stability.

Kim Tae-hyo, professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Sungkyunkwan University, argued that South Korea has grown tremendously on the global stage, especially recently, and that has led to a shift in the understanding of the geographic and conceptual range of the alliance. The shift in South Korea’s international standing provides momentum to rethink and reshape the nature and strategy of the alliance for the future.

Since Pyongyang has rejected initiatives to engage in multilateral talks in recent years, Dr. Kim advocates that the United States and South Korea take an alternative and proactive approach to deterring the North. This approach has three steps, which include reinforcing military preparedness against an attack, tightening international coordination to stymie any outside support North Korea may seek out, and encouraging official and unofficial changes in North Korea to exploit any opportunity to change it from within.

Regarding international coordination, and trilateral security talks in particular, Dr. Kim highlighted the strains that exist between Japan and Korea which may undermine the current default approach to trilateral deterrence. However, he posited that China, the United States, and South Korea may have grounds...
for a trilateral relationship due to a foundation of mutual interest based on strategic convenience. In addition to working together to hold North Korea in check, the relationship holds promise for looping China into other talks of international significance, such as environmental agreements and other quality of life concerns.

A potential drawback Dr. Kim sees to successful multilateral initiatives is rising negative public sentiment toward Japan, the United States, and China. He warned that adjusting South Korean policies to reflect domestic public opinion would sacrifice the long lasting relationship between the United States and South Korea in particular. Accordingly, Dr. Kim proposed that policymakers preemptively address the issue by considering how much shifting public sentiment can impact national security policy.

Shen Dingli, professor and associate dean at Fudan University, provided a Chinese perspective on the issue. He explained that as China has developed into a greater economic power it has revised its ideology to accommodate capitalism and desire regional stability. Professor Shen explained that in the past two decades China has transformed its ideology, placing economic development as the vehicle of its security. This has diverged from the view of North Korea, which continues to view South Korea as an illegitimate state in need of liberation. Though China has official treaties with North Korea, it is hesitant to act on the North’s behalf, and in recent years has notably not reinforced its commitments to the North.

China’s North Korea policy is based on strategic balancing, Professor Shen explained. The challenge is that while China has not become more comfortable with the ROK-US alliance, it has become less comfortable with the behavior of North Korea. China remains committed to nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula and views Pyongyang as a troublemaker. Additionally, China is now rich enough to defend itself and has less need for its alliance with Pyongyang.

Professor Shen noted that China respects others’ right to protect themselves, and conjectured that China would not get involved in the case that North Korea is punished for its bad behavior. In fact, he relayed that high-ranking Chinese officials have been making a nuanced shift in their talking points which “de-link” China from its treaties with North Korea. However, China also does not want to forfeit its leverage by becoming too entangled with the United States or South Korea, causing North Korea to turn against it. As relations between Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang continue to shift, China will be following events closely and tweak its stance in order to maintain a diplomatic and security advantage.

The ROK-US alliance exists at a time and place on the international scene very different than when it began. This demonstrates the strength of the lasting relationship while also suggesting the need for reform in order to maintain relevance. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States all possess nuanced views of security in the region, all of which hinge a great deal on North Korea’s actions. By focusing on the overlap in national interests, potential partnering countries face reasons to collaborate that outweigh tensions among themselves. It is fairly clear that the ROK-US alliance that we have seen to date is bound for change in the near future, but experts agree that the formal alliance is not likely to dissolve any time soon.
Security Crisis and Trade Disputes

Moderator: John Swenson-Wright, University of Cambridge
Speakers: Kent Calder, The Johns Hopkins University
T.J. Pempel, University of California at Berkeley
Soeya Yoshihide, Keio University
Igor R. Tomberg, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Rapporteur: Brian Gleason, Yonsei University

Panel moderator John Swenson-Wright, senior university lecturer at University of Cambridge, opened the discussion by asking how trade sabotage and embargoes are related to political and security tensions, and whether joint investment projects and regional economic initiatives can mitigate these disputes.

Kent Calder, director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, emphasized that although there has recently been some intensification in the use of economic measures to achieve political and security objectives, this is by no means new—there are numerous examples throughout modern economic history. The extent to which trade and finance are politicized depends upon the sector and the country. The energy sector tends to be prone to politicization, especially in Northeast Asia, where countries are particularly vulnerable due to their heavy dependence on international markets. In East Asia, the use of economic warfare can be tempting but largely ineffective, with the partial exceptions of cyberwarfare and some variations of financial warfare. Financial markets are extremely sensitive to demonstration effects such as the sharp short-term effects on financial markets during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

In the case of China’s politically motivated export restrictions on rare earth metals in 2010, this was not simply a strategic decision at the national level—there were also local and international dynamics shaping that decision, although they seem to have had largely negative effects for China. The export restrictions led to a reduction from 80 percent to 50 percent in Japan’s dependence on rare earth metal imports from China, and Japan has diversified, economized, and stockpiled these metals to some extent. Thus, economic warfare can undermine trust and promote countermeasures like diversification.

T.J. Pempel, Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, highlighted four particularly salient economic trends in post-Cold War Asia. First, by the 1980s and 1990s, virtually all the region’s political leadership shifted the basis for their domestic legitimacy to economic growth and providing economic benefits to their citizenry. Second, economic growth has been fostered by a growing wave of foreign direct investment across the region, the development of regional production networks, and increasingly the formalization of free trade pacts.

A third trend across the region is an increasing institutionalization of economic linkages among various countries. ASEAN+3 is one of the important links, as well as the Chiang Mai Initiative, Asian bond markets, and the East Asia Summit. This institutionalization demonstrates that there is growing government-to-government cooperation across the region, particularly on economic issues.

The fourth trend has been a decline in the use of military force across the region. In Asia there have not been any serious military conflicts since 1979, but since 2010, there has been an increase in the number of security tensions. These security tensions include four main challenges. The first is China’s renewed assertiveness pertaining to the Nine Dotted Line and the increasing escalation surrounding what China claims to be its core interests, especially the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. A second area of concern is the assertiveness of North Korea, including nuclear and missile testing, and that North Korea is largely outside of regional economic and production networks.

A third problem across the region has been the rise of nationalism. In Northeast Asia, tensions flare up over historical issues, “comfort women,” and perceptions that regimes are re-articulating a new nationalism. There are also elements of nationalist competition within parts of Southeast Asia, such as between Cambodia-Thailand, Malaysia-Thailand, and the Philippines-Malaysia dispute. All of these issues play out in some form of coercive diplomacy. Finally, the US pivot to Asia has also triggered a great deal of concern, particularly in China, about how this will develop and whether it is really a subterfuge for containment of China.

These security tensions have not been the result of economic disputes—they are essentially political disputes in which economic measures are periodically used as a weapon of political articulation or competition. We do not see replays of the kind of disputes that took place between the United States and Japan, for example over soybeans, textiles, automobiles, and semiconductors.

Soeya Yoshihide, professor at the Faculty of Law of Keio University and director of the Institute of East Asian Studies, observed that we are living in an age full of dichotomies and inconsistencies. Regarding a possible Sino-American confrontation in coming years, in the security sphere there may be some cause for concern, but the economic realities are totally different from the Cold War. Neighboring countries are all dependent on China, and China is dependent on the international system.
In this sense, there are some inconsistencies. As a result of China’s rise, China has become confident of its power, and the voices coming from China are requesting fair treatment and greater Chinese voice in the management of existing international regimes and processes. China could be regarded as a challenger to international regimes, but at the same time, the success of China is a result of China living within those systems and regimes that are basically creations of advanced democracies, first in Europe and the United States, and later joined by Japan.

Dr. Soeya expressed concern about the use of economic means to change the behavior of other countries. The Chinese manipulation of rare earth exports in 2010 was intended to change Japanese behavior. The economic effects were very uncertain—it can work against Chinese interests, and negatively impact the global economic system. Another reason that political actors use economic means for political purposes is to show political will. These political actors are attempting to show their resolve in responding to difficult issues with foreign counterparts. This is not necessarily intended to change the other’s behavior; it is as an act of showing your frustration or political position.

Dr. Soeya noted that when Deng Xiaoping started his open door and reform policies in the late 1970s, he looked to Japan for two major inputs: official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment. Japan started to give massive ODA to China and Japanese businesses started investing in the Chinese market. Japan realized that the political stability of China is important for the stability of Sino-Japanese relations and by extension East Asian international relations.

Igor R. Tomberg, director of the Centre for Energy and Transport Research in the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that Northeast Asia is naturally a region where energy cooperation is absolutely possible and synergetic, but this potential is far from realized. Resources are often the source of trade disputes and conflict, and since East Asia is the world’s major consumer of energy, territorial disputes can affect supply chains and transportation connections. Thus, alternative solutions for energy security and energy integration in East Asia are necessary. For example, there should be renewed emphasis on land communication and land transportation links, which are especially important for energy security and stable development.

Innovative projects can resolve or at least mitigate problems in the political sphere as well. A good example is the proposed trans-Korean gas pipeline. In the past it may not have sounded realistic, but times change. The feasibility study has confirmed the project’s viability, so Russia, North Korea, and South Korea can benefit from this project. Moreover, Russia can act as a mediator in negotiations between the two Koreas. Overall, East Asian countries should strive toward stronger strategic partnerships, which will be bolstered by integrated infrastructure networks.

Dr. Swenson-Wright followed up his initial questions by asking the panelists if East Asian institutional developments in recent years are able to address the economic needs of the states in the region, if there are too many institutions, which ones should be at the top of the hierarchy, and if they need alternative institutions at the local level. He also asked to what extent domestic political pressures are driving political actors to use economics as a tool to advance political agendas.

Dr. Calder contrasted Northeast Asia’s striking lack of security organizations compared to other regions in the world like Europe and Southeast Asia, yet Professor Pempel contended that East Asia should not look to Europe as a model. He advocated various institutions with different memberships that attempt to deal with a wide variety of problems. Unlike Europe, East Asia does not need to require membership in one institution that drives the entire regional agenda. Given the complexity of Asia, it is better to have more institutions, but they need to be more deeply embedded.

Professor Pempel also noted that domestic politics is always going to drive many of the decisions being made in the international and foreign policy arenas. Domestic leaders increasingly have to take account of the fact that there is a growing interdependence across the region. As leaders begin to think about what is good for them politically and domestically, they will naturally gravitate toward their supporters and toward nationalism, but they have to come to understand that the long-term economic future of the country is going to depend heavily on what happens economically in the rest of Asia, so making harmful economic decisions based on nationalist sentiments at home can hurt them politically in the long term.

Finally, Dr. Soeya reminded the audience that if you interpret the rise of nationalism in other countries, you tend to have your own prejudiced views embedded in those interpretations. When you define the nature of nationalism of other countries in your own preferred way, you may distort or over-exaggerate the role that nationalism plays in domestic politics while simultaneously denying or downplaying the negative aspects of the so-called rise of nationalism in your own country.
Violence between the Assad government and rebel groups in Syria continues to mount. The civil unrest has taken countless lives, left hundreds of thousands displaced, and created a refugee population of 1.3 million people (and rising). Once thought to be an out-cropping of the Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict has left a chill in the air of a once celebrated pro-democracy uprising. Many observers are now questioning the positive effects of the Arab Spring and asking what role the international community should play in diffusing the Syrian conflict.

At the Asan Plenum 2013, experts from Iran, Turkey, South Korea, and the United States discussed future prospects for international intervention and the threat Syria’s civil war poses to stability in the Middle East.

Panelists at the Plenum agreed that Syria is different from the rest of the Arab Spring. From cultural and ethnic demographics to the nature of the regime, Syria’s particular circumstances have contributed to the prolongation of the conflict. According to panelists, the myriad religious and ethnic groups, combined with economic and political factions, contribute to the lengthy conflict. Additionally, a large majority of the bourgeoisie and the Syrian Security Forces oppose democratic change, which contributes to a form of societal gridlock. Finally, the persistence of the Assad regime combined with consistent government-led propagandizing traps minorities into a dependence on the regime.

Khalid Abdulla Al Bu-Ainnain, president of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, argued that the myriad ethnic and religious groups within Syria prolong civil unrest. Factions within the Islamic faith, and the 10 percent of the population that is Christian, mean that a large portion of the country does not share the same religious values. According to Kayhan Barzegar, director of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, middle class rights have played a critical role in the conflict. Since Syria finds its roots in a pro-socialist government, it would logically follow that the rights of the middle class would be central to the ideology of its people.

The powerful nature of the bourgeoisie and the Syrian National Army cannot be under emphasized. As Dr. Barzegar mentioned, the power of the bourgeoisie in the conflict means that the majority of the information the average Syrian is getting comes from the Syrian government. That means that the propaganda is pro-Assad, anti-Free Syrian Army, and opposed to democracy. John Calabrese, professor of US foreign policy at American University, corroborated this concern, stating that the determination of the Assad regime and its use of propaganda make for a toxic environment for freedom. Dr. Calabrese concluded that the use of propaganda particularly targets more vulnerable minority groups such as the Christian and Alawite population because they fear retribution from the brutal Assad regime. Such coercion leads to undecided individuals caught in the mire of a conflict in which they have no voice.

Jang Ji-Hyang, director of the Middle East and North Africa Center at the Asan Institute, argued there are three possible outcomes to the civil war in Syria. Syria could either internally implode, defeat Assad with a better equipped Free Syrian Army, or an anti-Assad coalition could develop a coherent opposition movement. Later in the discussion, Dr. Calabrese proffered a fourth alternative, stating that the worst case scenario—a de facto partition of the country—was most likely.

While there are many potential outcomes for the Syrian conflict, few agree on the proper solution. Most panelists acknowledged that US intervention in Syria is unlikely. Sinan Ülgen, executive director of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, asserted that it might even be too late for a successful US intervention. Some panelists stated that specific countries in the region, such as Turkey or Iran, would be best suited to handle the conflict.

According to Dr. Barzegar, Iran is trying to balance its geopolitical and ideological interests. Arguably, Iran’s longstanding relationship with Syria formed through common enemies and a deep-rooted desire to increase defenses to maintain power in the region. The two countries are stalwartly opposed to Lebanon and Israel, and therefore are united as allies against other regional actors. For example, Syria seeks to regain the Golan Heights, which it lost to Israel in 1967, and Iran wants to be the leader in the region. Thus, both oppose Israeli strength and power. Iran and Syria also both oppose US influence in the region. Thus, the relationship between Syria and Iran tightened when the US invaded Iraq. Syria-Iran cooperation is not limited to diplomacy, but includes military cooperation including arms trade.

However, Iran’s relationship with Syria would be ideologically challenged if Syria becomes democratic. According to Dr. Barzegar, Iran is balancing its need for security vis-a-vis a Syria at war or under democratization. He claimed that Iran is not merely supportive of Assad, but seeks to preserve the state system in the region and produce gradual change.
Mr. Ülgen made the case that Turkey would be the best fit for intervention in Syria. While historically Turkey’s relations with Syria have not been smooth, in recent years the two nations have shored up relations. Mr. Ülgen argued that Turkey has made it clear that it no longer sides with the Assad regime, but that it is impossible for Turkey to change overnight from friendship with Syria to complete opposition to the regime. He believed that any stark action would limit Turkey’s ability to have meaningful effects on the reform process.

Turkey has supported the Syrian National Council (now the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) and the Free Syrian Army by supplying arms and logistical support. Turkey has already voiced support for regime change and does not acknowledge Assad’s right to negotiate a settlement. Mr. Ülgen felt that by taking Assad out of consideration, Turkey had sent a clear message of opposition to the regime, while still providing support to the country.

Turkey is experiencing serious spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis within its own borders. Over 400,000 Syrians fleeing the country found refuge within Turkish borders, and backlash from Syria due to Turkish support of the opposition has resulted in the May 11 car bombings and other violence in Turkey. Nonetheless, Turkey is likely to be a suitable partner for Syria in the long run and may cooperate with outside power that intervenes in the current conflict.

General (Ret.) Al Bu-Ainnain maintained that neither Russia nor Iraq were likely to be helpful actors in handling the fall-out of the Syria conflict. Russia’s involvement in the conflict is motivated by national interest. The Russians fear that the conflict might spill over into Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia which would in turn affect Russia. Russia’s intentions remain unknown, but so far it appears that they would rather prop up the regime than arm the opposition Free Syrian Army.

The fragility of Iraq makes it difficult for the country to play a significant role in the region. According to General Al Bu-Ainnain, Iraqis fear that instability in Syria would have adverse effects on stability in Iraq. Furthermore, Syria and Iraq do not have a history of cooperation. Iran and Syria bolstered their relationship after the Iraq War for the purpose of checking US and Iraqi power, even though both welcomed the fall of Saddam Hussein.

According to some of the panelists, if US intervention were to occur, it should have been initiated already. There is little willingness among Americans to see the US involved in another conflict abroad, especially on the heels of Iraq and Afghanistan. But according to Mr. Ülgen, Western policymakers should ask the following question: Why did the international community intervene in Libya but not in Syria? That question remains unanswered and the longer the conflict continue, the more important it will be to answer that question.

While many of the panelists downplayed the prospect of US engagement in the conflict, it was clear that leadership is key to ending the conflict in Syria. Some argued that the most prudent course would be to allow reforms to manifest themselves internally. By allowing the Syrians to shape and develop the future for their own country, domestic actors would have the political capital needed to rebuild the country.

Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that if the United States or other nations continue to avoid problems in Syria, neighbors like Iran and Russia may fill the vacuum. This could lead to arms in the hands of the wrong people such as members of Hezbollah and other insurgent and radical groups in the region.

As Syria continues its downward spiral, the international community has largely remained onlookers in the conflict. There are regional and international alternatives to the present state of affairs, and yet progress has stagnated. As the number of casualties mount and the number of refugees increase, it is becoming clearer that further action is needed.
Evolving New World Order in East Asia

Moderator: Philip Stephens, The Financial Times
Speakers: Choi Kang, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
Edwin J. Feulner, Heritage Foundation
Pan Zhenqiang, China Reform Forum
Evans Revere, Brookings Institution
Michael Schiffer, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Rapporteur: Moira Alice Kelley, Seoul National University

Moderator Philip Stephens, associate editor of the Financial Times, introduced the panel topic by noting parallels between the First World War and the current East Asian environment. These parallels include territorial disputes, unlikely alliances, and a region that is struggling to accommodate a rising power—then Germany, and now China. Mr. Stephens stressed the importance of recognizing these general parallels as well as specific differences in order to avoid repeating past mistakes. Currently, there are three vital events directly affecting the East Asian environment. These are the rise of China, the rise in nationalism, and the interactions between East Asian nations coupled with the subsequent reaction by the United States.

Korea National Diplomatic Academy Dean, Choi Kang described the “Asian Paradox” and the rising friction among the great powers during the evolution of the East Asian region. Two major changes underscore this evolution. First, structural changes in East Asia can be seen through power transitions, economic recoveries, and the global transition from a unipolar to multipolar world. Second, contextual changes have emerged through the presence of human rights concerns, shifting regional architecture, and non-security issues. Alongside these changes, there is a lack of strategic trust in the region, which has been created by the absence of common elements needed to foster this necessary trust. The region is plagued with an inability to determine which norms and values are universally appropriate for each of the nations in East Asia. Essentially, there is no common ground and therefore, regional and strategic trust is built on unstable foundations.

A common understanding of history is necessary as well as a realization of the need for management as opposed to forgiveness to establish strategic trust. History in the region is a complex and powerful enemy of cooperation. Historical misunderstandings and differing interpretations prevent the forward progress of negotiation and trust in many issues today. While there is a lack of trust, states in the region are intertwined by a growing dependence on one another, especially with regard to trade. Dr. Choi concluded on an optimistic note, observing: 1) power changes in the region are leading to a stable management of the situation; 2) nations in the region are cooperating on non-traditional security issues in order to build strategic trust between one another and; 3) open dialogue is evident and growing.

The next panelist, Edwin Feulner, founding trustee and former president of the Heritage Foundation, drew attention to how the United States—still the only superpower in the world—maintains bipartisan commitment to involvement in East Asia. The United States is a resident power in the region and will continue to provide East Asia with support in tandem with other regional powers. Today, Washington has no significant political actors who intend to sever American alliances in the region, and thus the existing US-Asian partnerships will remain and thrive under the supervision of multifaceted agreements. The United States has initiated and maintained relationships in Asia based not solely on bilateral agreements, but on the continued support of a certain set of principles (i.e. free economy and democratic principles), whereas China has not established shared principles and values with its neighbors. The US bipartisan
support for commitment in Asia has aided in the continuation of US-Asian partnerships and the recent establishment of free trade agreements (FTAs). While each US administration has created its own diplomatic goals regarding the partnerships, one element remains: overarching domestic support for the continued American presence in the East Asian region. Dr. Feulner highlighted the newly developed American “pivot” strategy, where the United States shifts its international and foreign policy directives away from the Middle East and toward Asia. Dr. Feulner thanked Obama for his Asian pivot and called the US role in the region “steady, reliable, and strong.”

Pan Zhenqiang, senior advisor of the China Reform Forum, outlined three types of major power interactions in East Asia—equality, mutual respect and benefits, and cooperation. Professor Pan was optimistic about the East Asian environment, saying that a bedrock foundation has been created for a strong East Asian community. The dynamics of economic development have produced a number of emerging economies in the region. The development of these new economies has led to cooperation among these states and the larger powers in Asia. The East Asian states share a common interest in the stability of the region without war or conflict. Heavy dependence on one another has lowered the probability for conflict and enabled cooperation. The East Asia network can be seen as a number of bilateral and multilateral systems and, while not perfect, can help to produce mutual trust and benefit. While several nations may fear the rise of China, the more appropriate approach would be to view the rising power as a provider of opportunities. China’s rise is a process that will take decades to reach developed status and in the meantime is bolstering the health of the regional and world economy. By working together with China, a new vision for security and economy will generate an effective and conducive atmosphere in the region for stability, trust, and cooperation.

Evans Revere, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, highlighted the importance of the post-Second World War core pillars, despite the potential for disorder and uncertainty in East Asia. Some argue that those pillars are past their prime in Asia, but Mr. Revere disagreed. The core values instilled following the war are still relevant, valuable, and will continue to function in East Asia. China’s rise has caused concern in the region, owing to China’s ambitions and assertiveness, coupled with its lack of transparency. Territorial disputes have created great unease and Chinese handling of these issues has unnerved surrounding states. China’s rise in the East Asian structure is unavoidable but the crucial task for that rise is its proper integration. It is important for China to continue to have a positive and influential role. Concerns regarding China have prompted East Asian nations to request the United States to play a more active role in the region’s economy and security, and the United States has responded positively—essentially pushing on an “open door.” The United States is, and will remain, the dominant player in the region, despite China’s rise. The United States will “reaffirm, reassert, and reinvigorate” its position in Asia. Crises such as the rising tension on the Korean Peninsula demonstrate the importance of the United States maintaining its presence to ensure peace and stability in the region.

The final panelist, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senior Advisor and Counselor Michael Schiffer, continued to discuss the US role in East Asia. The United States is currently pursuing a “rebalancing” agenda in Asia that has garnered broad bipartisan support in America, showing the importance of Asia in American foreign policy. The East Asian region has achieved a great deal of success, due in part to a series of strategic foreign policy choices by the United States and its Asian partners through systematic alliances and policy commitments to freedom of commerce, open access to sea, air, space and now cyberspace. Future commitments on the part of the United States and Asian regional states will include adjusting the regional and institutional order to instill rule of law, establishing a stable regional architecture, and resolution of regional conflicts—particularly territorial—peacefully through bilateral or multilateral dialogue and peacekeeping missions. As long as these commitments are pursued between the United States and its Asian partners, the East Asian region can be expected to prosper further.

The dynamics of East Asia are in constant fluctuation, driven by the rise of China, newly emerging economies and evolving opportunities for multidimensional and multifunctional cooperation. While Asia may not be ready for an architecture similar to the European Union, the structure is constantly transforming and readjusting to the ebb and flow of domestic foreign policy directives. Despite the challenges facing the region today, panelists remained optimistic on regional opportunities and cooperation. This optimism is underpinned by the sustained presence of the United States in the region, the development of a constructive means with which to effectively integrate China into the East Asian structure, and the success of a number of bilateral and multilateral institutions already present in the region.
Day 2
May 1, 2013

Session 4
- Confronting History in East Asia
- Stability and Change in Post-Crisis Party Systems
- How is the G20 Dealing with Disorder?

Plenary Session III
- Crisis and Reform of Global Capitalism

Session 5
- Sources of Instability in East Asia
- Maritime Security
- China and ASEAN

Session 6
- Refugees and Neighbors
- Democracies in Southeast Asia
- The Post-Arab Spring Leadership Deficit

Plenary Session IV
- Democracy and Economic Crisis
**Session 4**

**Date:** May 1, 2013  
**Time:** 09:00-10:15  
**Place:** Regency Room

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**Confronting History in East Asia**

**Moderator:** Christopher Nelson, Samuels International Associates, Inc.  
**Speakers:**  
- Bong Youngshik, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies  
- Mark Manyin, Congressional Research Service  
- Pan Zhenqiang, China Reform Forum  
- Tatsumi Yuki, Stimson Center  
**Rapporteur:** Steven Denney, Yonsei University

Through a volley of quotes about history by various intellectuals, moderator Christopher Nelson, senior vice president of Samuels International Associates, highlighted the political importance of “remembering,” the significance of national histories and discourse, Inc., and the security implications of history in East Asia. Mr. Nelson pointed to the resolution condemning Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni War Shrine, passed by the Korean National Assembly as he and others were making their way to the Plenum, as an indication that history, especially in East Asia, is as William Falkner understood it: “not…past.”

In good humor, Bong Youngshik, director of the Center for Foreign Policy at the Asan Institute, began by thanking the Shinzo Abe government for making the panel extremely relevant. Speaking for his native South Korea, Dr. Bong focused on the Japan-Korean bilateral relationship, with insights on the possibility of Japan and South Korea improving their bilateral partnership by overcoming the burden of history. Going forward, Dr. Bong’s assessment of the prospects for reconciliation between the two Northeast Asian neighbors is best summarized by a quote from his introductory remarks: “It seems that it is impossible…to get an apology [from Japan] that will satisfy South Koreans.”

Overall, Dr. Bong finds little reason to be optimistic that South Koreans can overcome the “burden of history.” Dr. Bong cited four reasons for his pessimistic assessment: 1) He finds it unlikely that any future apologies will satisfy South Koreans. “There is a feeling amongst the South Korean people that the apology should come from the emperor that will transcend” previous apologies made by Prime Ministers (one in 1989 and the other in 1995). Though this is highly unlikely, it is held as “a sort of demand made by the South Korean public.” 2) The Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute dominates the psychology of the South Korean public. In fact, according to Asan’s Annual Survey from 2012, more than half of the population feels this way. The Survey contained responses to the following question: “What is the biggest obstacle to the development of Japanese-Korean relations.” The top two responses were: Dokdo (60%) and “comfort women” (7.5%). No matter what progress both governments make in other fields, Dr. Bong stressed, historical antagonisms will continue to hinder an improvement in bilateral relations. 3) If the Japanese government denies the significance of the 1995 apology issued in a statement by Prime Minister Murayama, it will have a devastating impact on historical reconciliation. Conversely, if the Japanese government maintains the Murayama Statement, it will not do much good to earn credit and respect from the South Korean public.

Dr. Bong added that there is very little understanding or appreciation for the Murayama Statement. In another Asan survey, the following question was asked: “Have you heard about the Murayama Statement that was issued in 1995?” Only 14.3 percent of South Koreans responded in the affirmative. A follow-up question asked whether they had a correct understanding of the Murayama Statement. The 25 percent who had heard of the apology believed it was a promise by Japan to give up their claim of sovereignty over Dokdo. Another 10.2 percent believed it was a promise by the Japanese Prime Minister to cease official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Eight percent thought it was a statement in support of stronger trading relations and cultural ties between the two countries, and 4.5 percent believed it was a promise by Japan to return national treasures taken during the colonial period.

Pan Zhenqiang, senior advisor of China Reform Forum, coming at the issue from a Chinese perspective, made three general points. The first was related to, as Professor Pan put it, “the many tragedies in East Asia, caused by Japanese aggression.” In the face of such tragedies, “many Chinese wonder why the Japanese so obstinately refuse to face modern history.” For Professor Pan, Japan’s current behavior is unsettling for the Chinese. “Today many Chinese here and back in my home are wondering whether Japan today is…something out of the 1930s.” For Professor Pan, “a country besieged by many domestic problems, and decades of economic stagnation,” will have a hard time confronting its past and dealing with it in a way befitting of a responsible country.

“America has a role in the historical issue,” Professor Pan stated. Taking a position similar to that of Japanese historian John Dower, Professor Pan pointed to Japan’s special relationship with the United States, forged in the post-World War II era, as one major factor preventing the US from taking a more responsible role in resolving “the history issue.” He reminded the audience “that right up until the end of World War II, China was the center of gravity for America’s Asia policy.” According to Professor Pan’s understanding of post-war history, the relationship forged with Japan for broader geopolitical goals prevented Japan from reflecting, in a way similar to the Germans, on the pain and destruction it caused during the colonial and war periods. Though “Washington pretends not to see many things,” as Professor Pan euphemistically put it, there is no small amount of pre-1945 continuity in Japan. “I know that many of the imperialist generals and high-ranking officials continue to serve in the Japanese government and in corporations,” he remarked.
ideational issues related to the Asia-Pacific war. To this Ms. Tatsumi added, “When [people] say, ‘you
don’t recognize what you did, who are [they] referring to? Me, the government, who?’” This sort of blan-
ket criticism, she reasoned, is also unhelpful, because it has the effect of holding ordinary Japanese
citizens responsible for the poor decisions made by the government. “As they [continually] get blamed
in this view, [even ordinary Japanese] become resentful.”

Mark Manyin, specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service, presenting an American
perspective on the issue, concluded the panel by painting a narrative that allowed him to portray America
as playing the role of “referee” in an ideational soccer match. As such, Dr. Manyin provided a general
critique of all players involved. In addition to agreeing with others on the panel that Japanese politicians’
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine are detrimental to Japan’s image and regional relations, he emphasized that
Abe’s return to the position of prime minister was in no small part a reaction to the highly nationalistic
behavior of China and South Korea during 2012. “For those wringing their hands over Abe, they should
remember that South Korea and China’s actions last year played…a role in Abe’s return to power.”

Furthermore, on the issue of holding Japan accountable for its past actions, Dr. Manyin emphasized what
it takes to achieve reconciliation: a partner. He added, “while the primary responsibility goes with the
aggressor, it is also true that you cannot have reconciliation without [having] a partner, and many Japa-
nese feel that they don’t have a partner.” Actions like President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Dokdo and his
inflammatory comments about the Japanese Emperor elicited a nationalist response in Japan. Moreover,
Dr. Manyin added that for issues like Dokdo, “South Koreans want people to pick sides,” but picking a
side “would be a huge mistake and…a test of the alliance.” According to Dr. Manyin, this is the sort of
test that the “US would fail [because there is] no way to take sides” in the issue. In the end, though he
confessed his belief that Japan and South Korea have quite a wall to scale in overcoming the ideational
divide, Dr. Manyin remained hopeful that through prudent political leadership, and the use of existing
frameworks for dialogue, reconciliation can be achieved.

Professor Pan’s third and final point related exclusively to China’s understanding of history. Though the
Japanese may refuse to acknowledge history and Americans may simply ignore it, the Chinese position
is that history should be understood and taught literally—implying that it should be politicized. To illus-
strate, Professor Pan told a story of how he, as a professor in China, had to teach the importance of peace
and reconciliation to his students who were involved in demonstrations against the Chinese government’s
policies toward Japan; the students thought the government was too soft on Japan. Professor Pan recalled,
“professors like me went to the classroom to explain why we must seek reconciliation with Japan…
otherwise there would be no peace and stability in the regime amongst the major powers.” This effort,
Professor Pan emphasized, “requires a correct understanding of history.”

Tatsumi Yuki, senior associate of Stimson’s East Asia Program, provided some balance by highlighting
the Japanese perspective. She started off by reading three different apologies that have been proffered by
three different Japanese prime ministers over the last 18 years, starting with Murayama’s 1995 apology.
She emphasized that though she has lived away from Japan for the last 20 years , she still finds herself
defending Japan, to an extent, when it comes to historical issues. “I still get into a debate when people
say Japan didn’t admit what it did” during the colonial and war periods. However, when it came to the
issue of honoring the war dead, she criticized Japanese officials for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. “If
[officials] think [they] are honoring the war dead” by making a trip to a national cemetery, “why not go
the secular memorial too,” which is, as Ms. Tatsumi noted, an apolitical, secular alternative.

Though she sided with her Chinese, Korean, and American colleagues that visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
by high level officials, in addition to other provocative decisions (e.g. support for textbook revisions),
work against Japan’s self-interest and further entrenches the region’s negative views towards Japan, Ms.
Tatsumi entreated those concerned with the issue to consider how the Japanese have internalized the
Stability and Change in Post-Crisis Party Systems

Moderator: David Brady, Hoover Institution
Speakers: Christophe Crombez, Stanford University
Hahrie Han, Wellesley College
Kim Jiyoon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Kohno Masaru, Waseda University
Rapporteur: Darcie Draudt, Yonsei University

Moderator David Brady, deputy director and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, opened the panel by inviting panelists to present their views on how recent crises have changed party systems in Europe, the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Christophe Crombez, professor at Stanford University, began by questioning the meaning of “party instability” in Europe, as the strains of European party changes are not new. In countries such as Italy and Germany voters have joined new parties or fringe parties in increasing numbers; in the past few elections, some of these “fringe parties” have become almost the largest. In cases like Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Iceland, and even more so in Ireland, many voters have moved from one major party to another. These were the countries most heavily affected by the economic crisis and some of which are experiencing trouble staying in the Eurozone. And in other countries, there is not much change. In Germany, France, and the United Kingdom there has not been much movement, or at least no movement that is different from before. In the United Kingdom, the two largest parties received two-thirds of the vote. In Germany the largest received 60 percent of the vote.

Over the past several decades, voters have moved away from traditional parties for a variety of reasons, largely social. First, voters have become more demanding and better informed. Socialist parties face a decline in their electorate pool as the working class interests decline following industry’s fall in the European economy. Dr. Crombez also noted that religious motivations for deciding votes have become less important. Main parties have not been able to deliver solutions to the problems faced by welfare states in the postwar period. The dramatic reforms they suggested must lead to dramatic solutions, but the parties have failed to deliver. These failures and distrust have resulted in increased interest in fringe parties and protest parties. In countries where there are perceived regional differences, nationalist parties may also be growing. Traditional parties in some countries have reacted by becoming more nationalist themselves, as is the case in Scandinavian counties which made concessions to labor markets. But the left parties in most countries have yet to find a way to deal with this problem.

Hahrie Han, associate professor at Wellesley College, focused on two trends shaping contemporary US campaign strategies: a big demographic shift following the growth of minority groups and increased use of technology to contact voters. Dr. Han considered the 2008 US election to be “the social media election,” in which 1.8 million tweets went out on Election Day. In 2013, the US Election Day saw 1.8 million tweets every six minutes.

In response to the force of technology and changing demographics, Dr. Han noted that parties are responding by placing greater focus on ground mobilization. From 1950-2000, 25 percent of voters reported being contacted by a campaign. In 2008, 35 percent reported being contacted. In 2012, the figure reached 40 percent. While pundits tend to focus on campaign financing, Dr. Han suggested examining the growth of ground operations, especially in states that were decided by very close margins. In 2012, Obama for America had “a much superior ground game” than Romney’s campaign. Through this tactic, Obama’s campaign registered almost two million new voters and won early votes in key states like Ohio and Nevada. Obama’s campaign also had 20 million more “likes” than Romney’s on Facebook, and 18 million more followers on Twitter than Romney’s.

From the 2012 campaigns, we can take away a variety of lessons, Dr. Han said. This includes a new way of running ground campaigns. While before campaigns tended to hire many young staffers early, Obama’s 2012 campaign focused on recruiting, training, and equipping volunteers in local neighborhoods to provide personalized contact that is more effective late in the campaign. Contact with voters tend to increase linearly in traditional campaigns, but contact with voters in Obama’s campaign remained flat during the summer, and then increased exponentially in the last month of the campaign.

Demographics are changing and minority voters are becoming the majority, and these voters need to be mobilized in new ways. Parties are already reacting by placing increased focus on mobilization patterns, but the Republican Party in particular will continue to face problems if it does not reach out to minority voters, Dr. Han said.

Kim Jiyoon, director of the Public Opinion Studies Center at the Asan Institute, questioned how we might approach the concepts of “crisis” and “party system” in the South Korean case. Does crisis for Korea, Dr. Kim asked, mean the current US and European economic crises, the regional security crisis in 2007, the 1997 financial crisis, or the recent nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula? Moreover, has Korea, Dr. Kim asked, mean the current US and European economic crises, the regional security crisis in 2007, the 1997 financial crisis, or the recent nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula? Moreover, has the party system in Korea ever really been stable? Both economic crises and regional security issues factor into South Korea’s experience. Since the 1987 democratization movement, the average life cycle
of Korean parties has been only five years, as parties change names or merge with other parties. Parties are largely distrusted by the electorate, so it is hard to declare the party system as weak. In Korea, the parties have continually been unstable and always in disarray.

Following Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, from around the year 2000 many voters supported a party based on their opinions on policy toward North Korea. Voters who agreed with the Sunshine Policy tended to affiliate themselves with Kim Dae-jung’s Millennium Democratic Party (now the Democratic United Party) and those who disagreed joined the Grand National Party (now the New Frontier Party).

More recently, security issues have provided the New Frontier Party with the opportunity to solidify their voting block by appealing to moderates or independents, claiming that the current crisis shows the Sunshine Policy has indeed failed. In fact, 70 percent of Koreans agreed that no economic aid should be given to North Korea. Dr. Kim said that the younger generation of Koreans in their 20s agrees more and more with the New Frontier Party’s rather assertive approach, which has made it difficult for the Democratic United Party to recruit young voters.

While divergent security policies were the main factor driving party affiliation previously, the two major parties have now begun to take new stances on economic issues following increased public concern. In fact, 2012 was the first year in which the majority of voters supported redistribution programming.

A problem facing Korean parties, Dr. Kim noted, is decreasing voter turnout: 1987 turnout was over 80 percent, but in 2012 it was 63 percent, the lowest yet. Young people especially blame the lack of parties’ ability to give options to voters. Dr. Kim describes the time since democratization as a transitional era of the Korean party system. “Now we’re looking at a real party system,” she said, though one that may not necessarily be like the party systems in the United States or Europe.

Kohno Masaru, professor at Waseda University, focused on observations about two critical elections in Japan: the 2009 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) victory and the 2012 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) victory. Dr. Kohno pointed out that there seems to be increased volatility between those elections. As an indirect reason for the shift, Dr. Kohno pointed to the March 2011 earthquake, in which 20,000 people died and from which the economy is still recovering. The electorate seemed to feel that everything the government did following the earthquake was not enough for recovery, so the LDP, which happened to be in power at the time, was subject to a lot of criticism. With a landslide victory, now the DPJ faces criticism and widespread distrust. Dr. Kohno sees lack of coordination in the opposition as a factor in their election.

“I think there will be pressure to the party system in Japan to return to the two-party system,” Dr. Kohno said. Having a “one-party state” may seem to imply a lack of competition, but that is not the case in Japan; one party is not dominating or shaping all ideology. The fundamental problem with the Japanese party system, he said, is low party identification among voters. In the US, Dr. Kohno pointed out, party affiliation can be part of a person’s identity; there, it is possible to ask a voter, “Are you a Republican or a Democrat?” But in Japan, that conversation does not exist, Dr. Kohno said, and the lack of that identification is due to uncoordinated systems of elections.

Though some worry about rising right wing, nationalist sentiment, Dr. Kohno mentioned Shinzo Abe does not reflect the sentiments of the electorate, while movement to the right at the elite level, such movement is hardly reflected in overall preference of the general electorate. Dr. Kohno explained that recent movements may not be the same as in the past, but there has always been that kind of party; the party system in general tends to allow for that. The recent phenomenon in Japan is not particularly noteworthy, Dr. Kohno said.
How is the G20 Dealing with Disorder?

Moderator: David Shorr, The Stanley Foundation
Speakers: Ahn Ho-Young, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
Thomas Wright, Brookings Institution
Zhu Liqun, China Foreign Affairs University
Rapporteur: Darcie Draudt, Yonsei University

David Shorr, The Stanley Foundation Program Officer, opened the session by posing several questions to the panelists. First, evaluating the success of the G20 revolves around one central criterion: Whether the G20 as an international organization is spurring individual governments to do things on behalf of the common good that those governments would not otherwise do. Mr. Shorr also prompted the panelists to speak on the dual identity of the G20. Though it is mainly known as an economic coordination forum, Mr. Shorr pointed out that the G20 is also the place where rising powers and established powers come together as equals.

Ahn Ho-Young, former vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, spoke optimistically about the G20, its progress, and its potential. Ambassador Ahn made a distinction between the short-term and long-term measures taken by the G20 in the past several years. In the short-term, the reason for the emergency measures taken to address the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis was a genuine concern over the hard crash. In response, governments were encouraged to adopt certain fiscal policies to address the concerns. Following the crash, world trade shrank in 2009; this was the first time global trade has shrunk since the Second World War. However, in 2010 global trade recovered. In 2008 such a reaction would not have been predicted, but to a large extent it resulted from steps taken by the G20.

Ambassador Ahn also noted that the long-term measures proposed by the G20 have not yet been as effective as the short-term measures. However, Ambassador Ahn also noted that it is expected that long-term measures take longer to produce a conspicuous outcome. “I believe it is because of the nature of the measures, not because of a shortcoming of the G20, that it is taking longer,” Ambassador Ahn said. One such long-term measure was in the area of financial degradation; the Financial Stability Forum (formerly the Financial Stability Board) examined methods for strengthening financial regulation and then issued a package of measures that were agreed upon internationally. Now the measures must be implemented in each of the countries individually. “It cannot but take time,” he said.

Finally, Ambassador Ahn discussed how different national economies impact different perspectives on G20 response. At the April 2009 G20 meeting in London, the United States, Australia, South Korea, and Canada were the strongest proponents of introducing stimulative measures; European members were more cautious and favored austerity measures. This can be explained due to differences in national fiscal conditions. In Europe, in particular, nations have better pension systems. But the development after the crisis surprised many member nations and even led some countries at the Pittsburg summit in 2009 to propose removing some of these measures. At any rate, any movement to withdraw G20 measures should be just as coordinated as when they were initially applied, Ambassador Ahn said, in order to ensure efficient results.

Thomas Wright, fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that there is a difference between evaluating the process of the G20 and the substance of the G20’s efforts. While most actors agree on the former, there is disagreement about the substance of the efforts. As such, Dr. Wright proposes two questions that are useful in examining the issue. First, given the interests of all the major economies and taking into consideration the constraints of each state “is the G20 as an institution succeeding in squeezing the most amount of cooperation possible out of those countries in respect to the global economic crisis?” Dr. Wright believes that it is performing well, especially considering that it represents over 80 percent of the global GDP. Secondly, Dr. Wright addressed the question of whether the major economies are doing what is necessary to strengthen the global economic order. “Quite apart from tools they use, have they done enough since 2008? There the judgment is a lot more mixed,” he said.
Taken in a greater context—that of an open global economy following the end of the Cold War—the world has seen two major crises, in 1997 and in 2008. The second of these is worse than the first, globally speaking. If compared to the Great Depression, Dr. Wright posited, the first few months of the 2008 crisis are actually worse. However, recovery can be credited in part to the G20 response. Future historians will judge based on what happens in the next several years. If a crisis does not recur, the G20 will be judged favorably. However, if another crisis occurs in five years’ time, if the current crisis worsens, or if it causes further problems, we will look at it as we do the international forum of the interwar period in the twentieth century or the League of Nations. Though the G20 as an institution has done very well, the leaders of the major states need to work hard to ensure the institution is stronger in the future, Dr. Wright said. He also addressed the debate between stimulus and austerity. Even in the case of the United States, where stimulus is promoted, there have been restrictions due to domestic politics. Austerity now has more support than it enjoyed at the beginning of the crisis.

Zhu Liqun, vice president of the China Foreign Affairs University, spoke about China’s role and expectations of working within the G20. Generally speaking, China’s view toward the G20 is quite positive. Since its beginning in 2009, China has been highly involved at the ministerial level. President Hu Jintao participated in nearly every meeting, she pointed out, and his speeches at the first summits spoke to the issues of “joining hands with others” to work through the difficulties. Indeed, China generally seeks to take an active role in the forum. “We believe the G20 is the most important forum to deal with the current crisis,” she said. Economically, the G20 can provide the main vehicle for the leaders to meet together to discuss what problems are in the world economy and to cooperate on these problems. “Politically we believe this is very important because as an emerging power, China was invited to this forum to play some kind of role with the major powers,” Dr. Zhu said. “This is quite welcome back home.” It would help China to rise peacefully, she added.

Speaking to China’s domestic economic issues on the structural level, Dr. Zhu pointed out that the current iteration of China’s five year plan (the twelfth since 1950) aims to restructure the economy in order to spur domestic consumption and decrease reliance on international trade and investment for growth. Such a change involves several levels of the economy. “China also needs to balance our economy, especially to reach balance between the economy and society, [between] society and man, and [between] man and man,” Dr. Zhu said. The current changes are thus focusing on deeper reform and further opening up. First, China is supporting urbanization and in 10 years expects 300 million farmers to move to cities. Second, changes on the agricultural front will instigate land reform to help lead to urbanization and stimulate internal consumption. Third, China aims to reduce poverty as well as provide more social housing projects and social welfare for farmers, also in an effort to raise internal consumption. These efforts will not only help make the Chinese economy more balanced, said Dr. Zhu, but also will help the world economy become more balanced.

Consensus on which approach to take is as difficult to reach within China as it is in the rest of the world, Dr. Zhu noted. Agreeing with Ambassador Ahn about the differences among G20, Dr. Zhu pointed to diversity in terms of geography, demographics, economy, and culture, which makes it difficult to deal with long-term issues in terms of economic growth and sustainable development. In particular, China internally faces imbalanced development, which has meant their emphasis in the G20 is to address development imbalance, especially between North and South. Dr. Zhu compared this to the US emphasis on the current account balance. China is eager to see reform of the IMF and would like to see more power sharing, but points to the slowness of this process, especially as the United States refused to donate money to the IMF, a precondition of IMF reform. China is also looking forward to increased free trade, which is inconsistent with other G20 nations. However, despite their interest in the G20, China is, and will always be, reluctant to take a lead and instead seeks to focus on international trade imbalance. “Our internal debate is not between austerity and stimulus, but how to reach balance between the government and society. That’s a very important debate,” she said.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, and the ripples it has sent throughout the world, it is incumbent to evaluate the condition of the global capitalism system and to draft expectations for the future. As moderator, Philip Stephens, associate editor at the Financial Times, provided an overview of the current global situation, noting that global economic growth in the past year was a mere two percent, the slowest since the financial crash. Mr. Stephens remarked that in the global financial system we are seeing a re-nationalization of international finance that is now curtailing the liberalization that flourished before the crisis, which many blamed for the crash. With that being the case, the question is whether or not we can continue to have a globalized, interdependent economic and financial system without the tools of a global government.

Mr. Stephens posited that the state of global capitalism depends on the perspective from which the situation is viewed. Internationally, there appear to be three distinct groups in the post-crisis world: rising countries that appear to still be growing, established countries such as the United States that seem to be recovering well, and European countries growing at a sluggish rate. Global economic and political bodies, specifically the G20, have shown signs of adapting to fit the new realities of the global economy, but those moves seem to have fallen into disrepair, indicating that it is unclear what changes will be made.

Regarding global governance issues, Bark Taeho, former minister of trade at the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided an insider’s perspective informed by recent meetings with the World Trade Organization (WTO) ambassadors in Geneva, Switzerland. He explained that the reason we do not have a conclusive direction in the international economic community is because there is disagreement between the involved parties and their expectations of how to allocate the gains from trade. A dichotomy has emerged between the leadership of developing and more advanced countries, seen through rising regionalism, a lack of political leadership by more advanced countries, and a lack of trust in the WTO leadership among its members.

Namely, Dr. Bark outlined two fundamental issues undergirding the breakdown of international economic order. First, there is a lack of compromise between large, advanced economies and rapidly developing nations. Second, less developed countries do not feel that the WTO is doing enough on their behalf. Many developing nations do not feel that they are benefiting enough from their international participation, and that the issues they face are not being properly addressed. Since they are in the process of catching up to the more developed economies, they feel that greater compromises should be made toward their development. The more advanced economies, on the other hand, are in the process of pursuing their own economic revival and are displaying reticence to provide concessions.

To address these issues, Dr. Bark advocated that the direction of reform should be to secure buy-in from key parties like the United States, European Union, Brazil, India, and China to the international public good model of the WTO. Furthermore, reform should ensure that the least developed countries can gain from the multilateral trading system. Dr. Bark added that the WTO, through partnerships with the World
Bank and similar development institutions, should assist less developed countries in a capacity similar to how national governments function in advanced nations.

Kwon Goohoon, managing director of Goldman Sachs (Asia) and previously at the International Monetary Fund, provided an overview of the global financial order and the challenges faced therein. He explained that both structural and cyclical issues are at play in the current reordering of financial markets. In discussing the sustainability of the global architecture—like the G20, WTO, World Bank, and others—he cited two areas facing the global market: cyclical and structural issues. Many experts have focused on the structural elements of the financial crisis, but Dr. Kwon contended that the potential cyclical nature of worldwide financial shocks is a topic that should receive more attention.

It is important to examine the role financial markets play in the process of international development, and balance the tools of public finance so we do not repeat history. The near-term problem is how to get out of the lasting recession, and the longer-term issue is how to coordinate changes to the liquidity markets to encourage growth while implementing safety mechanisms to avoid another crisis. Structurally, free markets and democracy are the pillars to the global economy, and the challenge is how to employ and balance them against each other. In addition to harmonizing those two pillars going forward, special attention should be placed on key players and relationships like the United States and China because their decisions will have global repercussions.

Guy Sorman, contributing editor at the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal and a professor of economics at the University of Paris, provided a counter-perspective that the free market system is not the problem but is, in fact, the solution. The phenomenon of billions of people escaping abject poverty in recent world history is due to the free market and entrepreneurship, which must be preserved, along with democracy. Professor Sorman reflected that the free market system is inherently unstable, and that is the benefit. Innovation, trial and error, creative destruction, and entrepreneurship are all elements that produce uncertainty but also drive economic growth. We should encourage and not seek to curtail such change. Accordingly, Professor Sorman questioned why people talk about the crisis of “capitalism,” which cedes power to Marxist terminology, adding that if we use this incorrect vocabulary we lead ourselves to erroneous conclusions that threaten to undermine the whole system of prosperity that led to development in the first place.

Professor Sorman provided a historical perspective to his remarks, explaining that the growth rate during the industrial revolution in Europe was two percent per year and that to call today’s two percent growth a crisis indicates a misunderstanding of economics. However, he also noted that politicians have the incentive of promising much higher growth, which underscored his point that politics and economics are often at odds.

Governments act on political incentives and therefore often retard economic growth, so we should not desire anything more than a body that can preserve the rule of law. In fact, Professor Sorman posited that a global government that pursues public goals would certainly not be democratic. However, informal and unbinding associations should be encouraged because they align incentives rather than divide them.

In particular, Professor Sorman indicated three necessary international institutions to preserve the free market and economic growth. He confirmed the notion that there needs to be a permanent forum for discussion, noting that the G20 is an example of a body useful for conversation on international economic issues. Second, in the complex world of financial instruments, niche information, and expanding opportunities, fact-checking is imperative for making decisions, so an international body is needed to explore, document, and communicate economic facts to governments. Professor Sorman noted that this task could be done with a few hundred experts—in lieu of the thousands of IMF bureaucrats.

Third, for a global economy to function, rules of the game need to be respected. Professor Sorman admonished to not kill the free market economies by killing free trade. To avoid such an outcome, Professor Sorman argued that an international institution—such as the WTO—should be responsible for ensuring that rule of law is respected and that member countries are held accountable for anti-competitive behavior, like subsidies and uneven regulation. This type of arrangement prevents power from being dangerously centralized while also providing a level playing field—in terms of rules and not outcomes—for entrepreneurs from all over the world to develop their economies.

Yang Baoyun, professor of international relations at Peking University, began his remarks in agreement with the preceding panelists’ analysis that politics and economics have become much more linked, particularly since the end of the Cold War. He expounded on that point by illustrating how economic crisis has led to political destabilization, which has had many implications in individual countries both
rich and poor. While Professor Sorman made the case for getting politics out of the way of the economy, Dr. Yang made the case for shielding politics from the forces of economics.

While noting that developing countries have experienced large economic crisis in the past, Dr. Yang stated that the inference and effects of the recent crisis are different from the Asian crisis in 1997, which was more regionally isolated. The 2008 crisis acted as the trigger for many issues around the world—ranging from the Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa to austerity protests in European countries like Greece. These points indicate that the real crisis is deeper than simply economic, but extends into political, social, and even cultural realms. Dr. Yang concluded that because the recent crisis has been felt by developed and emerging countries alike, it is evident that the capitalist system that led to the crisis must be reformed.

A key takeaway from this panel is that both the crisis and the reform of global capitalism are ongoing processes over which policymakers are still debating the right responses. Yet a few actionable steps have emerged. There is consensus that international institutions are needed to facilitate growth and international relations moving forward, even if the ideal scope of their activity varies in degree. Additionally, as globalization continues, there will be increasing overlap between public and private sectors. The nature of these interactions and how they develop, then, becomes a forefront issue for scholars, politicians, and entrepreneurs alike.

In the past decade, East Asia has been more stable than it was throughout most of the twentieth century, yet there are still potential flashpoints where conflict can occur, panel moderator Anthony Nelson, the associate-director of the US-ASEAN Business Council, said to open a wide-ranging debate. Mr. Nelson, of the US-ASEAN Business Council, framed the discussion by highlighting the diverse challenges that currently pervade the region, including competition over dwindling water resources, the advent of social media that can aggravate nationalistic disputes among populations, and increases in national defense budgets. The diverse set of problems facing East Asia creates a regional system where, “These regimes could be less reliable or predictable actors than they have in the past.” Mr. Nelson then encouraged the panelists to tackle any potential conflict area and offer creative policy options to deal with it.

Hong Kyudok, dean of the College of Social Sciences at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul, began by broaching a central issue to security in East Asia that was referenced frequently in the debate—North Korean nuclear weapons and provocations. After the 2010 sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan and the artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, the Lee Myung-bak administration worked from scratch to create an effective doctrine to prevent future attacks. It came up with proactive deterrence, a strategy to respond to future provocations by striking back forcefully and quickly at a level of violence appropriate to the force used in the provocation. “You have to make it very sure that you have got to deal with it very promptly and strongly. That’s the only way you can prevent further provocations,” Professor Hong said.

De-escalation, however, is the ultimate goal, which Professor Hong believes can be best achieved through working with regional partners in Japan and China, as well as the United States. Professor Hong said he frequently argues that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is a crucial area in which all four nations can mutually reinforce each other vis-à-vis North Korea. Unfortunately, the three East Asian
nations are increasingly dealing with problems of nationalism and neglecting opportunities to solve common problems. He stressed that South Korea, Japan, and China can best protect national interests and the safety of their people by working together.

Later in the discussion, Professor Hong broached another key problem regarding North Korea. The regime consistently demands that it must talk alone with the United States in bilateral negotiations, something the United States will not consider. North Korea also wants to be recognized as a nuclear power, which the region and the United States cannot accept. Professor Hong said this prevents any progress on the nuclear issue and talks. Despite the existing security institutions in the region, North Korea cannot be invited to any of them because it insists on focusing solely on the nuclear issue. South Korea and its regional partners refuse to give up efforts to look for alternate paths to North Korea’s inclusion in the international system, such as Myanmar, but it has become increasingly difficult with Kim Jong-un’s insistence on bolstering North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

Huang Kwei-bo, associate professor in the Department of Diplomacy at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan, took a broader approach to the issue of regional instability, citing three main sources: subjective understanding of East Asian history, problems with good governance, and a lack of institutionalization regarding conflict management prevention. Without laying specific blame, Dr. Huang argued that East Asian nations distort history to their own ends, changing the agreed-upon view of twentieth-century history. This subjective take on history is harmful to the development of East Asian stability and prosperity. He said that it will cause endless disputes in the future if steps are not taken to curb it.

Rapid economic growth fueled by foreign direct investment has also changed domestic dynamics in many nations. Good governance, therefore, has become increasingly necessary in order to improve the living conditions of the people. While others have argued in the past that good governance is linked to democracy, Dr. Huang challenged that a non-democratic government can achieve the same standards of good governance as democratic nations. Dr. Huang emphasized the need for effective domestic management by highlighting the energy and water disputes that may lead to conflicts in the region over dwindling resources. Without better control over domestic factors, states will face bigger international problems in the near future.

Dr. Huang then said that despite the presence of ASEAN and other regional frameworks, the institutionalization of East Asia has been mostly verbal and in need of more deeds—not just words. Many experts cite the proliferation of institutions in the region, but they need to move beyond their establishment and proceed to actions that will bind the region together. In order to do this, Dr. Huang suggested that the region must coordinate with itself and not just look to the United States. It is necessary to create issue-specific regimes—not just broad ones—that consider the possibility of North Korean and Taiwanese participation. He also urged the creation of deeper levels of regional understanding toward the end of conflict reduction. Northeast Asia has seen increasing numbers of people-to-people exchanges via tourism, education, and cultural programs. However, this is superficial and is in need of structure and organization. Domestic civil society must play a stronger role in regionalism, gradually coming to influence their governments.

Noting first that East Asia has seen considerable positive developments in recent years, especially in the stability seen recently across the Taiwan Strait, Ren Xiao, a professor of international politics at Fudan University, then echoed the belief that historical burdens in East Asia are the source of considerable regional instability. Rather than demanding apologies from Japan, Dr. Ren suggested that reconciliation is a better path forward because it will force a two-way dialogue. While he stated that Japan is a peaceful nation that has achieved much over the years, he has been disappointed that Japan has not been successful in understanding the feelings and wishes of its neighbors—not winning their hearts and minds. “The burden of history is quite heavy,” he said, adding that it is a crucial question in East Asia that demands an answer. Nationalism was also mentioned as a serious problem in every East Asian nation, which needs an antidote to dissipate unhealthy sentiments. Finally, emphasizing the role that individuals can play in regional instability, Dr. Ren urged politicians to weigh their words and avoid irresponsible stands that can aggravate tensions.

Dr. Ren offered three avenues to reducing tensions in East Asia. The first is to avoid miscalculations caused by misunderstandings. He relayed an anecdote about a Japanese friend who confessed her fear that China would use its military to take over islands that are disputed with Japan. Despite his best efforts, Dr. Ren was unable to persuade his friend that China would not use force to achieve its goals. Secondly, it is necessary to have the regional powers sit together and discuss how to actively avoid military conflict because mature conditions do not yet exist in which sovereignty issues can be debated. Lastly, a responsible media has a special role to play if it can avoid exaggerating unhealthy and sensationalist stories.
Yamaguchi Noboru, professor and director at the National Defense Academy of Japan, analyzed the role that the regional powers’ military capabilities have in contributing to or hindering stability. He noted the dangers of high troop levels present in many nations, especially the hundreds of thousands of soldiers facing each other across the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula and the incredible density of soldiers in Taiwan—seven to eight Taiwanese soldiers per square kilometer. In the past, nations surrounding the South China Sea maintained force levels that were below what was necessary to adequately secure themselves, but these countries have made significant moves to increase their military levels in recent years. Lt. Gen. Yamaguchi next discussed the implications of China’s military spending relative to its large GDP. Chinese military spending as a portion of its GDP is similar to most nations, but to smaller economies in the region this relatively high spending causes fear and a possible security dilemma. In order to mitigate a potential arms buildup, it is necessary to pay attention to the type and quality of weapons systems rather than the sheer number of weapons a nation possesses. Lt. Gen. Yamaguchi said the region must “harmonize the buildup.”

During the question-and-answer session, Mr. Nelson asked the panelists for their views on how the change in leadership in North Korea has affected peninsular relations. Professor Hong answered that Kim Jong-un has made it hard to reduce tensions between the nations with his use of strong rhetoric. Kim has made clear efforts to convince the world that he can hurt others through the use of preemptive nuclear weapons. These actions are unacceptable to South Korea and severely reduce the chances of dialogue. Dr. Huang was more optimistic that change can lead to new opportunities, citing the stabilization of relations between China and Taiwan as new leaders have emerged. Professor Hong then offered a way to dampen tensions on the peninsula, offering that the regional powers must work to reduce the gap between ordinary North Koreans and the Pyongyang elites. The region should try to forge informal regimes that can give the North Korean people hope for the future and remind them that they are not forgotten.
dispute first by outlining the history of the island. Before 1971, China had never claimed ownership of the islands and its maps and documents were void of any position on its ownership of the Senkakus. When China ultimately claimed territorial ownership of the islands, Japan’s shock and surprise served as the genesis of the now long-standing dispute. According to Mr. Kotani, the Chinese claim over the Senkakus is illegitimate and is counter-productive to the peaceful resolution of issues between the two nations. Mr. Kotani debunked the idea that the territorial issue stems from a need for more land, energy security, or nationalism, when in fact the issue at hand is the future of Asia. If Japan were to compromise with China on the Senkaku Islands issue, short-term stability may be accomplished; however, this would only encourage China to replicate its actions in other parts of the region. Japan will stay firm on the issue of the Senkaku Islands in order to peacefully resolve territorial issues.

Alan Romberg, director of the Asia Program at the Stimson Center, continued the discussion by citing the shared values of maritime security as well as outlining the American perspective. Maritime security is a cooperative venture with committed interests against piracy, trafficking, terrorism, and the importance of humanitarian disaster relief. Today, security issues have dominated the maritime debate and can be seen through the “zero-sum” lens. The sea can be aggressive or cooperative in nature, as we have seen both cases in the past. The basis for much of the maritime law comes from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides some laws governing the ocean but does not resolve all issues or provide a framework on how to address rising territorial conflicts. A key problem with the UNCLOS guideline is that different countries rely on difference provisions and interpretations of the UNCLOS. For example, the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS but is obligated to preserving the terms set out by the document. History also makes resolving disputes problematic. There are overlapping and conflicting claims to history and these claims are linked with strong emotional, nationalist ties. In the case of Dokdo Island, the political results of the conflict are enormous and both South Korea and Japan are well aware of its importance. China’s claims in the South China Sea are another example. The differing historical interpretations are the key element linked to today’s territorial and maritime conflicts in the region. While the United States has no claim to any of the disputed areas, it does have vested interest in access, stability, peace, security, and protection of commercial affairs. In addition, the United States has a taken a strong stand against the use of coercion or provocation in maritime issues. The United States supports the resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia through peaceful diplomatic means and has stood by its alliance commitments to find diplomatic approaches rather than military ones. As far as Sino-American relations are concerned, the United States needs to address the issues in the context of major-power relations, however, whether this can be done remains to be seen. Most recently, North Korean aggression in the past years has shown the East Asian region as well as the world that there are major implications that accompany the absence of successful diplomatic negotiations. The United States and East Asian nations must stress maritime security as one of its top priorities for future administrations.

Su Hao, professor in the Department of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University, provided the Chinese perspective on maritime issues in East Asia. China’s rise to power is a natural phenomenon and should not be seen as a threat. In fact, China shares a wealth of common ground with its East Asian neighbors. States belonging to the East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions must maintain peace and stability on the sea and between one another. Maritime security issues in East Asia should have longer, well-thought-out approaches in order to foster solutions and cooperation. China should use the sea as leverage to enhance its relations in the region, as each nation uses the sea for goods, technology, and transportation. East Asian mutual benefits can enhance cooperation and maritime affairs can serve as the significant common ground for compromise. The whole of East Asia is facing the same or similar challenges on non-traditional maritime security through commitment to the safety of sea lanes, anti-piracy, non-proliferation, pollution and the environment, and freedom of navigation. In addition to these challenges, history has been a recurring theme in territorial and maritime conflicts in East Asia. Mindsets in the region vary drastically on these issues and have continuously caused concern. Support for the United States has also brought in a new dimension. According to Professor Su, the United States is intruding in the region in order for rebalance, when in fact the resident nations need to balance on their own without the help of the outside world. Unfortunately, countries are shelving disputes for future administrations or generations. This is unwise and unsafe, as our generation has the ability to solve these issues now.

Tran Truong Thuy, research fellow at the Center for East Sea Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, summed up the key issues of maritime security by outlining the root causes of problems as: 1) territorial disputes over land features; 2) overlapping maritime claims; and 3) freedom of activity. One crucial overarching issue is that the region does not have an effective mechanism to deal with or prevent disputes, and as a result the conflicts that arise can be, and have been, easily escalated. Eventually, territorial and maritime issues are passed down to later administrations and generations without resolution. Another aspect of maritime security that causes waves is sovereignty and national pride—where states refuse to buckle under the conflicts so as to not look weak on issues. As far as China is concerned, the rise of China is inevitable and its military has grown exponentially. Just as Mr. Kotani pointed out, as
Chinese military capabilities expand, so too does that need for larger areas for training and exercises. The South China Sea provides such an area, yet the consequence of this is China’s encroachment on neighboring countries. As a result, the South China Sea has become a hot discussion topic between China, the United States, and East Asian regional nations. Unfortunately, according to Dr. Tran Troung, there has not been a final resolution in our generation, so the question is how to manage the disputes to avoid escalation into military conflicts.

Maritime security has become one of the most important issues to face East Asia to date. Differing historical claims and interpretations, unclear maritime laws, the overlapping of domestic and international law, state complacency with the status quo, and the inability to find resolutions to these conflicts have formed the unstable foundation of maritime disputes. It is necessary for the world to establish a more effective mechanism to deal with disputes so that they no longer hinder diplomatic progress in East Asia.

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**SESSION 5**

**Date:** May 1, 2013  
**Time:** 14:00-15:15  
**Place:** Grand Ballroom III

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**China and ASEAN**

**Moderator:** A. Greer Meisels, The Wilson Center  
**Speakers:**  
- Satu Limaye, East-West Center in Washington  
- Liu Lin, PLA Academy of Military Science  
- Francesco Mancini, International Peace Institute  
- Nguyen Hung Son, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam  
- Victoria Tuke, Tokyo Foundation

China’s relationship with the ten member states of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has witnessed periods of both confrontation and accommodation, with economic cooperation at the center of interaction. This panel’s objective was to examine the long-term ambitions of China towards ASEAN, in addition to the probable responses of member governments. At the outset it was established by the moderator, A. Greer Meisels, the New Asian Initiatives Associate at the Wilson Center, posited that there was more to the relationship than the territorial disputes and maritime security issues that often attract attention. In addition, often each country within ASEAN maintains a different relationship towards China, for example that between China and Myanmar and China and the Philippines, which deserves consideration. There remains, however, despite deepening economic integration, a shared and growing unease about Chinese “aggressiveness” and future goals in the region.

Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in Washington D.C., began his remarks by noting how relations have worsened considerably in the past three to four years, asking whether this can be easily rectified or if the situation will become worse. Dr. Limaye recognized the constant possibility of miscalculation in relations but also that there was some room for management given the significant stakes for all parties involved. The challenge for ASEAN lies in how to create cohesion and unity when relationships within the region are becoming internationalized and additional players such as India, Korea, and Japan are starting to participate in regional forums such as the East Asia Summit. The China-ASEAN relationship, commented Dr. Limaye, was no longer one of interest only to the United States.

For the United States nevertheless, Dr. Limaye considered Southeast Asia to represent the most innovative element of President Obama’s Asia “pivot.” For the first time in history Dr. Limaye noted, the United States was working with all ten ASEAN members in response to demand for an American presence. Dr.
Limaye appreciated, however, that while each is seeking US participation, this does not equate to “alignment.” Instead members of ASEAN are looking beyond the bilateral relationships with the United States to the multilateral networks and trade opportunities working with the United States facilitates.

Liu Lin, associate research fellow in the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), drew attention to the South China Sea, which she believed to be an unavoidable topic for discussion. According to Lt. Colonel Liu, the issue is not just between China and ASEAN. Instead the problem relates to the continued modernization of Southeast Asian states’ militaries in recent years, rising nationalism, and the need for resources, which has intensified competition. The US “pivot,” which as Dr. Limaye noted earlier had given more focus to Southeast Asia, had also created a situation whereby while ASEAN sought a closer economic relationship with China, on security issues, the United States was still preferred.

Francesco Mancini, senior director of research at the International Peace Institute in New York, began his comments on a positive note, identifying how global trends in regionalism in such areas as the African Union and ASEAN are increasingly dynamic (the Middle East being one exception). For Mr. Mancini, regionalism is a response to rising global challenges and as China continues to rise, so too will ASEAN be encouraged to work together on issues such as trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as political alignment. The decision to grant Myanmar the chairmanship of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2014 for example, was but one case identified by Mr. Mancini of how leveraging the ASEAN network might have encouraged Myanmar to open up. Mr. Mancini also brought attention to the problems of corruption, organized crime and disaster relief, which can act as further incentives for cooperation.

The final panelist in this session was Nguyen Hung Son, the deputy director-general of the Institute for South East Asia/East Sea Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. While China had made significant moves towards ASEAN in the past decade, Mr. Nguyen argued that in 2012 Beijing made a “strategic mistake.” By placing pressure on Cambodia, then Chair of the ARF proceedings, to prohibit reference to the maritime territorial dispute between China and the Philippines, no joint communiqué was released for the first time in the association’s 45-year history. After a “honeymoon period” when relations warmed considerably and despite Chinese efforts for “silence” on the South China Sea dispute during ARF proceedings, Mr. Nguyen stated that the actual outcome was much louder and served only to reinforce regional fears of China’s intentions. In addition, if China sought to push away the United States, the result was in fact greater US involvement. Mr. Nguyen noted that a US-China confrontation would not necessarily lead to a permanent division within ASEAN but that it is likely, nonetheless that member states would take sides in such a scenario.

To conclude his comments, Mr. Nguyen called on China to work with ASEAN in establishing a more binding “Code of Conduct” on the South China Sea, which he stated could prevent the need to refer to international courts, which the Chinese government opposes. On the topic of the Korean Peninsula and support for regimes such as the military influence in Myanmar, Mr. Nguyen saw little reason for China to create and defend a buffer zone in this region, since in the context of globalization a maritime blockade against China was highly unlikely. Mr. Nguyen further asked if China could rethink its strategy towards North Korea, then a similar reassessment should be made in its current policy towards the South China Sea.

During the question-and-answer period, Lt. Colonel Liu was challenged on China’s recent military modernization efforts. Lt. Colonel Liu responded by stating that the purpose of greater investment was to protect China’s expanding maritime interests and it remained defensive in nature. She also added that given China’s size and growing challenges and interests, such a program was quite normal, further noting similar efforts by Southeast Asian countries to enhance their military capability.

The discussion involving members of the audience also raised the role of external players in the current dynamic between China and ASEAN, namely Japan. As a trading nation, Japan holds valid interests in maritime security but as Japan has increased its cooperation with ASEAN countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, China has become aware of the wider implications of the relationship, noted Lt. Colonel Liu. In response to another question from the floor, the panelists recognized a potentially useful role for the United Nations in monitoring developments in the region but also agreed that little to date had been achieved.

Dr. Limaye reiterated his comments from earlier in the panel, arguing that the relationship between China and ASEAN is not as bad as often supposed and that whilst there is often a focus on the negative, there remain several areas of cooperation. The disputes which do exist furthermore, are not new, but...
historical. On the topic of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and territorial disputes between some ASEAN members and China in the South China Sea, Dr. Limaye called for appreciation of the many differences between the two issues. Despite some overlap geopolitically regarding the rise of China and implications for the United States, which is witnessing some questioning of the reliability of US commitments among its allies in the region, Dr. Limaye was keen to separate the two.

Another question from the floor asked whether China was truly interested in ASEAN coherence and unity. According to the audience participant, some would argue that China’s moves are attempting to break up the ARF and that while they are favorable towards economic integration; they are also cautious regarding internal political unity. Lt. Colonel Liu stated in response that China supports ASEAN integration since this does not run counter to China’s own interests. Lt. Colonel Liu acknowledged that China should be more sensitive to ASEAN’s concerns on some issues but also that others should recognize China’s own reluctance to internalize the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, as was raised during a separate question, the events in Cambodia may well have suggested to some that China’s objective was to portray China as strong and ASEAN weak.

For the conclusion of the panel, an overall positive assessment was given by the moderator, Ms. Meisels, who noted how the very fact that such a topic of China-ASEAN relations was afforded its own panel demonstrated the evolving significance of the ASEAN region. As all panelists agreed, the South China Sea was likely to remain a critical issue as strategic mistrust destabilizes an otherwise mutually beneficial relationship. Further dialogue and efforts to recognize each other’s concerns and objectives will reduce the likelihood of increasing tensions and result in greater coordination. As this panel discussed, such an objective is not just the task of China and ASEAN members alone but also the other regional players such as Japan and the United States.

Refugees and Neighbors

Moderator: Lucy Williamson, BBC
Speakers: Bruce W. Bennett, RAND Corporation
Cheng Xiaohe, Renmin University
Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute
Miyake Kuni, The Canon Institute for Global Studies
Shin Beomchul, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Ardie B. Ermac, Korea University
Rapporteur: Ardie B. Ermac, Korea University

At the heart of the contingency plans and strategies for a potential North Korean collapse lies the concern over the displacement of millions of North Koreans. It is expected that the responsibility for the millions of North Korean refugees would fall upon the UN, South Korea, the United States and also China. Moderator Lucy Williamson, BBC’s Seoul correspondent, opened the session by raising important questions surrounding the potential North Korean collapse, as well as the country strategies and preparations for such scenarios. These issues dominated the ensuing conversations.
On the potential collapse of the North Korean regime, the panelists appeared to have divergent views on the driving factors. To begin with, Shin Beomchul, director of the Division of North Korean Military Studies at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, presented three plausible scenarios of a North Korean collapse. The first two scenarios are triggered by domestic forces. On the one hand, Dr. Shin articulated that the regime’s strategy to advance their nuclear program alongside economic development is not sustainable. The financial resources necessary for the maintenance of its nuclear programs will eventually compromise its economy, leading to its collapse. The second scenario is arguably an outgrowth of the potential economic difficulties of the country. If the young leader fails to improve its economy or maintain the influx of financial resources, he noted that it might lead to a power struggle among factions. The third scenario points to the potential for military conflict with South Korea as local clashes might escalate into an all-out war. Dr. Shin however did not offer assessment as to which scenarios are more likely, but he articulated that the size of the North Korean refugee flow is contingent on the conditions that bring about the collapse of the communist regime.

Bruce W. Bennett, senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation, argued that North Korea shows signs of a failed state and as such the chances of collapse are relatively high. However, unlike Dr. Shin, Dr. Bennett posited that the collapse will be rather be dramatic and sudden. He believes that the drivers for change will be a result of a successful assassination of Kim Jong-un. The apparent presence of personal security surrounding the young leader, Dr. Bennett argued, is a reflection of fear over his safety. Since Kim Jong-un has not named a successor, for obvious reasons, his assassination could bring about a political vacuum that could reinforce existing factions within the Party. Essentially, struggle for power among elites will result in a dramatic and sudden collapse. Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, pointed to the probability of an economic collapse as the impetus for fundamental changes in North Korea. According to Dr. Eberstadt, in cases where there is a breakdown of the division of labor, where people can no longer sell their work for food, the country essentially has a system that is in effect collapsing. However, he cautiously noted that there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the conditions that lead to a collapse of a certain regime, and more often than not, the real contributing factors will not be evident until the regime has already collapsed.

In contrast, Miyake Kuni, research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies, while open to the possibility of a North Korean collapse, maintained that the dictatorship is resilient and strong, an idea that is shared by Dr. Shin who cautioned observers about underestimating the stability of the regime. In fact, Dr. Shin argued that the Kim family has been relatively successful in portraying themselves as gods, and akin to religious groups, enjoy the support of their followers.

Nevertheless, the panelists, despite their varying views on the strength of the regime, agreed that, in some way or another, it is bound to collapse. Hence the need to prepare contingency plans and strategies to deal with a post-DPRK scenario is paramount, particularly for its immediate neighbors and the United States.

Dr. Bennett argued that providing humanitarian aid will be far more challenging when the people are displaced or when they start moving across borders. Hence in the event of North Korean regime collapse, Dr. Bennett posited that a better approach would be to launch an early intervention. Moreover, an assessment of the social and political context is crucial to the success of the intervention. For instance, in a collapse, food will be scarce not only for the civilians but also for the military, and in under such circumstances, Dr. Bennett argued that merely injecting food aid and other assistance might not reach the people who need it the most. More importantly, with the breakdown of the state apparatus, a conflict among social groups might ensue. He pointed out that interventions are not purely humanitarian, and if North Korea collapses, a military intervention might be necessary in order to provide security and stability, as well as to provide help in the distribution of humanitarian aid. He also argued that co-opting the North Korean military through food or selective amnesty will prove to be more beneficial than fighting it. Similarly, Dr. Shin appeared to share the idea of an early intervention. Although, he believed intervention should be much sooner than what Dr. Bennett had in mind. He argued that the South Korean government should focus on prevention as opposed to responding to a potential collapse as the influx of refugees is, on the one hand, hard to control and, on the other, poses a great challenge to their country’s capabilities. Prevention, according to Dr. Shin, can be achieved through cooperating with other countries in leading North Korea in the proper direction, and in the event that it collapses, South Korea should focus on humanitarian aid. However, North Korea’s refusal to dismantle its nuclear program makes this approach far more challenging.

Dr. Eberstadt noted that over the past years, the predominant narrative about the post-DPRK future of the Korean Peninsula has been largely influenced by the German experience. There are many reasons behind this comparison. Advocates would point to the many similarities between the German and Korean case. Korea, like Germany in the past, is divided, it is ethnically homogenous, and Eastern Germany was a communist nation. With Germany’s relative success in reunification, many observers argued that given the fundamental similarities between the two cases, perhaps Korea could learn from the German model. Dr. Eberstadt however believes that there exist other historical analogies that could help Korea in the prospective reunification process. Dr. Eberstadt posited that in many ways the US experience with reunification, commonly referred to as reconstruction at the end of the Cold War in the 1960s, has a wealth of lessons to offer to Korea. He further argued that the US analogy might even be closer to the Korean situation than Germany. For example, he noted that the Southern experience lasted for a few generations, as with North Korea. The North Korean system of classifying society into different castes is similar to the US experience in the South. Prior to reunification, the United States went through a long and bloody civil war that left lasting historical animosity. By reflecting upon the difficulties the US faced during the early stages of reunification and what it failed to do, South Korea can better equip itself in the event a North Korean collapse. For instance, due to the failure of the United States to facilitate mobility between the two regions, and their failure to extend political and civil rights to the defeated population, particularly those subjected to oppression in the South, a considerable difference in living standards is apparent.
between the North and the defeated parts in the American South. Learning how to avoid situations like this to follow immediately after a prospective Korean reunification might inform ROK strategies and policies.

Furthermore, China has over the years been consistent in its approach to North Korea. It recognizes the importance of maintaining healthy relations with the communist state. However, as Cheng Xiaohe, associate professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China noted that the relationship between the two countries has recently witnessed changes. He maintained that the current DPRK leadership has alienated China and as such it proves to be difficult to predict what the relationship will be like in the future. Dr. Cheng believes that it is not in the interest of China to make the North Korean regime its enemy, but some Chinese observers argued that the bilateral relations have been costly and prevented China’s ability to contribute to the collective good of the region. Nevertheless, Dr. Cheng maintained that the Chinese government is and should be prepared to respond to the possible contingency in North Korea. While the flow of refugees might more likely be towards China and South Korea, Mr. Miyake emphasized that Japan remains vigilant of the possibility that thousands of North Korean refugees might board vessels and head towards the western coast of the country. Recognizing the need for additional capacity to accommodate the influx of refugees and its economic and security implications, Mr. Miyake emphasized the importance of coordinating with the United States and South Korea in order to better address the potential problems. Indeed, with a great deal of uncertainty over the prospects of contingency in the North, broader cooperation among its neighbors truly is the best way forward.

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Democracies in Southeast Asia

Moderator: David Chance, Thomson Reuters
Speakers: Lee Jaehyon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Satu Limaye, East-West Center in Washington
Toh Kin Woon, Penang Institute
Christopher Walker, National Endowment for Democracy
Olivia Enos, Heritage Foundation

Democracy has taken on many forms in Southeast Asia. From Singapore that has a robust economic system to Burma that is struggling to implement democracy and uphold the human rights of its own people; the countries are varied in their degrees of development.

At the Asan Plenum 2013, a group of panelists discussed the myriad ways that democracy has played out in Southeast Asia. By noting the key trends and differences amongst the countries, the panelists were able to envision the future of Southeast Asia.

Lee Jaehyon, director of the Center for ASEAN and Oceania Studies at the Asan Institute, placed democracies in Southeast Asia into two different categories. The first category, semi-democracies, includes Malaysia and Singapore. Characteristics of a semi-democracy include rapid economic development, regular election-like cycles, and the implementation of a sustainable governmental system. According to Dr. Lee, both Malaysia and Singapore have the potential to be turned into Western-style democracies.

However, Malaysia and Singapore are only considered semi-democracies rather than full-fledged democracies because the democratic process has not been brought to completion. For example, within both countries, particularly Malaysia, the ruling parties remain the same. Dr. Lee explains this phenomenon by noting that the people fear that they will lose the economic gains the countries have made if the ruling party is uprooted. Politics in Malaysia are particularly tenuous because the potential for ethnic conflict is not off the table.

The second category, unstable democracies, includes Indonesia and the Philippines. They are placed in this category because their party politics are not as established as other countries in the region. For
example, the Philippines experience rampant judicial killings and does not enjoy freedoms that generally accompany democracies in the region. The deeply rooted patron-client relationship that exists in the Filipino society contributes to the aristocratic societal structure. It also means that the wealthy dominate both politics and economics in the country.

Indonesia, on the other hand, is a fledgling democracy. The size of the country makes it difficult to institute democracy in any sort of sweeping fashion. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been in place since 2004 and has implemented a suitable democratic structure. Nonetheless, Indonesia has struggled in the areas of religious freedom. Persecution of Christians, and the Muslim minority group, the Ahmadiya, has increased in recent years.

Another panelist, Christopher Walker, executive director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) International Forum for Democratic Studies, classifies Southeast Asian democracies differently. He identifies Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia as middle-performing democracies and Burma as an authoritarian state. He views Indonesia as a more developed democracy than Malaysia. This is largely based off of their designation as free, partly free, or mostly free by the Freedom House study conducted on international freedom abroad.

Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in Washington D.C., would agree with Mr. Walker on Burma. Dr. Limaye contends that Burmese government reforms could hardly be considered democratization. There are lessons from Indonesian democratic development that are instructive for Burma, however, continued persecution and human rights violations within the Rohingya and Kachin communities have demonstrated that Burma’s reforms are far from finished. Additionally, corruption within the Burmese military and other branches of the government contribute to instability. While Burma has made rapid and productive reforms, it is integral that the international community reward Burma with restraint—not acting too quickly to remove sanctions.

International actors play a key role in the formation of democracy in the region. According to Dr. Limaye, China is a requirement for democratization within Southeast Asia. China has played an integral role in much of the region, particularly through investment in natural resources and infrastructure development in places such as Burma. While China is not a democracy, Dr. Limaye says its understanding of democracy has been insightful for democratic development in Southeast Asia.

The Obama administration’s rapprochement in Burma has worried the Chinese because they fear losing a key foothold in the region. As the United States implements its pivot to Asia, Southeast Asia may become a new frontier for development. As Dr. Limaye notes, US and Western influence in the region should have a particularly positive impact on human rights.

Malaysia is the most recent nation in Southeast Asia to hold elections. On May 5, 2013, the ruling party, Barisan Nasional coalition, was re-elected—continuing its 56 year reign. Malaysia expert Toh Kin Woon, senior research fellow at the Penang Institute, notes that in recent years, Malaysia has experienced a decline in governance, or “de-democratization.”

The most recent election was not unlike past elections. As expected, Najib Razak was once again elected Prime Minister. Malaysia is one of very few democracies to have never experienced a change in the ruling party.

Dr. Toh identifies six reasons for this anomaly: 1) Domination of mass media. In Malaysia, the media is not free, and the country consistently gets low rankings for its media freedom. Freedom of the press has further declined in recent years. 2) Lack of an independent judiciary. 3) Weak legal system. Individuals can be detained without trial. 4) Emergence of civil society. Only in more recent years has there been a growth in independent vocal groups and NGOs that recognize that unless elections are free and fair there is no way to challenge the ruling party. 5) Poor election integrity. Voter rolls are full of phantom voters and bribery is common. 6) Ethnic strife. People fear ethnic conflict will occur if the ruling party is unseated. The ruling party plays on these fears in order to secure re-election.

The characteristics of the Malaysia democracy as identified by Dr. Toh contributed to the tumult in this past election. The 2013 election was the closest election in years. Opposition party leader Anwar Ibrahim of the Parakatan Rakyat party did not immediately concede the election because they believed that election fraud had stolen their victory. Turmoil in Malaysia’s last election seriously challenged the right to free speech, and yet again demonstrated that the ruling party’s willingness to abuse power to squelch the opposition. While Malaysia nominally operates as a democracy, there are still several steps that need to be made to implement a full-fledged democracy and guarantee election integrity for the future.

The Philippines has a strong and stable party system, but it struggles to secure certain basic freedoms for
its people. The wealthy dominate Filipino society. This means that political views tend to be more or less homogenous since the elite are in the ruling class. This often widens the gap between the rich and the poor and further diminishes the lower classes say in day-to-day politics. Additionally, clans are formed that use personal armies to coerce the polity.

The fact that military personnel have not been prosecuted is startling, particularly since the military and the police are most commonly involved in the vast number of instances of brutal torture and extrajudicial killings. Dr. Lee notes that cronyism is rampant in the Philippines, thus it is logical that extrajudicial killings and the suppression of minority populations would be common. Nonetheless, the Philippines has come a long way and is a key ally and partner of the United States.

While all of the panelists agreed that Burma has made vast improvements, it could hardly be characterized as a democracy. What are the primary improvements that Burma has made in the past few years? Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from her house arrest in late 2010 marking a turning point in the Burmese politics. Suu Kyi’s dedication to democratic principles has given voice to the opposition party.

The new government under President Thein Sein has ushered in a new era of reforms and to some extent reduced the power of the Burmese military. Under Thein Sein’s leadership, Burma has attracted vast amounts of foreign direct investment from developed countries such as China, Japan, and the United States. High-level officials including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama have visited Burma. Such recognition has granted credence to Burma’s progress. The United States and the European Union have reduced and removed certain sanctions and granted greater legitimacy to Thein Sein’s government.

A multiplicity of positive developments include the introduction of an uncensored Internet, labor protections, and a more developed and reliable banking system. They have even held landmark elections in which the National League for Democracy garnered 43 out of the 45 parliamentary seats in a by-election. From visits to the United States to greater international recognition for its progress, Burma has come a long way.

However, persecution of minorities, increased violence between Buddhists and Muslims in 2012 and 2013, as well as discriminatory legal policies like the “two-child policy” aimed at the Muslim minority Rohingya reveal that Burma is for now, just a patchwork democracy. Violence, displacement, and discrimination have accompanied reforms in Burma. The military continues to play a strong role in persecution of the minority groups, and the government of Burma has legally sanctioned the “two-child” discriminatory law against the Rohingya.

The international community must send the message that democratic governments recognize the human rights and dignity of its people. By using a steady hand, the international community should reward Burma for its economic and political increases, while simultaneously addressing human rights concerns in the region.

Democracy has taken on many forms across Southeast Asia. As the region continues to grow and develop it has the potential to become a burgeoning market for investment and economic development. In the coming years, it is critical now more than ever that the international community encourage growth and development in the region, but simultaneously emphasize the importance of free and fair elections as well as the vital importance of protecting human rights.
Just as Ralph Waldo Emerson identified the American Revolution’s “shot heard ’round the world” as the spark that ignited the wave of Atlantic revolutions in the late eighteenth century, so has Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation been highlighted as the catalyst for the series of revolutionary uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring. Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, which culminated in the deposition and exile of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was soon followed by 18 days of massive protests in Egypt that precipitated the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. Since then, the combination of oppressive leaders and agitated citizenries produced an explosive chain-reaction of insurrection in numerous countries throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, but there has been a notable deficit of post-revolution leadership in many of these countries, leading to further violence, confusion and upheaval instead of a peaceful path to democracy. Panel moderator Han Intaek, associate research fellow at the Jeju Peace Institute, asked the panelists to highlight the causes of these revolutions, as well as to explain the consequences of the “Post-Arab Spring leadership deficit.”

Mohammad Elhalawani, first secretary and consul at the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt at the Republic of Korea, informed the audience that the term “Arab Spring” is not preferred in the Arab world because it can insinuate a hidden foreign agenda or imply that the Arab people didn’t have the self-confidence to achieve the social and political transformations on their own. The revolutions and uprisings that took place in Arab countries like Tunisia and Egypt are actually still ongoing, which means there isn’t a clear sense of leadership or direction. The people who participated in these revolutions cannot fully understand what happened—they lived for generations under regimes that ruled with an iron fist, but suddenly, those regimes crumbled before their eyes.

To some, the revolutions were expected because of the cumulation of corruption and systemic decay. Pent up frustrations with corrupt and inefficient leaders in the Arab world has been building for many years. Many Arab states, such as Mr. Elhalawani’s native country of Egypt, experienced rising social discontent due to dire economic problems, rising prices, and mismanagement of state funds. After the revolutions, the people were initially ecstatic, but now there is a state of disorientation, and nobody seems to know the right step forward. One clear effect of this disorientation is the rise of collectivism in the post-Arab Spring states. The Arab Spring introduced the idea of people as leaders, but the people have overemphasized their power. This is another sort of leadership—in the people themselves—that the Arab people have not been accustomed to, so they are not yet fully capable of efficiently organizing or making collective decisions. They will need time to adapt themselves to the process of democratic change.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian state is now in trouble—the leadership has not been living up to the expectations of the Egyptian people, and political Islam continues to be contentious on many levels. This current state of affairs in Egypt is not what the Egyptian people expected, so now they have to reappraise the situation. The Egyptian revolution is still in the making and needs to move on to the next phase of greater political organization.

Ellen Laipson, president and CEO of Stimson Center, stated that ensuring competent, capable leadership is a global challenge, and is not unique to the Arab world. The “Arab Spring” countries are not merely suffering from a leadership deficit, they are suffering from the increasing competition for leadership. Unstable systems in the Arab world cannot currently face the demands of societies in turmoil. We must remind ourselves that the Middle East, in recent history, is known for an excess—not an insufficiency—of leadership. These societies have come from a long period of top-down authoritarian politics with little room
for expression or political action. Thus, there is some element of relief in the Arab Spring countries that
the revolutions represent the end of an era in which larger-than-life political figures occupied the whole
political space.

One problem resulting from this new era of politics in the Arab Spring countries is what Ms. Laipson
refers to as a “citizenship deficit,” meaning that many of the citizens do not have realistic expectations
about the relationship between society and government. The old social pact between the leaders and those
who are led has been exposed as obsolete or non-functioning, but we don’t know what the new pact looks
like; labor unions, women and other actors who have been mobilized to protest need to effectively petition
the government and make their voices heard. The development of a new concept of citizenship in the Arab
world can help to overcome societal cleavages, but at present, it seems as if nobody is happy: the leaders
of revolution, the Islamists, the military, and many of the people are dissatisfied. There is still much social
turbulence and nobody seems confident about how to reach a new equilibrium point.

A primary example of this conundrum can be found within the Tunisian political system. The former prime
minister of Tunisia comes from the dominant political party, and he aspired to be a competent, modern
and inclusive leader of a modernizing state. Yet in less than two years of transition in Tunisia, he was
marginalized due to the polarization of politics within his party.

To move beyond the current state of political division and uncertainty in the post-Arab Spring states,
those who participated in the protests and who seek a new social pact need to organize themselves and
channel their demands effectively so the political leadership can address the issues. Contentious issues
such as the status of women, sectarian identities, and the role of religion in public life might not be resolved
by political institutions; thus, strategic patience is necessary while these societies work through the process
of addressing the numerous challenges that create social cleavages and diverse societal demands. In the
Arab world and beyond, we need to rethink traditional concepts of leadership, not just as power residing
in the executive, but as a government with the authority, legitimacy and capacity to rule effectively.
Until the post-Arab Spring states achieve a stable level of democratic rule, the people also need to be
wary of “charismatic populism,” in which a charismatic individual telling the people what they want to
hear may actually lead down the road to authoritarian rule.

Christian Berger, director general for North Africa, Middle East, Arab Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran at the
European Union External Action Service, reminded the audience that despite the nineteenth century revo-
lutions in Europe, it took about a century for a majority of European countries to become democratic. In
the post-Arab Spring states, there are currently strong political forces voicing pent up frustration from
years of oppression, as well as widespread disenchantment with those who took power after the revolu-
tions. These disenchanted individuals in society are trying to redefine their relationship with the state.
Regimes in Europe went through this transition period in the nineteenth century, and European coun-
tries, working through the EU, are now trying to support the people in the Arab Spring countries as much
as possible without being intrusive. In the formation of new social pacts within these Arab countries, the
leadership needs to provide the people with “economic dignity,” meaning jobs that provide sufficient
income.

The EU is trying to help improve the socioeconomic conditions in these post-revolution countries in
numerous ways. The EU has set up an array of support structures and a special task force, provided expertise,
allocated 1.6 billion euros for development cooperation, and worked with various institutions in the
public and private sectors to facilitate stable transitions in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet numer-
ous challenges remain. For example, although Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi wants to encourage
European tourism and investment, Mr. Berger noted that it’s difficult to achieve these goals if Europeans
are seeing images of Egyptian violence and social upheaval on television. Nevertheless, Egypt has played
a strong and positive leadership role on several regional issues, so we should not assess the “leadership
deficit” merely in domestic terms, but in regional and international terms as well. Overall, the road to
democracy will take a considerable amount of time, as it did for many European countries, and the EU
hopes to help facilitate a stable transition process.

In terms of domestic leadership, there is no clear answer yet, because too many people in the post-Arab
Spring countries want to be leaders, but too few people have embraced a new sense of citizenship. There
is a consistent struggle between Islamic forces and other civil society groups, as well as a backlash in
society due to legislation proposed by those in power. In order to achieve the aims of the Arab Spring
revolutions, the EU wants to help put these countries on the proper path to “deep democracy,” which
requires the protection of human rights and the establishment of good governance.
Democracy and Economic Crises

Moderator: Simon Long, The Economist
Speakers: Morris Fiorina, Stanford University
Carl Gershman, National Endowment for Democracy
Yukon Huang, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Charles Kupchan, Georgetown University
Lee Keun, Seoul National University
Rapporteur: Seukhoon Paul Choi, Council on Foreign Relations

Simon Long, Asia columnist of the Economist began the session quoting Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker who stated “we all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected after we’ve done it.” He then challenged the panel to discuss the connection between democracy and economic crises.

Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy expressed several concerns in regard to democracy. In the advent of the Arab Spring, there has been pushback from authoritarian countries. He noted that Freedom House reports that a greater number of countries experienced a decline versus advancement in freedom in 2013. This setback for democracy was not the result of economic crises, but rather poor governance and a decline of trust in political institutions. Still, countries have gotten rid of governments more than regimes. Arguing that democracy provides resilient stability, Mr. Gershman advocated that democracy can correct its problems whereas other authoritarian systems that are more rigid will find it more difficult to do so. Countries like China base their legitimacy on performance. Although many Chinese believe their regime is stable, forces of change are becoming greater than forces of status quo.

Charles Kupchan, professor of international affairs in the School of Foreign Service and the Government Department at Georgetown University, explained that the crises which have beset the democratic West in the last few years mark an inflection point that is the end of a 200 year period in which Western democracy has anchored and shaped the global system. He argued that globalization has shifted productivity and wealth to other areas of the world. In the United States, wages are stagnant and economic inequality is rising. This stumbled of the West comes at an inopportune time because emerging models of governance and economic activity will pose challenges to the liberal economic system. As the world enters this difficult period, it is important that Western countries avoid becoming preoccupied internally. Dr. Kupchan warned that the United States may be going into entrenchment and that Europe was having similar problems. Although Dr. Kupchan expressed his confidence that the United States, with its democratic system that is self-correcting, would overcome these challenges, he explained that a major obstacle to its recovery would be the current political polarization that is paralyzing government. To overcome economic difficulties governments need to practice and implement good politics and policies, which requires a restoration of hope among the middle class.

Lee Keun, professor of economics at Seoul National University explained that the relationship between democracy and economic crises was more complex than is often recognized. He argued that democracy can lead to economic chaos. Furthermore, although liberalization was thought to lead to greater economic growth, it could instead lead to financial crisis, as was the case in 1997 South Korea and 2008 United States. Dr. Lee argued that economic performance is an intervening variable between democratic and economic crises. He explained citizens’ expectations in a democracy change over time and phases of development. South Korea’s economy advanced rapidly under authoritarianism, after which there was greater demand for democracy. Following political transition and democratic consolidation in the 1980s, public
demand has now shifted to economic democratization, a check against conglomerates, and support for small and medium enterprises. As this case demonstrates, there is no single path to or ideal model of democracy. Even US style democracy is beset with many problems including inequality and a system that is weak to political donations.

Morris Fiorina, Wendt Family Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, explained that there has been marginal change in the partisanship of voters and their support for issues. There is a “big middle” in American politics. However, this majority of US citizens have no home in the main parties of the US political system. This is because groups, including lobbies and civic organizations, which are highly polarized, have taken over the political agenda. Administrations are governing toward their party bases. Thus, Dr. Fiorina argued that US politics will be characterized by a ping pong dynamic until a competition for the middle ground emerges. It is unlikely that much will change in the 2014 congressional elections and that gridlock is likely to continue for the next four years.

He explained that there is a mismatch between the priorities of the political class and the electorate. Also, the media is failing in an accurate portrayal of what is important to the general public. The Pew foundation published a poll in January that revealed most voters considered immigration and gun control lower level issues when asked what should be the federal government’s priorities. This divide between the political class and the electorate, which are highly polarized, have taken over the political agenda. Administrations are governing toward their party bases. Thus, Dr. Fiorina argued that US politics will be characterized by a ping pong dynamic until a competition for the middle ground emerges. It is unlikely that much will change in the 2014 congressional elections and that gridlock is likely to continue for the next four years.

Mr. Gershman then argued that democracy with all its problems remains the only system of legitimacy in the world. The main weakness of China is that it lacks political legitimacy. He noted that the Arab Spring represented the demand of people in the Middle East for their fundamental rights and dignity. Democracy is a universal value. One problem faced by democratic South Korea and Japan is that their citizens are not having children, but their expenditures for entitlement programs are rising. It is uncertain whether democracies can deal with this problem. Without scaling back on entitlement programs, there will be no resources to invest in infrastructure and human capital.

Dr. Kupchan then discussed the relationship between globalization and democracy. He noted that many democratic societies feel that the campaign finance system has captured their political system. Winners of globalization block reforms to deliver goods equally across society. It is difficult for average voters to be represented when lobby groups are so influential. The challenge is to reconnect the political system with the mass public. The dichotomous distinction that democratic governments are legitimate and nondemocratic governments are not lacks nuance. Although the US government is democratic, it seems illegitimate because it is captured. In the Middle East, some governments gain their legitimacy through Islam. Fringe parties on the left and right remain, but are in the opposition. Democratic systems have a resilience and centrism that is anchored in the will of mass publics even under great strain.
Asan Plenum 2013 Photos

[Images of various scenes from the event, including speakers, large group gatherings, and networking opportunities.]
The Asan Institute’s Young Scholars Program was created to invite undergraduate and graduate students from Korea’s most prestigious universities and young professionals from think tanks around the world to participate in the Asan Plenum 2013, in which they have the unique opportunity to engage in discussions with senior experts and have lasting networks of future leaders and policy analysts.

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Director, Middle East and North Africa Center

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Research Fellow
Director, Quantitative Methods Center

Kim Hankwon, Ph.D.
Research Fellow
Director, Center for China Policy

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Director, Center for Humanities

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Lee Sung Hee
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Operating Manager, Asan Academy

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Asan Academy, Alumni Program

Kim Yuri
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Lee Eui Cheol
Public Opinion Studies Center

Lee Hye Sun
Modern Society Studies Project

Lee Ji Hyung
Center for Foreign Policy

Lee Jin Ju
Asan Academy, Admission Affairs

Peter Lee
Middle East and North Africa Center

Kang Chungku
Public Opinion Studies Center

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Public Opinion Studies Center

Lee Hye Sun
Modern Society Studies Project

Lee Ji Hyung
Center for Foreign Policy

Lee Jin Ju
Asan Academy, Admission Affairs

Peter Lee
Middle East and North Africa Center
Statistics

### Total Participation

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<th>Category</th>
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<td>Public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Press</td>
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<td>Young Scholar</td>
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<td>Overseas Observer</td>
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<td>Rapporteur</td>
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### Attendance by Category

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<td>Asan</td>
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### Overseas Participants by Country

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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam)</td>
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<td>Middle East (Iran, UAE, Turkey, Bahrain)</td>
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