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Greetings from the Chairman

Welcome to the Asan Plenum 2023!

This year, we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, which is widely regarded as one of the most successful alliances in the world since its establishment in 1953 based on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. While US-led alliances have played a crucial role in promoting peace and prosperity in the second half of the 20th century, they are now facing various challenges and opportunities in a rapidly changing international security environment. For example, the liberal international order is today being seriously tested.

We are thrilled to have you here with us to evaluate the current state of the ROK-US alliance and explore its new role and vision for the future during this year’s Asan Plenum, themed “Alliance of 70 Years and Beyond.” Your participation is essential to our efforts, and we are honored to have you join us.

As in previous years, the Asan Plenum 2023 brings together renowned scholars and professionals from around the world to engage in intensive dialogues and analyses. We look forward to all the invaluable contributions and insightful discussions that are sure to take place during the event.

Thank you for joining us, and we hope that you will enjoy the conference.

Yoon Young-kwan
Chairman
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Asan Plenum is a yearly gathering of some of the world’s leading experts and scholars. In addressing the most pressing problems facing the world with expertise from around the globe, Asan Plenum aims to impact the policy-making process and enable the global community to better deal with the challenges it faces.

**Plenum Format**

The “conversational” format of the Plenum is intended to maximize interaction among panelists and participants. Plenary and concurrent sessions will provide further in-depth discussions and networking opportunities. The Plenum features three plenary sessions and two concurrent sessions. Plenary Session 1 is 1 hour and 30 minutes, and the others are 1 hour and 15 minutes.
As an independent, non-partisan think tank, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies is dedicated to undertaking policy-relevant research to foster domestic, regional, and international environments conducive to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The Asan Institute was established in commemoration of the late Founder and Honorary Chairman of Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, who left an indelible mark on South Korea’s modernization and inter-Korean exchanges towards peace.

Named after Chung Ju-yung’s pen name “Asan,” Dr. Chung Mong Joon founded The Asan Institute on February 11, 2008, to become a world-class think tank that mirrors South Korea’s place on the world stage.
WELCOMING RECEPTION & DINNER
Date: April 24, 2023
Time: 17:30-19:30
Place: Namsan I+II

WELCOMING RECEPTION & DINNER

Date
Time
Place

April 24, 2023
17:30-19:30
Namsan I+II

ASAN PLENUM 2023

ALLIANCE OF 70 YEARS AND BEYOND
Welcome! There are many reasons we are here. Most importantly, Asan Institute has been going very well by helping Korean foreign policy in order to keep the peace in the region. In a very crucial time, we have the Asan Plenum this year.

Speaking about the Asan Plenum, let me just explain it. I entered Seoul National University in 1953 when the Korean War ended. But the following year, I received some scholarship and fellowship from a couple of American universities such as Emory University and Harvard University. Since then, I spent the next 10 years studying in the United States. In 1968, I returned to Korea so as to join the faculty of political science of Seoul National University.

What I want to point out is that Seoul National University became a very large university at that time and we brought very prestigious high school students in Korea to the campus. It was about 1981 when there was a very important freshman group.

I found MJ Chung in that group. We quickly became very close at that time. He was very much interested in politics as well as football. In terms of politics, he early ran for the national assembly and was elected seven times as a senior member of the National Assembly. He also became a very important figure in the field of Korean football by taking a role in FIFA. But, in all situations, what I want to say is that his father, Mr. Chung, the founder of Hyundai, emphasized the fact that he should study economics. Therefore, he went to the Department of Economics at Seoul National University. Contrary to his wish, MJ Chung didn’t go to economics class very often. Instead, he always came to my class, political science, which means he was more interested in politics.

Let’s go back to stories again quickly. We, MJ Chung and I, brought the world cup game to Korea. It was originally planned to host in Tokyo itself. However, we persuaded our friends in Tokyo to co-host the world cup game along with Korea. It was a time to show the world that neighboring countries, Japan and Korea, could go together by succeeding in co-hosting the world cup game. Regarding this point, I still appreciate my Japanese friends.

Let’s go back to stories again, MJ Chung graduated from Seoul National University. And then what about graduate studies? As I early mentioned, he was more interested in political science rather than economics. So, he studied international relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C. I recommended him to study there because it was the best academic institute for him to study international relations further. During his academic years, he studied very hard and obtained a Ph.D. degree as a result. After he had come back to Korea with a Ph.D. degree, we agreed that it was a right time to establish our own institute to study politics and international relations as well as peace. His late father, of course, supported his idea, which led to the born of the Asan Institute. On that track, he decided to have Asan Plenum to bring his friends from all over the world to discuss our common problems, focusing on discussing how to bring peace to the world. Now, we are enjoying this plenum every year except for the pandemic years. We are delighted to have many of all friends back here and I am looking forward to having a good meeting to come up with excellent ideas.

Let me just finish by saying that, because of the Korean War, we are interested in, more than anybody else, peace. This issue has not only become the problem of peace and war but also the problem of economic and cultural development. I can tell you that Korea has become a major country with a great achievement. The situation is very difficult now and we don’t expect an easy day or a few months in the future. But we are here together and I am sure we could bring about the idea to keep the world in peace and try to get rid of poverty as much as possible. In order to guarantee individual freedom everywhere, let us have a good plenum this year again.

Thank you very much for coming.
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, friends, Dr. Choi Kang, President of the Asan Institute, and other colleagues of Asan.

I am delighted to be here with all of you again here in Seoul. It is always a particular pleasure for me to express my sincere thanks to my long-time dear friend, Dr. Chung Mong Joon, who is welcoming us for this evening’s wonderful gathering and tomorrow’s Asan Plenum 2023, commemorating the 70 years of Korea-US alliance as well as looking beyond. Thank you, MJ, once again for your tireless efforts to move forward our two countries’ enduring alliance in action through the Asan Institute and so many other activities you have initiated during your entire illustrious career.

As you and I candidly discussed in Washington earlier this year, the Republic of Korea and the United States have accomplished a lot together. Yet we can do a lot more as we move forward with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of our alliance. In fact, that’s precisely why we are here together. I join everyone in this room for appreciating your vision and leadership toward that shared objective, MJ.

My dear friend of many years, Prime Minister Lee, it’s always good to be with you, particularly to talk about our two nations’ ever-elevating heights of partnership on many key fronts. I welcome and appreciate your opening remarks very much as well. Thanks for sharing your wisdom and offering some timely reminders on why our alliance matters more today than ever.

As we gather here in Seoul this evening, in Washington President Yoon Suk Yeo and the First Lady are paying a State Visit to the United States at the invitation of US President Joe Biden and the US First Lady. In this historic year marking the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, President Yoon has become the first leader of an Indo-Pacific country to make a state visit to the United States under the Biden administration.

It is encouraging to me, and I hope to all of you, to see that not yet one year into his presidency, President Yoon has spoken frequently of the importance of freedom. He has also underscored the importance of the South Korea-US alliance, calling the relationship “the foundation” of freedom. While visiting Seoul last May, President Biden echoed that sentiment and praised the relationship as reaching “new heights.”

The current state visit need not be just a ceremonial event. In fact, it should not be that. It can and must be a substantive success in terms of renewing and elevating the bilateral partnership to a new level of pragmatic global engagement.

As a policy person, I have been keenly interested in the ever-evolving US-Korea relationship. I have visited Korea countless times since 1971. Looking back, I must say that it is always encouraging and refreshing to be back in Korea. As all of you know, South Korea is very dynamic, politically and economically, to say the least. I don't mean to indicate how old I am by saying this, but well…I am a bit older than our two nations’ alliance that was formed by the Mutual Defense Treaty in…1953.

Since then, our relationship has proven to be one of the strongest and most successful built by America since the end of World War II. Indeed, it is a time-tested alliance. Those words really sum up the seven-decade partnership between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Though culturally different,
the two nations share the same values. Seoul has demonstrated a trustworthy and capable partner, both in terms of national security and commercial dealings.

Yet much more can and should be done. Anchored in mutual respect and common values of democracy, human rights, and freedom, over the past seven decades, the US-ROK alliance has played an indispensable role in promoting democracy, peace, economic prosperity, and security in Asia and beyond.

The enduring, proven partnership between the two willing allies continues to serve as one of the keystones of America’s entire foreign policy. Once a recipient of US development assistance, South Korea has become one of the most competitive economies in the world, and notably transformed itself from a security consumer to America’s capable and reliable partner of providing security to other nations.

Not ambiguously, the United States and South Korea share a relationship that is truly unique among our closest friends and allies. Many of America’s main alliances today are with countries the US was once forced to fight against. Japan and Germany are obvious examples, but in the early days of American history, it was with England that we were most often at war. Clearly, adversaries can become friends. However, Americans and South Koreans have never been enemies. Our two countries’ bilateral relationship was forged in the struggles of World War II and, in its aftermath, the battle against communist aggression from China and Russia. Fighting together against common enemies has indeed forged a lasting, vibrant relationship between the two long-time allies, both of whom have long supported each other, defended each other, and depended on each other.

The 70-year-long alliance has a track record of shared mutual interests of the two like-minded nations across the Pacific while overcoming challenges and adapting to ever-changing global economic and security environments. As the years have passed, these shared values have bound the two nations closer and closer. This is not to say that relations have never been strained. Yet despite numerous ups and downs—or perhaps thanks to them—Washington today considers the Republic of Korea a model ally.

Needless to say, South Korea’s relationship with the US has been underpinned and reinforced by a strong foundation of shared entrepreneurship, enduring people-to-people ties, and close business cooperation led by global companies in both countries.

Clearly, the US-South Korean alliance has been fulfilling its promises. Yet, more can and should be done, given the fact that there are untapped, innovative ways in which to broaden the work going forward together. It is in the clear interest of Seoul and Washington to elevate their partnership to the next level of greater practical engagement. In order for Korea and the United States to advance anew toward the next 70 years, all of us need to carefully cultivate this invaluable alliance and make sure it evolves in line with the changing times. Having started as a military alliance, our relationship has subsequently deepened exchanges and cooperation in a wide range of areas such as economy, society, education, and culture, and expanded into an economic alliance through the KORUS Free Trade Agreement in the dawn of the 21st century. As all of you would
agree, we have so much to learn from each other; so many similar interests; so many opportunities to create more prosperous and free societies for a greater number of people.

Let me close my remarks with the following observation. I posit this as a framework in which we can move ahead and make the next 70 years of real bilateral cooperation even more positive and productive than we have built over the last 70 years.

Let me start this observation with a personal reflection: One of the main lessons I have taken from my decades in Washington is that in Washington there are no permanent defeats. But neither are permanent victories. There are only permanent battles, particularly battles of ideas. In my 36 years as President of The Heritage Foundation, I always asserted, and still believe, that “ideas have consequences.” We need more of good ideas and far less of bad ideas! But where do these ideas come from, and how do they influence the policymakers...and eventually our policies and all of us? Ideas are produced by individuals who elaborate and expand the core ideas. Then, it takes an institution to popularize and advocate ideas. For example, our host organization here this evening—the Asan Institute—to develop, expand, and promote these positive ideas. What really matters is how to generate, facilitate, and ensure the virtuous cycle of these three “I”s—Ideas, Individuals, and Institutions. It’s a process that requires our commitment to values and principles. And specifically, our commitment of time, talent, and treasure to advance this shared agenda of the three “I”s—Ideas, Individuals, and Institutions.

That’s why our alliance matters. The ROK-US relationship is a time-tested alliance of ideas—fundamentally a mutual security commitment to each other; individuals from Presidents Syngman Rhee and Dwight Eisenhower down to today’s leading individuals in both governments and in private institutions—yes, the governmental agencies that do the day-to-day grunt work to make our bilateral relationship happen, but also the private organizations, so well represented by this program’s emphasis on individuals representing those private institutions.

And that’s why it’s an honor for me to open this very special Asan Plenum. The Asan Institute, the third “I” in the private sector built on the idea of closer, collaborative, cooperation between us, yes, in government, but also in the private sector of civil society. And I believe that through innovative thinking and follow-up action by we individuals and so many others whom we know and work with, we can keep adding and multiplying a more positive future—based on our shared vision of the future for the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

I look forward to our discussions throughout the conference tomorrow. Let us move onward and upward.

Thank you very much.
Opening Ceremony

Date: April 25, 2023
Time: 09:00-10:00
Place: Grand Ballroom I+II
This year marks the 141st anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and the United States and the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance. With the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Korean Foreign Minister Byun Young-tae and the United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the ROK-US alliance was established on October 1st, 1953.

The alliance has contributed to the free and prosperous Republic of Korea. Today, South Korea has become the 10th largest economy in the world. According to the “2022 Best Countries Report” by the Wharton School of Business and US News & World Report, South Korea ranked 6th in terms of public perception of global power, surpassing other advanced countries such as Japan and France.

The ROK-US alliance did not have a smooth start. With the end of World War II, Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which recommended “the elections be held not later than March 1948,” across the entire Korean peninsula. North Korea rejected the UN resolution, then the United States proposed a resolution to hold a general election in South Korea only. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly declared “there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea). This is the only such Government in Korea.”

The geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula at that time was very harsh. On August 9, 1945, one week before Japan’s surrender, the Soviet Union unilaterally broke the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression Pact and marched into the Korean Peninsula. To prevent the Soviet Union’s occupation of the whole Korean peninsula, the United States decided to establish a military demarcation line at the 38th latitude between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Before Japan surrendered in August 1945, there had been a civil war in China between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. In 1949, China became a Communist country. In January 1950, the United States committed the blunder of announcing the “Acheson Line,” which excluded South Korea from the US defense perimeter in the Far East. Just six months after the announcement, North Korea started the Korean War on June 25th, 1950.

Within one month of the invasion, North Korea occupied most of South Korea, except the southern port city of Busan. UN Security Council adopted a resolution condemning North Korea’s invasion and dispatched military units. The Incheon Landing Operation by General MacArthur helped recover Seoul and UN forces continued to advance north toward the Chinese border. People expected that Korea was going to be united. However, in October 1950, China intervened with one million soldiers.

The United States and fifteen other UN member states helped save South Korea by sending combat troops. 1.8 million American
soldiers and 165,000 soldiers of other UN member states were dispatched to Korea. Six countries sent medical units for field hospitals. The Korean War was a fierce war. South Korean civilian casualties numbered over a million. 140,000 South Korean soldiers died and 38,000 UN soldiers died, of which 34,000 were US soldiers.

I was born in the city of Busan in 1951 during the Korean War. Had it not been for the intervention of the United States, I would not be here today. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the United Nations and the United States. At the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C., the inscription says, “Our nation honors her sons and daughters who answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met.” We, Korean People, will never forget their noble sacrifice.

In 1953, the armistice agreement entered the final stage and South Korean President Rhee Syngman opposed the signing of the armistice agreement because he believed a mutual defense treaty with the United States was essential for the security of Korea. The United States did not see strategic value of Korea and was reluctant to sign defense treaty with South Korea.

Under these difficult circumstances, President Rhee, Ph.D. in international relations from Princeton University, unilaterally
released 27,000 anti-communist North Korean prisoners of war, which made the United States worry that President Rhee might continue the war by South Korea alone. This was one of the reasons why the United States accepted President Rhee's insistence on signing the mutual defense treaty.

In 1954, one year after the end of the Korean War, President Rhee visited the United States and delivered a speech in New York. He said, "I am not here to ask for more aid, more fund, more everything. … Our people are not crying for help. We do not beg and never shall. … Korea wants to make this contribution, not just for our own unification and survival, but to help assure liberty, justice, and peace for all people everywhere." President Rhee's speech well explains the purpose of the ROK-US Alliance.

General MacArthur, the commander of the UN Forces, once said, "It will take them [South Koreans] 100 years to recover from the devastation." In 1951, during the Korean War, the British newspaper, The Times ran a condescending editorial, saying that, "It would be more reasonable to expect to find roses growing on a garbage heap than a healthy democracy rising out of the ruins of Korea." However, both predictions were proven wrong.

In 1981, just 28 years after the Korean War, during IOC Congress in Germany, Seoul competed against Nagoya, Japan, for the 1988 Summer Olympics. Seoul won the bidding and hosted the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. My father, Chung Ju-yung, the founder of the Hyundai Group, served as the chairman of the bidding committee. South Korea also co-hosted the FIFA World Cup Football Tournament with Japan in 2002. As the Vice President of FIFA, I proposed the 2002 FIFA World Cup to be the first World Cup co-hosted between two countries, Korea and Japan.

In 1953, after the Korean War, the per capita GDP of South Korea was $67. Today, South Korea is a liberal democracy with a per capita income more than $32,000. South Korea is the world's leader in semiconductors, shipbuilding, automobiles, and smartphones. Jimin, a member of BTS, reached number 1 on the Billboard Hot 100. He became the first solo South Korean artist to reach the top spot on the chart. In 2020, the British monthly magazine "Monocle" evaluated Korea's soft power as the second most powerful in the world.

Despite these remarkable achievements, the alliance still faces many challenges. North Korea continues to maintain one-person ruling system for three generations. Observing the collapse of East Germany and the unification by West Germany, North Korea regards the existence of a free and prosperous South Korea as the very threat to the survival of North Korean regime. This is why they continue to seek the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under communist flag. Last year, North Korea tested missiles 39 times, and is threatening to turn Seoul into "sea of fire."

While we need to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea for the long-term, we must first strengthen the ROK-US military deterrence. Since nuclear weapons can be deterred only by nuclear weapons, a Korean version of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) better be formulated. The key is to make North Korea realize that with its nuclear weapons, it may lose more than it can gain.

In the face of increasing North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea should declare that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been nullified by North Korea's nuclear armament. And the United States better bring tactical nuclear weapons back to Korea, which were withdrawn in 1991.

Despite the fact that numerous governments have enshrined concepts like liberty, democracy, and human rights in their respective constitutions, they often fail to implement these concepts.

The North Korean constitution stipulates that “the State shall effectively guarantee the genuine democratic rights and freedoms” and “citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly.” However, as we know very well, the reality is very different from these words. According to the Korean Ministry of Unification, there are five political prison camps in North Korea. The regime carried out public executions for watching South Korean TV dramas or reading the Bible.

We also learned that both Chinese and Russian constitutions carry the similar provisions such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of ideas. But again, the reality is different from those provisions. According to British weekly The Economist’s “Democracy Index 2022,” out of 167 countries in the world, Russia is ranked 146th, China 156th, and North Korea 165th.

In the recent summit in Moscow, President Xi and President Putin claimed that “the United States should take concrete actions to respond to the legitimate and reasonable concerns of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” President Xi and President Putin simply try to justify North Korea’s nuclear armament and blame the United States as the very cause of the problems. What they want is the withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula with the 2nd Korean War in their mind. Such a preposterous claim is nothing new. During the Cold War, the Soviets insisted that the United States withdraw its forces from Europe and Eurasia.

If we look at the shear magnitude of the geopolitics of the vast Eurasian continent, where Russia, China, and North Korea dominantly preside, the fact that a small country like South Korea, located at the southern tip of the continent, remains a free democracy is a miracle, a miracle in progress. It is our duty to maintain this miracle.

Strengthening the alliance between South Korea and the United States does not imply treating neighboring countries as adversaries. China is a neighboring country with good relationship for thousands of years. Buddhism and Confucian philosophy came to Korea through China in the 4th century.

Recently, at a Chinese Communist Party meeting, President Xi announced “We firmly oppose hegemony and power politics in all their forms. … We advocate the common values of humanity, peace, …, equity, justice, democracy, and freedom.” We sincerely hope President Xi means what he said.

Under the slogan of “We Go Together,” “같이 갑시다,” our alliance will be the driving force for freedom and democracy.

I hope this Plenum helps the 70-year-old ROK-US Alliance overcome current challenges and move forward into the future.

Thank you.
Honorary Chairman Chung Mong Joon and Chairman Yoon Young-kwan of The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Former Prime Minister Lee Hong Koo, Former Deputy Prime Minister Jeon Yun-churl, Former Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo, Former Unification Minister Hong Yong Pyo, Former Foreign Minister De Gucht, Ambassador Castillo Fernandez, Ambassador Ahn Ho-Young, Ambassador Bolton, Ambassador Wolfowitz, Ambassador Ichiro, Ambassador Hallgren, Dr. Feulner, Dean Steinberg, General Sharp, Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me start by conveying my appreciation to Honorary Chairman Chung Mong Joon and The Asan Institute for Policy Studies for organizing this enlightening forum every year. It is a great honor and privilege for me to deliver my Congratulatory Remarks here, and, it holds all the more meaning for me since I was part of the Asan Institute as a visiting fellow years ago.

Today’s conference could not have come at a more opportune time. 2023 is a momentous year marking the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US Alliance. And as we speak, President Yoon and First Lady Kim are in the United States on a State Visit.

Today’s theme—“Alliance of 70 Years and Beyond”—allows us to contemplate the pressing challenges before us. Indeed, we are at a turning point where globalization and engagement have given way to geopolitics and disruption. Aggressions and the threat of force are reaching unprecedented levels. Supply chains are at a constant risk, and the competition for critical technologies is intensifying. That is why the term “poly-crisis” has gained widespread adoption. The world is now trying to cope with the various challenges that have ensued. So too should our alliance.

As we navigate through these uncertain times, the ROK-US Alliance has never been more critical. I can say with confidence that our alliance is one of the most successful and stout alliances in all of history. And, it is a clear testimony to the value and strength of the solidarity between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Having started as a military alliance, we have always stood shoulder-to-shoulder with each other against the numerous provocations of North Korea, including its growing nuclear and missile threats. The alliance has now become the linchpin for peace and prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula, but for the region at large.

The Korea-US relationship has subsequently grown into a very important economic partnership as well, culminating in the KORUS Free Trade Agreement. We are now further expanding the boundaries of our collaboration into the realms of science and cutting-edge technology. Our alliance has stood the test of time, based on the solid foundation of shared values and mutual trust. I note with great satisfaction that our partnership has now evolved into a robust, resilient, and enduring friendship.

Distinguished Guests, I am very proud that our alliance has never stopped evolving even in the face of changing times and challenges. In this vein, our two countries have articulated a vision for a “Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance.” The alliance would be ‘global’ as its scope will extend from the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. It would be ‘comprehensive’ as it will encompass security, economic, and technological cooperation, as well as people-to-people exchanges. It would be ‘strategic’ as we have shared goals in safeguarding core values such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, that go above and beyond our
immediate national interests.

In this process of advancing our partnership to new heights, the Republic of Korea is committed to playing our part. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s “Global Pivotal State”—or GPS—vision is an advancement of that commitment. It represents our will to redefine and recalibrate Korea’s role in the world, commensurate with our stature, to uphold universal values and the rules-based international order.

One concrete roadmap for implementing this vision is the “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” which is an open, reciprocal, and inclusive strategy based on the core values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Korea’s decision to host the Third Summit for Democracy next year in addition to its recent co-hosting of the Second Summit is yet another example of our strong commitment. The alliance has more work ahead of us to stay competitive in this era of “poly-crisis.”

President Yoon’s opportune State Visit to the US this week will provide a blueprint for future cooperation which can serve as a guiding light for the next 70 years and beyond. The visit is expected to yield substantive outcomes that will allow the two countries and peoples to truly sense the tangible security, economic and technological benefits our outstanding partnership brings. They will include strengthened extended deterrence measures, a stable business environment, expanded partnerships in new growth engines such as AI, biotechnology, space exploration, and deeper educational cooperation for future talents, among many other positive outcomes.

Also encapsulated in the theme of the State Visit is “Alliance in Action Toward the Future.” Our alliance will make every effort to chart a brighter and more prosperous future not only for our two countries and peoples, but also for the greater region and in turn the entire world.

I believe the discussions here will surely enlighten us in our efforts to prepare for the next 70 years of the alliance and beyond. On this note, I would like to bring my remarks to a close by saying that our alliance is not 70 years old, but 70 years young and strong. Let us grow even stronger together in the years ahead.

Thank you for your kind attention.
Thank you, Honorary Chairman Chung Mong Joon, Chairman Yoon Young-kwan, and Former Prime Minister Lee Hong-Koo for the opportunity to speak to such an esteemed group of participants and presenters this morning. Congratulations on convening this important event. April 26th, tomorrow, starts President Yoon Suk Yeol’s historic State Visit to Washington. So, the timing of this year’s plenum could not be better.

As we talk today about our “Alliance of 70 Years and Beyond,” the constant pace of bilateral engagement by our senior leaders reflects the fact that shared commitment to the US-ROK Alliance remains as strong as ever. One of my roles as the Deputy Chief of Mission is to nurture and further develop the comprehensive and strategic partnership we’ve created. Our goal together is to expand our cooperation to address the most pressing regional and global challenges. Our Embassy team is deeply committed to advance our bilateral relationship to new heights.

The security relationship of our two countries spans generations and serves as the foundation of our bilateral partnership. In fact, some of our American Embassy staff have parents who fought in the Korean War. Since 1953, the Alliance has provided a solid foundation for Korean prosperity. 70 years later, we have built an entire ecosystem of security, economic, and people-to-people ties that will ensure that future generations of Koreans and Americans enjoy the opportunities we do today. I anticipate these connections—security, commercial, and cultural—will be highlighted during President Yoon’s State visit to Washington tomorrow.

That President Yoon is only the second world leader President Biden has invited to the White House for a State Visit emphasizes to all of us the US-ROK Alliance is critical to advancing peace, stability, and prosperity for our two countries, the Indo-Pacific, and the world. It highlights the enduring strength of the ironclad US-ROK Alliance, the United States’ unwavering security commitment to this country, and our shared resolve to deepen and broaden our political, economic, security, and people-to-people ties, particularly through educational exchanges.

This will be the third spring in a row in which the US President has held a summit with his Korean counterpart. Each summit builds on the next, and we should expect progress on strengthening our economic security and deepening cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductors, EV batteries, biotech, quantum computing, AI, and in the defense industrial sector.

Through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Minerals Security Partnership, we are working together to secure and diversify critical supply chains, address climate change, and promote free, fair, open, and inclusive trade and development throughout the region. Meanwhile, our economic relationship continues to flourish as our bilateral trade reached a new height of $227 billion in 2022. US companies are forging new, innovative partnerships with Korean firms, and in just the last 12 months, Embassy in Seoul has processed over 15,000 work and investor visas. Over the past two years, ROK firms have pledged to invest an additional $70 billion-plus in the United States in semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), high-capacity batteries, and solar.

As we look ahead, another opportunity to advance our cooperation...
is through the ROK’s ambitious Indo-Pacific Strategy, that reemphasizes the country’s aspirations to contribute more and take on a bigger role as a “Global Pivotal State.” The United States fully supports the ROK in expanding its global role, which aligns with our own commitment to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian and Pacific Island countries and promote sustainable development, energy security, and high-quality, transparent investment, including in infrastructure. We also welcome the ROK Indo-Pacific Strategy’s emphasis on contributing to strengthening coordination with its neighbors, notably through trilateral cooperation with Japan and the United States, as well as collaboration on supply chain disruptions, cybersecurity, climate change, space, and health security.

It is an exciting time in the US–ROK bilateral relationship. We are working together around the globe. The Republic of Korea is also taking on an increasing leadership role as a champion of democracy in the region and globally. For example, this country clearly demonstrated its commitment promoting shared values on the world stage when it co-hosted the Summit for Democracy in March and as it takes on the role of sole host next year. We’ve done a lot. But we can, and will, do more together.

As we confront a host of global threats, the United States and Korea will only deepen our ties and strengthen our resolve. As I said at the outset, this bilateral relationship is already dynamic and full of energy. It certainly keeps me and the entire embassy busy…and that is a good thing.

I congratulate the Asan Institute for convening its 2023 Plenum. Your track record in stimulating dialogue is impressive and I wish you continued success. Thank you again for the opportunity to address such an impressive group of scholars and Alliance practitioners today. We look forward to the next 70 years as we go together.

Thank you very much.
advanced industrial and economic countries, I believe number ten on the overall list. And the Republic of Korea has achieved a degree of security and stability, which were only visions when I first encountered it. In fact, Korea is now engaged globally and participates with other countries in international security issues.

In the meantime, all of Asia has become a teeming area of recovery pursued in various ways, but generally moving towards a greater role in international affairs. But as these countries develop, the most significant one, in terms of history and size, is China. But other countries, like Japan, are resuming its historic growth and in that manner, the security concerns of different countries have changed. And so, I see the impact on each other.

I believe that one fixed element needs to be a clear and unambiguous commitment by the United States to the defense of South Korea—because of its strategic importance, because of its historic role, because of the decades of cooperation which have expressed these facts. In this process, inevitably, all the countries involved are adjusting their defense policies to concrete circumstances. This is not the occasion to go into any detailed discussion except to point out that the United States should be open to Korean views of their necessities overhung that South Korea is by a dictatorial regime in North Korea that is developing weapons of mass destruction.

So, we should have discussions about this special case based on the solemn commitment the United States has made to defend South Korea. And we must be prepared to analyze this evolution and to respond to dangers in a way that meets the dangers and doesn’t create new challenges. The Asan Institute is a wonderful institution to implement these tasks.

And I congratulate you for what has been achieved and for your future responsibilities and visions, to extend warm greetings to MJ Chung. Good wishes to all of you. And face in the indissoluble close relationship and defense partnership between my country and the great people of South Korea.

Thank you.
It’s understandable that Koreans would be thinking about this. Now, talking about it. We’ve been almost 20 years since North Korea pulled out of the IAEA system and kicked inspectors out and really started their aggressive program to develop and test nuclear weapons. And of course, in the last five years, they’ve been extremely active in launching missiles, short-range missiles, long-range missiles, just astounding program of launches. And it’s very understandable that Koreans would be saying, okay, what do we do? I mean, we’ve gone going for 20 years trying to talk North Korea out of having nuclear weapons. That hasn’t worked, obviously.

So, what do we do? You know, there are really only two options now. One option is that, you know, we invade North Korea with our conventional forces. We find the nuclear weapons, seize them, destroy them. Well, you know, that’s one option. But of course, that would trigger a hellacious war and undoubtedly would trigger the use of those weapons. You know, so that’s not a very good option.

The only other option really is deterrence. And I think that is at the core of our thinking in Korea now. What does Korea need to do to feel that they have adequate deterrence for, what, 30, 40 years? We have said to our Korean friends, “Trust us. We’ll take care of that. You don’t have to have nuclear weapons. You can rely on us.” But there have been events over the last three or four or five years that have really caused Koreans to question, “Can they count on the United States for what we call extended deterrence? Are we reliable?” And I’ve had quite a few conversations with Koreans about this question.

It’s understandable why Koreans are asking now “What should they do?” And as I said, there’s an awful lot of talk about Koreans feeling that they need an independent nuclear retaliatory capability for their own deterrence. I, look, this is Korea’s decision, you know, ultimately. But I think we should, it’s a decision we have to be involved with as you make it, you know, because our troops are on the ground there and our troops are going to be targeted, too.

And so, we need we’re in this together. And so, we should talk about it together. I don’t really think we’ve had an adequate conversation about this with Korean friends. We’ve just said to you, trust us. But I think, you know, there’s a lot of questioning about that now. So, I think we really have to have a kind of a pretty focused and dedicated effort to think this through together. You know, building a nuclear warhead, that’s relatively easy. You know, Korea easily has the scientific and engineering talent to do that. You know, that would be easy. But building the warhead is really the easy part. It’s everything that goes with it that becomes much more complicated.

North Korean missiles are 5 minutes flight time, 4 minutes flight time away from Korea. Chinese missiles would be 8 minutes maybe, you know, depending on where they’re based. So how do you ensure that President Yoon or whoever is authorized to retaliate, how do you ensure that they survive? What is the procedure for that? What is the intelligence system that you would need to put in place so that you have minute-by-minute tracking of important indicators for indications and warning? How do you ensure positive control over nuclear warheads? Remember, you’ll be building a nuclear warhead and giving it to a 26-year-old pilot or a launch control officer. How do you ensure that only the president controls that warhead, not the 26-year-old pilot?

You know, these are very big and challenging questions. And so, building a nuclear warhead is the start of the problem. It is not the end of it. It’s not the answer. It’s the beginning of a very big and complicated, expensive and challenging program that will never end.

I think Koreans should think through all of that, every bit of that. And I think we should be thinking through that together. I think as a first step, it would be good for us to see if we can rebuild your confidence in the US. That may not be possible, but I think it takes more of an effort on our part to sit down and talk through all of these issues with you. Biden and President Yoon did enter into an important agreement last fall at Bali, and it was that we were going to have a joint early warning capability.

I think if we don’t really work at it hard, that’ll just end up to be two times a year and they’ll get together and talk about it. I think I personally think it needs to be very real minute by minute. Korean intelligence officers, American intelligence officers sitting there side by side looking at the satellite feed, you know, that we’re getting from early warning satellites, looking at the radar feed, looking at the indications and warning indicators that are being reported by the intelligence systems. I think we need to start building real capacities side by side. I hope that that gives you more confidence in us, but you’re going to need it if you decide you have to have your own
nuclear deterrence. You’ll need to know what it means to take on this astounding burden of being a nuclear weapon state.

I think we should do that together. I think we should be talking quite openly with each other, candidly with each other about what it means, why it’s in your interests or not in your interest, what our credibility is and what we have to do to reestablish our credibility with you. There’s no way we can solve that without just a lot of direct conversations with each other at a very detailed level about what it takes.

You know, ultimately, this is, as I said, Korea’s decision. It’s very complicated because you live very close to the threat. But we do, too, now, because we’ve got 25,000 American soldiers who are just as close as Korean citizens are to this threat.

I should say that’s what extended deterrence really means. Extended deterrence is not we extend our promise of retaliation to you. Extended deterrence means we’re going to fight side by side with you. Our forces are there on the ground with you. We’re going to fight side by side. And if necessary, we will extend that all the way up to and including the use of nuclear weapons.

Now, the question is, “Is that credible enough for Korean citizens to believe in and to work with us on an ongoing basis?” That should be our first step. And then if at some point, Korea feels it has to have its own nuclear deterrent, at least you’ll understand what is involved in having that kind of a capability and the remarkable obligations that come with it.

If I had an opportunity to be in Seoul with you today, I would have said this to you personally. We’re recording it in advance because it’s the only way I can be with you now. But I do want to wish you the very best for this very important conference. I want to thank you for inviting me to be a part of it. I promise you I’ll be there next year if you invite me. So very best wishes, and I hope that you have a very successful Asan Plenum 2023.

Thank you.
political risk was disappearing from international business and commerce; we could reduce military expenditures dramatically in the West and around the world. And we suffered no adverse consequences.

We were so focused on what was happening in Russia and Europe that we didn’t pay enough attention to what was happening in China. And we did pay attention to it, we got it wrong. Very many prominent Americans said that after Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, China was engaged in a peaceful rise; they would be a responsible stakeholder in world affairs; it would parallel the successful democratic, market-oriented economies of the developed world. Let’s face it—in the West, in the United States, we almost all believed it, I believed it.

But we were wrong about China. We were fundamentally wrong about China. The exact opposite of our prediction is what happened. China became an aggressive, mercantilist power, using all forms of influence—military, political, economic, and social—to achieve hegemony, first along its periphery, and ultimately the world as a whole. It spent decades stealing intellectual property from the developed world and turning it to its economic and military advantage. It created forms of aggression that we never dreamed of before. It took companies like Huawei and ZTE which appeared all external purposes telecommunication companies, and has used them and as arms the Chinese state. This is the kind of the aggression that over a long period of time under the Deng Xiaoping policy of ‘hide and bide.’ ‘Hide your capabilities and buy your time’ has now become ‘wolf worrier’ diplomacy—no longer hiding, no longer buying; it’s right out in front of us.

So, the fact is even after 9/11, too many people thought we were on a holiday from history. And growing threats were ignored, particularly when it came to China and Russia. Even in 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine for the first time, what was the West response? It was pitiful. And the lesson that was learned in Moscow and the lesson that was learned in Beijing was that NATO—perhaps not entirely “brain dead,” as French President Macron said, but weak and unwilling to respond.

What we have seen with Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, I think, was the confirmation that the relationship between China and Russia is now an axis. And unlike the Sino-Soviet alliance of the Cold War, China is very much the senior partner—Russia is not yet reduced to the status of satellite but it’s a very junior partner. Now, this is an axis that is accompanied by rogue states, outriders: North Korea, Iran, and Belarus. That has not yet completely gelled into a clear alternative military alliance, but as I will explain here in a minute, these adjunct outliers very much serve the interests of China and Russia. The complications that this means around the world is that when we formally thought and quite reasonably so in regional terms we again have to focus on global terms.

The Republic of Korea is already part of that. The remarkable fact that South Korea is selling armor and artillery to Poland tells us a lot. And all I can say to South Korea is ‘good for you.’ I wish it were the United States selling that armor and artillery to Poland, but part of our problem is that our defense production lines have grown from cold over the last thirty years and that’s an issue that the United States itself has to pick up. I think this evolving world is going to be very much part of the second Yoon-Biden summit, and not a moment too soon.

So, if my hypothesis is correct and we’ve passed beyond the post-Cold War era, I think the lessons that we need to carry away first are, we have to wake up from the ‘end of history,’ not just in political and military terms but in economic and social terms as well. The holiday from reality is over. Second, for the United States, we need a contemporary version of the famous NSC-68, the 1950 Truman-era document that was the foundation of American Cold War policy. 2025 when, I hope the next American president is inaugurated, will be the 75th anniversary of the NSC-68. I don’t know who today’s Paul Nitze is, I just hope we have one around somewhere because we desperately need it.

And for Korea, I think that, with all the problems faced here on the peninsula, with North Korea and China, it’s critical for this great country to think in larger East Asian and Indo-Pacific terms and to see where the risks and threats that Korea continues to face fit into this larger picture, particularly to understand how China’s threat to Taiwan directly affects South Korea. Now, we hear much about how economically interlinked South Korea is with China, and that is economic and political reality here. My free advice to South Korean business is to hedge your bets a little bit more—reduce your reliance on the Chinese market, make as much money as you can anywhere you can but make less in China. That is the only safe course.

Now, South Korea has had a laboratory experiment in dealing with authoritarian societies ever since it became a functioning independent state, and especially in the last thirty years a lot of dealing with North Korea and its nuclear threat to South Korean and the rest of the world. I think we can say with considerable confidence that after 30+ years of trying to negotiate with North Korea we can say that there is no evidence whatever that North Korea has ever made a
strategic decision to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In fact, I think that all of the evidence is the opposite that they’re determined to get deliverable nuclear weapons and if they can get it with economic aid or reduced economic sanctions from the US, South Korea, and Japan, they are going to do it. They have, for 30+ years since the joint North-South denuclearization declaration, lied and cheated about every commitment they’ve made on the nuclear front. I don’t know how much evidence you need before you conclude that they can’t be trusted and the negotiation with them is futile.

Let’s also be clear that China is not a disinterested party here. For the Chinese government, North Korea is a useful part and useful aspect of advancing Beijing’s strategic interests. They have consistently misled South Korea, Japan and the United States about this. The six-party talks during the George W. Bush administration was a bad charade. The fact is that China benefits from North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons—there is no threat that China from North Korea, only a threat to China’s adversaries.

Now, I want to stress one thing here. For the entire part of this thirty years, nearly everybody in the United States, South Korea, and Japan and elsewhere has said that it is unacceptable for North Korea to have deliverable nuclear weapons. I understand the word ‘unacceptable’ means ‘we will not accept it.’ What are we doing today? We are accepting it—we don’t like it, but we’ve effectively given up. And I blame the people who have this 30 years told us about North Korea and Iran that ‘but you have to negotiate with them.’ These are the people who have said ‘You can’t use force,’ ‘You can’t use regime change,’ ‘You have to negotiate’ and we’ve done it over and over again. Now, we’re told in effect certainly with respect to North Korea, ‘well, too late. They’re nuclear weapon state.’ So you can’t use force, you can’t use regime change, it’s still unacceptable.

But look at what they were saying. First, they are premature to try and take decisive action. ‘Too soon.’ Now, ‘it’s too late.’ When did the moment pass? When really strong action to prevent contemplation of mutually assured destruction and the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. When did we miss that? This is what brings to my mind, for me, when Winston Churchill called the ‘confirmed unteachability of mankind.’ And it may be too late with respect to North Korea, and maybe with Iran. But just remember what Churchill said for the next aspirin for nuclear weapons—he said this in 1935—”When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is thoroughly out of hand we apply too late the remedies which might have effected a cure. Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.” That’s basically where some people think we are.

Now, the moment is late, but North Korea has yet to demonstrate that it can make a real nuclear warhead with a functional missile that it can target effectively at a distance or they have reentry vehicles that can successfully reenter the earth atmosphere at ICBM level. I understand, of course, that the North can always put a nuclear device on a train and sail it into a harbor, but we’re not yet at the moment when we have to say, ‘There’s nothing more we can do.’ And, to the people of South Korea who have watched twenty-five million fellow Koreans live in a prison camp these last 75+ years, it seems to me that it’s always opportune to think not how we’re going to change the regime in North Korea, but how we will achieve success in the policy that we have all said our objectives since 1945, which is a reunited Korea. It is not impossible. We should not give up on it, simply because North Korea has gotten close while we wasted time and resources. Here, I think the conclusion we should consider, looking at the broader context I described a moment
ago, includes that the totalitarian states and terrorists are essentially incapable of negotiating in good faith, unless a gun is held to their head. And they will renege on their commitments once the gun is removed.

Second, we should hold China responsible for North Korea’s actions, and nuclear issue should be the top of the bilateral US-Chinese agenda. Now, let me turn to the 800-pound gorilla in the room and John Hamre mentioned it in his remarks. I think it’s appropriate that we all consider, and that is the quietly asked question here and in many other countries: Does the United States still have the resolve and determination and willingness to come to the defense of its allies? I think the answer to that is ‘yes, we do,’ although there are problems, and I think we should acknowledge them.

The principal problem for four years in our country was Donald Trump and the virus of isolationism that is unleashed again in the Republican party. He didn't need to unleash it in the Democratic party—there is hardly anybody left in that party you can find who still believes in Harry Truman, Scoop Jackson's form of US national security. But within the Republican party, it is a problem—I think a solvable problem and the one that I'm certainly spending a lot of time trying to solve. There are other things we’ve done that have called our resolve into question: withdrawal from Afghanistan, the catastrophic strategic mistake—the mistake first made by President Trump and then followed by President Biden. It is indefensible in my view. All I can say is that I hope we don't make that again.

And now, we've got strategic muddle in Ukraine because of the lack of broad thinking about what our objectives were and about NATO's objectives. That has legitimate grounds for concern. But, look at the other aspects that have happened where Macron was calling NATO brain dead, nobody says it anymore. We've got two new countries that ask to join NATO after the Russian unprovoked aggression against Ukraine—Finland which is now in and Sweden which will be shortly. That doesn't speak about the brain-dead alliance or the lack of American resolve. This is something that I think is going to be a major part of the debate in the 2024 presidential campaign. And on the positive side, I think I can say in Washington today it's driven by partisan disagrement and harsh personal politics. There is no issue on which there is greater bipartisan agreement than dealing with the threats from China. We don't have all the details worked out. This is a huge strategic discussion that is still ongoing. But it is something that I think we should find encouragement and that we need to push forward.

But there are certain things that have to be done—the US has to do and others have to do it as well. I think the United States has to return its defense spending to the Reagan era level, from about 3+ percent of GDP to something in the range of 5 to 6 percent of GDP. I think to bring our federal budget deficit down, we already need massive cuts in domestic spending. Increasing defense more requires more domestic cuts—so be it as far as I am concerned. A large welfare state will not defend us from foreign adversaries. I think that means our friends also have to increase their defense spending. Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO has said that 2 percent of GDP, the current NATO goal, should be raised to 3 percent—I think they could go higher than that. I congratulate the ROK for 2.6 percent GDP spending rate on defense. I'm sure everybody here knows that Prime Minister Kishida of Japan recently said that he would double Japan's spending from 1 to 2 percent of GDP over five years. Assuming Japan's GDP increases, that's in real terms significantly greater than doubling. Defense expenditures will make Japan the 3rd largest military in the world, after the US and China. The ROK can certainly catch up with that as well.

And let me just spend a second here on what this means for the US extended deterrence commitment and whether the Republic of Korea needs nuclear weapons. I spent a good part of my public career dealing with non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction that goes against the grain to say that any additional country should get nuclear weapons. I think John Hamre summed up a lot of the consideration, pros and cons. I would say this in the short term, I think the United States should redeploy tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula. And that could be made very clear to Kim Jong-un and whatever relative he is looking to succeed him in North Korea that we and the government of South Korea would use tactical nuclear weapons without hesitation. That's how you make deterrence credible. And I think that buys time for South Korea to think long and hard about whether it wants a separate nuclear capability. And I think we'll find in the United States whether indeed our resolve and our determination remain. But it is a complex question. I just want to emphasize one more time—I refuse to give up on the possibility of stopping North Korea from getting deliverable nuclear weapons in the first place. That should remain the center of our attention. This is not over yet.

In terms of US resolve, I would just say, my conclusion is that they are in the US depended on shifts in public opinion, just like every other democracy, no better no worse. But I would advise everybody to remember another famous Winston Churchill's
line: he once said, “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—usually after they’ve tried everything else.” And we are in the trying everything else category right now. But I have faith that we will come through in the end.

Now, what is this means for South Korean in the larger political context—we’re seeing in Northeast Asia in particular, but East Asia more generally, and Indo-Pacific even more broadly, a lot of creative thinking about collective self-defense structures. I understand that there’s not going to be an Asian NATO anytime soon—the circumstances are different. That’s fine. But look at what else is going on. The Asian Quad—India, Japan, Australia, and the United States—a fantastic idea driven by Shinzo Abe when he was Prime Minister of Japan. I think this man will go down as a hero for his country and freedom-loving countries around the world. The Quad has a lot of possibilities—let me suggest one here in South Korea. I think it should be Quint. I think South Korea should join the Quad as soon as possible. I think it would make it far stronger and give many, many more opportunities. AUKUS—Australia, UK, US nuclear-powered submarine consortium—can be expanded both in terms of its membership and the range of its activities. We could do it with South Korea, we could do it with different combinations of countries. There’s no one right formula. But AUKUS is something that throws a completely new configuration of power into the equation here and something that we should all be thinking about.

China and Taiwan—as I said a moment ago, a threat by China to Taiwan is a threat to South Korea. South Korea should play a larger role in the structures that are being created in this part of the world. There’s every reason for South Korea to step up and take the leadership role. And I think, right now, we need to be thinking not about a war with China, but how to deter China, how to prevent the war. And in part doing that, not simply by arming Taiwan, but by articulating the cost that China will bear if it takes any form of military actions against Taiwan—whether invasion or blockade. Let’s take it in pieces. First, what if they go after Kinmen or Matsu? What do we do to China then? I think we move, to cut off anything that looks like strategic trade.

We’ve all got to do this together, and maybe more because the attack to Kinmen or Matsu, which will be relatively easy, is just the first bite of the apple. And if they go after Taiwan itself, I think we excommunicate China from what many people call incorrectly the rules-based international order. Ask Vladimir Putin about that. He lost that memo somewhere. But, China becomes a priori state if it takes military action against Taiwan.

And then, finally, I think all of these need to be more creative about missile defense capabilities. Because whatever North Korea does, China has nuclear weapons, the US should remember the Ronald Reagan’s idea about the strategic defense for ourselves, not just against rogue states but against real nuclear powers. Every advance in national missile defense technologically and scientifically is an advance in theater missile defense, which is really national defense for countries like Korea and Japan.

So, let me conclude. In this extraordinary fast-moving era, we need a regrounding and reaffirming of the ROK-US alliance and it should be, and I hope that’s what’s going to happen in Washington—be a top priority for both countries. We have to believe that in the next decades, we are facing Cold War levels of risks and challenges probably for the foreseeable future, and that continuing and strengthening the alliance is the only feasible approach to maximize the chances for peace and security in Northeast Asia.

Thank you very much.
Luncheon

Date: April 25, 2023
Time: 11:40-13:10
Place: Grand Salon Namsan I+II
It is a great pleasure and real honor to be here to speak to you. I’d like to begin with a serious note of thanking our host Chung Mong Joon for not only inviting me here but also for his incredible initiative in creating the Asan Institute in the first place. Its success is a tribute to the vision and boldness of Mong Joon. And thank you, Mong Joon, for being here and inviting me and for organizing this.

I was told about a remarkable young Korean businessman in his early 40s at that time who just completed his Ph.D. in Johns Hopkins and that was, of course, MJ Chung. What struck me and was remarkable about this was that he was a politician and a businessman, who thought it was worth a couple of years out of his life to sit down and study and get a PhD. Most people would not have thought that it is a good use of time if your father was wealthy and could actually provide you with a very comfortable life without it. But, of course, MJ has never looked for a comfortable life and he always looked to contribute and has always been a good contributor.

As everyone knows, he would not be sitting back enjoying life. He is a true patriot with a deep vision of Korea's extraordinary achievements, of its potential for the future, and with an understanding of its vulnerability. He also has a quality of boldness. It was bold to establish a think tank in a small country when the world, and in particular Washington DC is, simply a chock-a-block as we say in English, full of think tanks. But MJ recognizes that Korea's challenges were unique. It needed an organization dedicated to addressing those unique challenges and coming up with ideas for how to address them.

And boldness has always been a characteristic of his behavior. There’s a marvelous story about when he got a meeting with the newly elected president Kim Dae Jung to ask for a favor. The favor was to build a soccer stadium in Seoul so that he could successfully compete to have Korea co-host the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Korea with Japan. Kim Dae Jung, apparently, must have thought this was some spoiled rich kid who loves soccer and I have much more important things to do so he said, “Look. I have an economy that’s collapsing and I have to worry about it.”

He got up and started to walk out. Now, if any of you have been in the presence of a president, you could imagine what it’s like to follow a president who’s just walked out on you and grab him by the arm and say “Wait a minute. You've got to listen to this.” And that’s what MJ did. They sat down and he explained to Kim Dae Jung, “Look. I know you have a much bigger problem right now than building soccer stadiums but this one isn’t going to come into operation until the World Cup five years from now. At that point, your policies will have succeeded and it will be time to celebrate your great success. And what could be better than co-hosting the World Cup in Korea along with Japan?” And he persuaded Kim Dae Jung, and they got the soccer stadium, and they got the co-hosting. I guess it was the first actual Asian appearance of the FIFA World Cup.

Also, along the way of his illustration of his boldness, I remember at the time reading some of these stories were planted by him in British newspapers. He went after Sepp Blatter, the notorious corrupt head of FIFA who ultimately lost the job because of the corruption and use that as a tool, I believe, to secure the co-hosting for Korea. It was a tough battle but he won it.

So let me, before I go into other remarks, just ask you for one more round of applause for our wonderful honorary chairman. What our son has accomplished is something I don't think anyone could have predicted 15 years ago when it began. But as MJ noted in his remarks today there's so much about this country that no one predicted. Everyone has their favorite example of someone who got it wrong. MJ this morning quoted Mac Arthur who said Korea would take 100 years to recover.

I have to tell you my favorite one came from an American economist who was an expert on Korea who came to visit me in Jakarta. And he thought a little bit optimistically but ultimately he said Indonesia has the potential to do something like what Korea did in the last 25 years. And I remember saying that "Oh my Indonesian friends would love to hear that." But they would say “Oh you don't understand us. We're not insane workaholics like those South Koreans. We can't do what they do.” And this man then said, “Well you should go back and read what one senior
economist was saying in 1962.” And I found this and he said, “South Korea is a hopeless basket case because it has no natural resources.”

Of course, we’ve since learned that natural resources could be a curse and it’s human resources that really matter. But the part that I love is that “It was burdened with a Confucian ethic that teaches that gentlemen don’t work they wear white clothes and grow long fingernails to show their contempt for manual labor.” That’s the same Confucian ethic that now today is supposed to be responsible for so much success in Asia but South Korea managed to apply it in a creative way with Korean talent and they’ve really made their mark in the world.

As MJ noted this morning they now ranked number sixth in the Wharton School’s estimate of perceived power globally with thanks not only to the economy but also this remarkable political transformation that took place actually that brought Kim Dae Jung into the presidency and also thanks to the fact that they have a truly capable military which frankly I would like to see made bigger and stronger and better. But it’s wonderful as it is.

My first real contact, if you can forgive me the exaggeration, with the problems of the security problems on the peninsula, came when I was eight years old. Not that I’m precocious but I was on a walk with my father in Los Angeles and there was a newspaper with big headlines saying, this was during the election campaign in 1952, “Ike promises to visit Korea.” Of course, what he was promising was to go to Korea and get an armistice. My father being a university professor didn’t think too much of Eisenhower but Eisenhower didn’t think too much of University professors so it was a fair game. In fact, Eisenhower did go to Korea. He did have a major role in securing that armistice in 1953.

And as a result, we’ve seen one of the bloodiest wars that we’ve fought. In three years twice as many Americans died in Korea as died in 20 years in Afghanistan and Iraq. That was the intensity of the combat in Korea. And of course, what we went through was nothing compared to what the South Koreans went through. I think it suffered something like double the casualties and South Korean civilians suffered horribly. But the end result was that a lot of wonderful people managed to escape North Korea including MJ’s father whom I had the great pleasure to meet late in his life and to found a series of private enterprises that have been the model for the world and in the envy of the world.

Not long ago I spent some time but the Wilson Center and we have someone here from the Wilson Center raise your hand. Maybe not? There you are. Thank you. The Wilson Center has a marvelous collection of translated documents from the Soviet archives from the time when they were releasing archives. They stopped doing that when Putin came into power, I guess. What these documents show very clearly is that the Korean War was a war that could have been prevented. It’s almost as somebody ran randomized tests which they like to do with prescription drugs.

In the first round, Kim Il Sung went to Moscow in January of 1949 to try to persuade Stalin to allow him to go and liberate South Korea which of course meant conquering South Korea. And Stalin at first was going to have nothing to do with this. He said very clearly, “No, if you do that the Americans will intervene and I will end up having to go to war with the United States and I’m not about to do that. A year went by and in January of the next year of 1950, Stalin summoned Kim Il Sung to Moscow and said, “Well things have changed. The Americans have run out of China and they have decided as a military that they’re not going to defend South Korea. They’re drawing a different kind of defense perimeter. And my spies tell me that that’s actually the official policy of the American general staffs.”

As a result, two men, Dean Atchison and separately Douglas MacArthur made public statements destroying the perimeter excluding South Korea and in the end, we know the rest is history. But not quite because Stalin wasn’t finished and he said, “Look, I need an insurance policy. You can’t trust these Americans. They may be tricking me. If they do come in, I’m not going to rescue you. You’ve got to get the Chinese to rescue you.” So, he sent Kim Il Sung to Beijing and got a promise from the Chinese that if the Americans did intervene that Mao would come and rescue them which of course is exactly what happened and which probably also benefited Stalin the second way because it meant 20 years of frozen relations between the US and China. And by the way, in case you didn’t know this, Mao’s only son was killed by an American bomb during the Korean War but I guess he was pretty cold-blooded so I don’t know if that mattered too much.

There’s no question that the Dean Atchison speech was a mistake but it’s important to recognize it was part of a larger picture. It was part of a situation of American war weariness. People think we get weary because we fight wars like Vietnam or Iraq. We also get weary when we fight triumphant victories like World War II which was of course in some ways the most terrible war in history and the greatest victory in history. We didn’t celebrate by saying okay we’re going to go around taking other things. We celebrated by cutting our defense budget to the bone.
Truman had a defense secretary in Lewis Johnson whose main distinction was he had been the major campaign fundraiser for Truman during the 1948 re-election campaign. He did cut the budget ruthlessly as Truman had asked him to do. As a result, when North Korea did invade in 1950, we were almost kicked off the peninsula having not long before we had the greatest army in world history greatest and largest. We were almost kicked off the Korean Peninsula by a fourth-rate power meaning North Korea and we barely called our way back in. That's what ignoring the defense budget can do to you. I mean, to Truman's credit and very much Eisenhower's, we followed the invasion with a major defense buildup which I think had a big role in preserving the peace in this part of the world for a long period of time. But it's much better to make those buildups ahead of time and deter war rather than waiting until afterward and rebuilding in a panic.

Of course, the alliance which was established by treaty 70 years ago and in which we celebrate here this week has had its ups and downs and 1950 wasn't the last down one. If the American retreat in the 1940s was the product of and it was done in the flush of victory, in the mid-70s a different kind of war weariness resulted from our defeat in Vietnam. It was reflected here in a series of weak responses to a large number of North Korean provocations, including the capture of the US Pueblo about which we did virtually nothing and the others we did very little about. That American weakness I believe led President Park Chung Hee to decide that South Korea needed its own nuclear weapons. So he started a covert program to develop a nuclear weapon. We had spies here who learned what was going on and reported back to Washington. And Henry Kissinger decided that we had to persuade South Korea somehow to stop this. I was on the staff out of the arms control agency that helped us support Kissinger. Frankly, I actually believe that it was the right thing to do and even in hindsight, although it was complicated.

I'll put it this way. I think it was not only the right decision for the United States and bear in mind we were doing this in our own interests. We have a way of persuading people to give up nuclear weapons and we did that with Ukraine although they weren't really weapons but it was nuclear material that could have been converted. We've persuaded Taiwan to give up nuclear weapons in 1987. We should understand better than we seem to as a country. It should be explained to our people, I think, that when you get countries to make that kind of sacrifice and make that kind of concession, we should take on an obligation ourselves to take very seriously their defense. And I think that's part of what we should be talking about today is, whether it's right or not to bring nuclear weapons back to Korea and that's a big question that has to be debated and has to be thought about, there's no question that we took on a responsibility when we persuaded Korea and France to give up the program that France was supporting here. And as a result, we served our own interests but we also I think took on an obligation to the South Koreans.

I do think that if the ROK had completed its nuclear program then Jimmy Carter would have completed his promise to withdraw American troops from Korea. I can't prove that. I do know that Carter was adamant about his campaign promise to take troops out of Korea. And the only time I met him in person was when he was president. I met him later when he was a former president as an election observer in Indonesia. The only time I met him when he was president was in his first meeting with his National Security Council where I accompanied the then acting head of the arms control agency, who ironically the only senior member around the table was the head of the arms control agency who was trying to persuade Carter you have to leave the troops there because they prevent a war. Carter would have none of it. He took a whole division out. At that point, a group of people, of which I'm very proud to have been part, including some names that you're probably familiar like Richard Holbrooke and Morton Abramowitz, and Andy Marshall as well, put together an analysis that we gave to Harold Brown showing how dangerous it would be if there were no American troops in Korea. North Korea had an ability to take over the peninsula in very short order and we couldn't wait and reinforce it after the fact the way we did in 1950. Brown took that to President Carter and President Carter did something that no president likes to do ever, which is to go back on a campaign promise. It's a very hard thing to do but to his everlasting credit, I believe, Carter said, "Okay, wait a minute. I don't want to be responsible for the war in Korea," and he left one division there. I don't know the exact history. General Sharp could tell us. It goes up and down. I think it's gone more down than up in the last few years. I'd like to see it go up. I think the stronger our conventional presence in Korea, the stronger our deterrence is whether or not you decide to add a nuclear element to that.

I do in fact think that talking a lot about nuclear options in Korea is something that has a
potentially very harmful effect on delicate American opinion these days. On the right it will say, “Well, wait a minute if the Koreans can take care of themselves with nuclear weapons and then they don’t need us, we can start doing what Trump was talking about ending this wasteful expenditure. So it’s wasteful and so it didn’t serve our interests. And on the left, it will bring up all the scare talk about a nuclear war, which frankly never plays very well for good reason with American public opinion. I think keeping that issue out of our public debate is probably a very valuable thing to do. That doesn’t mean that it has to be the decisive factor in making the decision about where we go forward.

For me, it’s impossible not to feel the deepest sympathy for the awful situation and painful situation in which South Korea finds itself today. I’ve heard MJ describe that most eloquently that it’s the product of two adverse trends. The first trend is the continued relentless expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capability to the point where today John Bolton expressed some skepticism. I hope you’re right but I think it now threatens the United States as well and if it doesn’t now, it will before long. And it doesn’t have to be a tramp steamer that does it. It’s a threat not only to the ROK but also to Japan and to the United States.

And the second trend is the appearance of another round of war weariness and potential isolationism in the United States. That is reflected not only in our inadequate defense budget. I know people say how can it be inadequate when the numbers look so big but the numbers are full of a lot of things like inflation, military medical care, and military retirement. When you actually look at what’s going to buy real defense resources, it’s a shrinking part of a budget that’s not growing fast enough basically. I also think it’s not just the United States but I think that the South Koreans should be spending more than what was mentioned today. I think 2.5 percent of their defense budget. It’s true that looks good compared to the Europeans but it doesn’t look good to me compared to the situation we face here collectively.

Unfortunately, also that trend toward loss of American credibility has been I think badly increased by the abandonment of Afghanistan. As I mentioned, one of the things that Stalin apparently noted when he spoke to Kim Il Sung in 1950 was the way we had withdrawn from China with basically without whimpering, and without doing anything about it. The Afghanistan situation seems to me awfully similar to where a series of presidents actually starting with Obama, continuing with Trump and then with Biden, were talking endlessly about ending endless wars. As though you end a war when you just leave the field to the enemy and I think we’re starting to see already in Afghanistan some of the signs that leaving that field to the enemy is already beginning to have some bad results and certainly had terrible results for the people who were trying to help us when we were there.

So to get to what may be the hardest question for this conference and that’s about the nuclear option. In the face of those adverse trends, it’s only natural I think to consider bringing back US tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or perhaps even for the ROK to resume a nuclear weapons program of its own. As much as I can appreciate the logic behind that, I think there are a number of hard questions which our time-tested alliance, the word that Ed Fuller used several times last night and I think it is a great description of this alliance. This time-tested alliance needs to consider some very important questions before deciding any course of action either forward or backward on the nuclear issue.

In my view, the first and most important question is how would any course of action affect the US commitment to the defense of Korea. I believe, as I’ve said a bit earlier, that that commitment could be jeopardized if there’s too much talk about a commitment here leading to nuclear war. There’s plenty of nuclear capability outside Kim Jong-un knows that and that’s why he says that denuclearization has to include the denuclearization of the United States and not just of the peninsula. It’s a ludicrous position but that’s his. It shows that he knows what we are capable of doing which is good. But I also think that we’re truly guessing in the dark. I have some guesses about how American opinion would react but nobody knows nobody knows how Kim Jong-un thinks to put it mildly. So I think whatever course of action we take here is to go in a gradual fashion, and there are ways to do that gradually.

In fact, my second question to be asked is what might be done to overcome the perceived decline in American credibility here in Asia and worldwide. It’s foolish to pretend that that perception doesn’t exist. It is foolish to pretend that it hasn’t affected Kim Jong-un or has Chinese backers. Unfortunately, we don’t have the credibility that we had. I don’t know what the exact time is. Pick your time period. Go all the way back to 1991 in the first Gulf War. In fact, I think that was a contributor to the idea that we didn’t need to keep tactical nuclear weapons here in Korea because we had so much conventional dominance that we could handle situations. If we’re going to restore that kind of conventional dominance, it’s going to require a much bigger defense budget than we’ve so far been able or willing to confront. But as I’ve said it’s much better to confront it in advance than have to do it after the fact.
The third question I would suggest that could be asked is what might the ROK do to let the world know that they have a nuclear option of their own. I agree that that may scare some people but maybe that’s part of the point. One could start with MJ’s suggestion of declaring the so-called denuclearization agreement which never did anything to denuclearize at all. To declare it null and void in the light of DPRK violations. There are some other things I think that could be done to remind people just as the Japanese regularly remind people that if they are forced to go nuclear. They have a great capability to do that and to do it very quickly. I’m not advocating this idea but I do think it’s one of the questions that has to be part of any serious discussion.

And having mentioned Japan, I would say the fourth question that we need to consider is the ripple effects of what happens here in South Korea. And I don’t mean the discrediting of the non-proliferation treaty. I think it’s already kind of discredited itself. But it’s actually been a vehicle for so-called peaceful nuclear programs in countries like Iran that have been the pathway to nuclear weapons. The only countries that seem to have been stopped from having nuclear weapons or countries like South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, and Korea, basically American allies and democratic countries. It’s a rather one-sided application of an arms control principle. John Bolton could probably expound at much greater length on that than I can. But I do think that the ripple effect in this part of the world and particularly, with respect to Japan, is something that really has to be thought about. It’s I think we could see a very major shift in the geopolitical tectonic plates, if I have the right phrase. If that were to happen. And I think that’s a reason to not do this sort of thing covertly as Park Chung Hee felt he had to do.

But the more open the debate and the more discussions you have in places like Asan, the better it will be in my opinion. I realized that so far I’ve offered many more questions than answers and that’s quite deliberate. I believe that answers have to come from dialogues like the ones that we’re having here. Dialogues like the ones that Asan conducts and dialogues that need to take place in private and in secrecy between our two national security establishments and in Korea, here, and probably to include friendly countries in this part of the world, particularly Japan. But as difficult as our present circumstances are, there’s no reason to give way to hand-wringing or despair, nor to complacency. Those are not the qualities that made this relatively small country an inspiration for the world, nor are they the qualities which have enabled Asan to reach the point that it has today in just 15 short years.

So, I’d like to close if somebody wants to bring me a glass... Raise your glasses and I’m raising an invisible one to toast Asan and to toast the alliance and may it have another 70 years of great long successful life. Thank you.
Plenary Session 1, titled “World in Turbulence,” was moderated by Karen E. House from the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She opened the session by asking the panelists about the critical fault lines, confrontations between great powers, and the impact they will have on the global order.

Dr. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, started the discussion by explaining China’s position on current global affairs. While congratulating the ROK-US alliance on its 70th anniversary, he noted that it is ironic that there is still a need to maintain the alliance after 7 decades. He pointed out that the reason that alliance is still needed is because the world has become more turbulent. He further argued that countries should focus on improving the quality of life to become more prosperous, by working on infrastructure, disaster management, and wealth redistribution. Dr. Jia expressed his belief that alliances should go beyond military alliances, though he understands the importance of the military aspect. He insisted if countries can use their resources cooperatively instead of wasting their resources by squabbling with one another, global challenges can be solved. He highlighted that this would be difficult to achieve, but it is the only way forward. According to him, we need to do more than just celebrate military alliances if we want to make the world less turbulent.

Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, the Founder of the Heritage Foundation, expressed his satisfaction that a Chinese professor joined today, taking a contrasting view compared to Dr. Jia. Dr. Feulner commented on the puzzling remarks made by the Chinese
ambassador to France recently, that ex-Soviet states such as the Baltic states were still part of Russia. He also criticized China for making use of its status as a developing nation to gain access to subsidies and concessions it would otherwise not have access to. Dr. Feulner also expressed his deep admiration for President Yoon’s recent policies toward Japan, lowering the barrier between ROK-Japan cooperation. When choosing between an economic partner and a security partner, he argued that security should come first. He mentioned that US-ROK-Japan intelligence sharing is better than it has been in a long time—a positive sign for the future of inter-alliance cooperation.

Ms. Maria Castillo Fernandez, European Union Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, laid out the European perspective. She emphasized the importance for countries to adhere to universal UN norms and values, which Russia has neglected with its unjustified invasion of Ukraine. As such, she asked China to take its responsibility as a UNSC member to safeguard the UN values. The freedom of navigation is another delicate issue that has to be preserved. The waters in the Indo-Pacific are becoming more turbulent, and the international law of the sea needs to be protected. She also wished for South Korea to maintain its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in light of the current discussion on nuclear weapon procurement. Furthermore, alliances require carefully maintained balance. Currently, the large trade deficit between the EU and China creates an uneven playing field. Lastly, she called for international institutions to be upgraded to uphold universal values and international order. She hopes others, such as the ROK, will join the EU in using their voice to promote universal values.

Mr. Randall Schriver, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs,
argued that the US-China competition is the most important contemporary issue. Firstly, he stressed the importance to “right shape” the relationship with China. He explained that that does not mean decoupling from China but managing normal trade relations. Similar to Ambassador Castillo-Fernandez, he expressed that export controls on sensitive sectors will have to continue, potentially including new sectors such as biopharma, since the large trade deficit between China and the US creates an uneven playing ground.

Secondly, Mr. Schriver focuses on deterrence, particularly regarding a potential Taiwan contingency. According to him, the elements of this would include providing arms to Taiwan for counter-invasion and counterblockade scenarios. It also includes strengthening the posture of US forces, allowing them to have a broader reach. The final element is integrated deterrence, referring to the economic costs that China would incur if it chooses conflict. The potential costs would have to be made crystal clear. He stressed that we have seen it fail with Russia, and this shows how deterrence needs to be credible.

Lastly, he stated that finding the floor and building the guardrails for the US-China relationship is still of great importance. Since there is work to be done with China, whether that is preparing for the next pandemic, dealing with climate change, or talking with North Korea, the US is open to continue engaging with China, although the US should remain sober.

Dr. Jimbo, a professor at Keio University, explained the Japanese perspective on worldwide turbulence. Despite global economic growth and interdependence, this is not accompanied by liberal reforms in growing states. International institutions such as the UN and the WTO have faced setbacks to their credibility, Russia invaded Ukraine, and tensions between China and the US are growing. However, he aimed to emphasize positive aspects by showing how the dots between countries are becoming more connected.

By mentioning one such example of great importance to Japan are the improving ties between Japan and Korea, Dr. Jimbo praised President Yoon for his policies which have led to a normalization of ties between Korea and Japan. This will lead to not just better intelligence service between the two countries on General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), but also to better trilateral cooperation including the US. He hopes that the increased cooperation will mean that when the three countries strike, they will strike together. In the economic aspect as well, the improved Japan-Korea ties will secure supply chains and enhance their economic prospects.

He also pointed out that this extends beyond the trilateral US-Japan-ROK relationship, to other countries such as the Philippines. While the US-Philippines alliance hit a stumbling block in the Duterte-Obama years, the re-invigoration of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will enhance US credibility in the region. It would also improve the bilateral cooperation between the Philippines and other like-minded states, such as Japan and Australia.

But while those dot connections might be competitive, there are also collaborative connections, Dr. Jimbo posited. China’s brokered deal between Saudi Arabia and Beijing seemed unbelievable to him at first, but it showed another avenue through which dots can be connected. Chinese initiatives also have to be incorporated into plans to connect the dots. Japan also can work on its relationship with China to find a common agenda on relevant issues.

Dr. James B. Steinberg, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, warned of the existential challenges of our and the extraordinary impact that new technologies will have. While it is true that the US has an issue with China, they need a framework to deal with both these issues at once. Bilateral relations with key US allies such as Korea and Japan should not just be defined through the lens of a new cold war, Dr. Steinberg contended. The US should not ask its partners to see everything through its competition with China.

It is possible to deal with the challenge of China but also cope
with other issues at the same time. Multilateral institutions should remain open to focus on solving contemporary challenges, leaving the two issues as parallel challenges that do not have to intertwine everywhere. Above all, Dr. Steinberg wished not to establish a new cold war.

Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, Chairman of The Asan Institute for Policy Studies saw three major international events as being linked to a world in turbulence. First of all, Russia's violation of the UN charter on territorial integrity and self-determination cannot be accepted by South Koreans. South Korea itself benefited from the rules-based international order and suffered 35 years of colonialist rule from Japan, and as such cannot accept a world view based on sphere influence, or brutal power politics. South Koreans do not want to see the world regress to a state where might make right. South Korea faced a similar attempt to forcibly change international borders by North Korea. South Korea cannot accept Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as it would legitimize North Korea's actions in 1950 as well.

Secondly, the North Korean security threat, which is thoroughly discussed in other sessions. Nonetheless, Dr. Yoon notes that it is the focal point that has now made the ROK-US alliance more crucial than ever. The last factor causing turbulence is the ever-increasing tension between the US and China. Dr. Yoon notes a lack of rules in their rivalry, and the need to develop a guardrail. China, too, should respect international law in matters such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Thirdly and finally, he mentioned that South Korea's biggest fear in a Taiwan contingency is a potential power vacuum caused by the Americans leaving Korea to head to Taiwan. The possibility of North Korea making use of such a situation would be South Korea's first concern in a Taiwan contingency, according to Dr. Yoon.
Concurrent Session 2-1, titled “State of Alliances,” was moderated by Mr. Jakob Hallgren, Director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He opened the discussion by reflecting on how the United States and its allies have strengthened their alliances since the US-China strategic competition and the invasion of Ukraine. Addressing the remaining challenges in the alliances, such as the Taiwan issue, inflation issues, and concerns over the future US administration’s commitment to the alliances, Mr. Hallgren invited the session’s five influential speakers to discuss new geopolitical circumstances, the allies’ perception of the US leadership, and the dilemmas of the US strategy in maintaining an alliance system.

General (Ret.) Choi Byung Hyuk, Vice President of the Council on Korea-US Security Studies, noted that the ROK-US alliance has been a cornerstone of the ROK’s security, economy, and foreign policy since its formation in 1953. However, he said, there are a lot of internal and international challenges ahead of the ROK-US alliance, including geopolitical change, security instability in South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and the authoritarian solidarity between China, Russia, and North Korea. To overcome these challenges, he called for a global comprehensive strategic alliance between the US and ROK, including defense strategy and all areas of the economy, advanced technology, space, cyber security, public health, and climate change. In addition, he suggested that three things need to be implemented: (1) Transparent extended deterrence measures and redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, (2) A new supply chain ecosystem between ROK and the US, and (3)...

The ROK-US-Japan security cooperation. Regarding the trilateral collaboration, he underscored the importance of a step-by-step approach, noting that developing young officers or trilateral training programs could be an efficient way to develop a good relationship among the three nations.

Lieutenant General Andrew Harrison, Deputy Commander of the United Nations Command, stressed the importance of the partnership set up under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions in 1950. He identified two things vital to the ROK and the ROK-US alliance: (1) Legitimacy that keeps an alliance or coalition together for a military mission, and (2) Strategic...

**Moderator**

Jakob Hallgren  
Swedish Institute of International Affairs

**Speakers**

Choi Byung Hyuk  
Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies

Andrew Harrison  
United Nations Command

Kim Byung Joo  
National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

Paul D. Wolfowitz  
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Yamaguchi Noboru  
International University of Japan
Concurrent Session 2-1
State of Alliances

depth of which the important lessons are learned in the war in Ukraine. With the UNC that could bring these two to ROK and the ROK-US alliance, Mr. Harrison underscored that ROK and the US should build their relationship with that to focus on a number of problems around the world and prepare for difficult days that might come in the future. In consideration of the nature of warfare and difficulty of responding to a contingency instantly, he urged the ROK-US alliance to take the role of the Combined Joint Task Force and the UNC into consideration.

General (Ret.) Kim Byung Joo, a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, noted the country’s long-lasting public support for its alliance with the US. To promote the further development of the ROK-US alliance, he said, it is essential for the alliance to remain healthy. Calling for a healthy alliance based on mutual respect, benefit, and trust, General Kim expressed his belief in the importance of transparent communication to strengthen the ROK-US alliance in the next 70 years. With a changing geopolitical landscape, he marked that only through discussions ROK and the US can reach a consensus and achieve their political and economic goals.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Yamaguchi Noboru, a Professor at the International University of Japan, welcomed the recent
Ambassador Wolfowitz underlined the success of ROK in this field could make Korea, in combination with other countries of these coalitions, take the leading position in international debates.

Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, addressed major dilemmas that the US is facing in a new era with all the challenges identified during the session. Firstly, he criticized China's cyber censorship and lack of transparency that hindered the WHO COVID origins investigation and caused uncountable damage to the world economy. He stressed the need to form a new organization that is open to investigations and prepared for the next pandemic.

Secondly, he pointed out cyber security as the second area in need of a new organization that brings together countries with transparency. Expressing concerns over China's cyber censorship, he noted Huawei would likely win the battle for the next generation of the internet, which could lead to a national security issue, a personal security issue, and a commercial issue. Therefore, he said, some of the few competitors of Huawei, including Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung, could play a critical role in making the market competitive.

Finally, he underlined the future of artificial intelligence, where China aspires to be the Saudi Arabia of data. Despite a 1.2 billion population as a huge advantage, he said, China is not bigger than the coalition that could be put together and deal with the challenges. When answering questions from the moderator about the close link between technology and security,
Flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific

Moderator
Lee Chung Min
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; KAIST

Speakers
Ahn Ho-Young
Former Korean Ambassador to the United States
Kent E. Calder
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Gordon Flake
Perth USAsia Centre, The University of Western Australia
Bonnie S. Glaser
German Marshall Fund of the U.S.
Ankit Panda
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Walter L. Sharp
Former Commander, United Nations Command, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea

Concurrent Session 2-2, titled “Flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific,” tackled the tensions among the United States, China, and Taiwan as well as North Korea’s nuclear threat. And the global supply chain was further discussed in the session. The distinguished panelists expressed their respective positions and perspectives on conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

Dr. Lee Chung Min, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, opened the session by expressing his gratitude to the Asan Institute for Policy Studies with a special address to President Dr. Choi Kang, Chairman Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, and Honorary Chairman Dr. MJ Chung. Dr. Lee denoted the key flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region and proceeded to go down the line posing the same question to the panelists about what they are most worried about and why.

Ambassador Ahn Ho-Young began his remarks with North Korea being the most worrisome issue. He emphasized two points within this context—deterrence and diplomacy. In regard to deterrence, there is growing consensus in Seoul and Washington, D.C. that something must be done, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-style nuclear planning group is attracting attention from both Seoul and Washington, D.C. as an appropriate deterrence benchmark. With respect to diplomacy, Ambassador Ahn stated that despite North Korea’s lack of response, diplomacy must be pursued as he believes there will be something called the Gorbachev Moment arriving in Pyongyang soon due to the growing level of discontent and the worsening economy. Thus, he emphasizes the importance of...
Dr. Kent E. Calder, a Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, continued a discussion by remarking on both short-term and long-term threats in the region. In the long term, there are existential concerns about the nuclear threat over the Korean peninsula and there are others relating to Taiwan. In the short term, Dr. Calder is primarily concerned about contingencies in Northeast Asia including Taiwan, Korea, not simply Korea and the United States, but also Japan due to the possibility of North Korea’s military provocation against Japan. He indeed argued that the current command and control system is not sufficient in this era of rapid communications and missile technology and that new forms of coordination are necessary for such a complex relationship.

Mr. Gordon Flake, a Professor at the University of Western Australia, expressed his opinion over the next major crisis in the region from an Australian perspective. Mr. Flake believed that the risk to global supply chains, particularly those related to critical materials, rare earth elements, and future energy materials, is a flashpoint in waiting. With China commanding a significant share of global rare earth mining processing, reliance on China for these components poses a significant risk now. As such, Mr. Flake called for more attention to the global supply chain disruptions as it is deeply intertwined and could have severe economic consequences.

Ms. Bonnie S. Glaser, Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the US, opined the Taiwan situation is fairly unique, also there are many factors that are different between Ukraine and Taiwan when asked about any
Taiwan remains a potential trigger of the US-China war in the region that could escalate very quickly. There are several factors contributing to this concern, including the shifting military balance in China's favor, Xi Jinping's instructions to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take Taiwan by 2027, failure of Hu Jintao's strategy of pursuing peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait and Beijing's loss of confidence in the US' One China Policy. She further argued that raising the costs of attacking Taiwan through various actions can help avoid war and that China needs to understand that all countries have a stake in peace and stability, and suggested that leading democracies should be willing to impose sanctions if China uses force against Taiwan.

Mr. Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, expressed his concern about North Korea's potential use of nuclear weapons for coercive purposes in the short term. Mr. Panda noted that the changing geopolitical context in which Kim Jong-un is operating has changed and it can be a possible simultaneous crisis or horizontal escalation emerging in the Indo-Pacific. Mr. Panda emphasized the importance of deterrence in the uncertain security environment of Northeast Asia explaining that deterrence involves communicating to adversaries that the cost of using nuclear weapons will outweigh any benefits, and that punishment or the denial of benefits can be used to impose costs. In addition, he noted that assurance is another key element of deterrence, as adversaries need to be reassured that restraint will not lead to costs being brought down upon them. Then, he suggested that the salience of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific region requires a serious rethink about their role in this part of the world.

General (Ret.) Walter L. Sharp, Director on The Korea Society BOD, brought North Korea's growing conventional capability, cyber capability, and special operating forces to the discussion. He accentuated the possibility of accidental incidents and the potential for escalation in a volatile environment. If some mistake or attack in South Korea happens, the response of going back to

North Korea is going to be very rapid and strong which would make the escalation very hard to control. Within this context, General Sharp pointed out two important items; the strength (of military, alliance, and coalition) and the acceptable instate (not only from our perspective but from North Korea's perspective). He also encouraged the advocacy for strengthening the military alliance, including the United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, and the trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States deterring North Korea and preparing for any potential conflict.

The second round of the discussion proceeded with Ambassador Ahn's positions on how South Korea should cope with Chinese and Russian pressure going forward. Ambassador Ahn noted the importance of this issue in terms of foreign policy and security issues for South Korea and touched upon three points. He believed that South Korea should cooperate with all four major powers, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia while prioritizing its alliance with the United States. Nonetheless, this does not mean that South Korea must agree with everything each country does or says. Then he clarifies President Yoon's statements, which emphasized the importance of complying with international humanitarian law during wartime in Ukraine and urged against using armed force to change the status quo in Taiwan.

Dr. Calder shared his opinion on the Korea-Japan ties during major crises involving China or Taiwan or North Korea. He suggested that the polarization between the two main parties in South Korea has made things more difficult, and the critical stance of Japan towards South Korea on Japan-related issues has added to the problem. In spite of that, he believed that trilateral cooperative projects between South Korea, Japan, and the United States in areas like energy, overseas development assistance, and cultural exchange can promote cooperation. He cited the example of the 2002 World Cup, where the two countries were able to cooperate, and suggested that sports and cultural exchange can be important in promoting cooperation.
Dr. Calder emphasized the need to find areas where cooperation makes sense, despite competitive economic interests.

Mr. Flake praised South Korea for returning to its global role after a period of inward focus on the peninsula. He emphasized the importance of Korea leveraging its international relationships and stature to improve its position technologically, diplomatically, and militarily. Mr. Flake also noted that the AUKUS agreement, while focused on Australia, has potential benefits for South Korea and the region at large in terms of industrial cooperation and technology development. It is impossible to deny that the United States has been supportive of South Korea's efforts, but Australia has been leading the way in facing critical challenges in the region. He highlighted that any Indo-Pacific strategy would be incomplete without Australia.

Ms. Glaser remarked that there is evidence that the Chinese military, as stated in its own writing, does not believe it is currently ready to take Taiwan. While there are disagreements about China's transport capabilities, the most important factor is that Xi Jinping and the PLA themselves lack the confidence to take Taiwan. Ms. Glaser emphasized that strategic communications matter, especially given the uncertainty around potential invasion timelines. While the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific does not foresee major use of force before 2030, the next decade is still seen as a dangerous time as China may fear losing its current conventional advantages as the United States introduces new technologies.

Mr. Ankit Panda mentioned that the Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a security dilemma, with countries perceiving their adversaries to be improving their self-defense capabilities, leading to increased investment in defense for deterrence purposes. He noted the rise of hypersonic capabilities and their potential impact on escalation in a crisis. Mr. Panda proposed negotiated restraint and transparency as means of avoiding unwanted wars in the region, although acknowledged that this will be challenging given China and North Korea's opposition to such measures.

General Sharp reiterated the concern about the potential for simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regard to Taiwan and North Korea. He acknowledged that the United States has assets beyond the 7th Air Force to address these issues, but the challenge lies in managing multiple conflicts at once. He specifically worries about North Korea taking advantage of a conflict in Taiwan and the potential for major conflicts in two different areas of the Indo-Pacific.

The panelists welcomed questions from the audience concerning South Korea's nuclear armament and ROK-US alliance commitment, and North Korea's nuclear threat. Ambassador Ahn reaffirmed his suggestion that the appropriate benchmark for South Korea would be providing a NATO-style nuclear planning group to strengthen extended deterrence. Although South Korea could go further based on NATO-style nuclear planning, Ambassador Ahn stated that, for the time being, the nuclear option would not be the way to.

General Sharp shared that South Korea's perception of the North changed since the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident and it led to increased preparedness for any future attacks. Since then, the South Korean military has developed plans and exercises, capabilities to rapidly and powerfully respond to any potential attack. This has been successful in deterring North Korea from launching any further kinetic attacks, and the focus now is on applying both external and internal pressures on North Korea to bring about change. The goal is to get information into the North Korean regime to apply internal pressure and get them to understand that change is necessary.

Mr. Panda further pointed out that Kim Jong-un would be willing to use nuclear weapons under certain conditions. Despite the fact that using nuclear weapons would mean the end of Kim's regime, North Korea's ongoing growth and diversification of its nuclear capabilities mean that it could use nuclear weapons in a limited way, leaving sufficient nuclear capability to continue threatening the US and its allies. In such a scenario, the US and South Korea would have to make a difficult decision about whether to continue escalating and risking additional nuclear retaliation against their cities.

This is why North Korea's nuclear threat presents a similar set of policy challenges as countries like Russia and China. The session concluded with the other panelists' remarks as to the importance of broader recognition of the change in the environment, and the roles of allies in peace and stability.
Plenary Session 3, titled “Future of Alliance,” surveyed initial impressions on what lies ahead and what the future looks like for alliances. Looking through the past centuries, wars continue to change and evolve rapidly, bringing us to a time that Mr. Karel De Gucht, the Former European Commissioner for Trade calls a revival of alliances. Because of these changes, the alliances need to accommodate the new features of war that have emerged, like the possible predominance of artificial intelligence in the cyber war over nuclear arms, which he regards as the arms of the past soon. Mr. De Gucht also believed that cooperation must go beyond military cooperation, incorporating economies and industries as part of its approach.

Ambassador Fujisaki Ichiro, President and CEO of the Nakasone Peace Institute, argued that strengthening the alliance will only be possible when there is inclusivity. When countries sense that they are being excluded from an alliance, these countries who were not invited will be targeted by others who could take advantage of their perceived sentiment of exclusion to advance their agenda.

Mr. Ha Taekeung, a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, presented his idea that South Korea needs to play a more active and leading role in global politics. He also highlighted that South Korea became part of the G7 group with the country’s economic performance, therefore, it is necessary for South Korea to play a more active role in global politics. In terms of the North Korean threat, Mr. Ha suggested the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in South Korea.

Ms. Allison Hooker, Senior Vice President of American Global Strategies, proposed ways to enhance the alliance through economic and technological cooperation, focusing on capacity building and infrastructure development. She emphasized the importance of fostering a collaborative environment that can drive innovation and growth in the alliance framework.
Strategies, emphasized that the alliance today is the strongest it’s ever been by mentioning that the US-ROK alliance may have seen its share of ups and downs over the last seventy years. She also mentioned that defending against the North Korean threat, which was the basis of the alliance between the two countries, will continue to be a focus area. She added that the concept of "strength deters, and weakness invites hostility" becomes even more critical for this alliance as military preparedness increases. In this context, the necessity of extended deterrence was underscored as the common goal of the alliance.

Ms. Hooker argued that implementing sanctions against North Korea remains an area for improvement as the US-ROK partnership continues to grow. And she put emphasis on the alliance's goal of working to counter the North Korean threat as well as other current concerns such as cybersecurity, global health, and climate change. She called these new concerns "new frontiers" that have been identified for the alliance. Ms. Hooker specifically said that these new frontiers and emerging technologies are continuously being developed such as Artificial Intelligence, Electric Vehicle (EV) batteries, quantum technologies, and autonomous robots. It means that these technologies are not just our future, but they are also critical to the future of our cooperation and the future of our threat.

Mr. Anthony B. Kim, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, identified the US and ROK partnership as an action alliance. He added that it lies in multi-functionality in security, economy,
Plenary Session 3

science, and culture. In addition, Mr. Kim commented that the next steps of this alliance to advance it further can be one of the ways to ensure its longevity and strength.

He figured out there was a lot of learning and development that has taken place between the US and the Republic of Korea after looking back on three significant crises from the first decade of this century. Mr. Kim continued to say that the US-ROK alliance has become unique and more capable than ever, from the security crisis of 9/11, continuing with the global financial crisis, to the recent global health crisis. In light of its history, it is clear that both nations have been charting an impressive relationship over the last seven decades.

Mr. Kim, therefore, highlighted that it is high time to shift the focus from what the alliance has accomplished these past seventy years. He added that both nations are equipped with the know-how and possess the tools to be partners, but no longer in the region of Northeast Asia, which means that South Korea is the linchpin for the United States, especially in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. Mr. Kim argued that this impressive relationship can elevate the alliance and forge new ways to make it an even better and greater version of itself.

Colonel (Ret.) David Maxwell, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, identified the mutual defense treaty between the US and the Republic of Korea as focusing on defending each other in the Asia Pacific region. He argued that its threats must be acknowledged for any strategy to be effective.

Colonel Maxwell cited the case of the US-ROK alliance so as to highlight that this threat is the continuing presence of the Kim family regime. He argued that identifying the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim regime is critical to address it. And it has been evident that North Korea conducts blackmail diplomacy through gains political and economic concessions by increasing tensions and provocations to subvert South Korea and the US-ROK alliance. He also mentioned that their continued use of political warfare to advance their warfighting capabilities to unify the peninsula under their rule is essentially the Kim regime’s nature, objective, and strategy.

Colonel Maxwell suggested that an alliance shift takes place in order to address the threats of the Kim regime and it is timely as the 70th year of the US-ROK alliance is celebrated. Mr. Maxwell argued that revisiting the Armistice Agreement, particularly paragraph 60, shows that the military commanders who authored this agreement understood that the problem on the Korean Peninsula must be solved from a political solution and not through military means.

He said, however, the political solution must be anchored on the strength of the combined military capabilities of the United States and the Republic of Korea to be able to defeat the North Korean People’s Army. In addition, complementing this political solution is the military support that is deemed necessary towards achieving a unified Korean peninsula. Especially when the leading of a Korean General in Operation Control Transfer (OPCON) transition is critical for its long-term legitimacy and protection of the United States from any perception of the US being an occupying force in North Korea.

Colonel Maxwell reiterated that the future of the alliance rests on a strategy towards unification that involves a human rights approach. Human right is not only a moral imperative but also a national security issue. Therefore, the denial of human rights of the people of North Korea sustains the power of the Kim family regime and in turn, fuels their prioritization of weapons and missiles over the welfare of the citizens.

Ms. Park Young Sun, Former Minister of SMEs and Startups of the Republic of Korea, participated in the session virtually. She recognized the rich history behind the seven-decade-long alliance, and outlined it in three chapters. The first one took place during the Cold War, followed by the second one, which took place during the economic collapse of the Soviet Union, and the third one is characterized by science, IT, as well as space explorations. Looking ahead, geopolitical changes, the deeper integration of China into the global economy, and evolving technologies can influence the alliance’s future.
Plenary Session 4, titled “Dealing with North Korea Nuclear Threat,” discussed the perceptions of the panel speakers on North Korea’s provocations and nuclear threat as well as the progressive development of its nuclear weapons that can be seen in the recent events, especially within the past 16 months. Dr. Sue Mi Terry opened the session by noting that with North Korea’s constant expansion and build-up of its nuclear missile arsenals, it has been getting more difficult to detect and preempt their actions. All of the panelists shared their viewpoints not just through their personal lens but also through the lens of the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia, and emphasized that there has been continuous progress in achieving this complete denuclearization despite the number of challenges that come with it.

Mr. Tae Yong Ho, a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, shared his view on Kim Jong-un’s goals by pointing out that North Korea’s nuclear policies were more of a response towards the US-ROK joint military exercise in which the nuclear tests that they run now serve as a ‘homework’ for the United States. Mr. Tae also mentioned Kim’s plan has been getting more explicitly detailed as what has been presented during The Eighth Party Congress of January last year, showing how much he has carried the plan and his current position. Thus, Kim’s bigger goal is to show North Korea’s capability and how much it has been developed to deal with the US and ROK forces. Another issue that Mr. Tae raised during the session was the question of whether the case of the Korean Peninsula should be dealt with separately or if there should be considerations of seeing the issues in Northeast Asia as one whole theatre. He personally thought that given the current situation, it should be better to opt for the latter by starting to think of the whole Taiwan and the Korean peninsula contingencies as one theatre. However, it is still a question that needs to be discussed as the US and its allies have to get themselves prepared for this.

Dr. Bruce W. Bennett, an Adjunct International/Defense Researcher at the RAND Corporation, shared his takes on North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities that have been developed, not just quantitatively but also qualitatively, by going into the technical capabilities of the weapons.
This development indicates on where Kim is heading to, and Dr. Bennett emphasized that it is very different from everyone's expectations. It also shows what Kim is more worried about, which among mentioned are, with regards to attacking airfields, ports, and military command control. Dr. Bennett concluded his point that the issue that needs to be considered is more of whether North Korea has fueled missiles that are all ready to be launched somewhere, other than learning about the development of these nuclear weapons.

In the viewpoints of both the United States and the ROK and how these two states have responded to the increasing threats from North Korea, Mr. Sung Y. Kim, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, started off by saying how the “picture's bleak,” and hence having the need to bolster close cooperation and coordination, not just with ROK and Japan, but also with other partners and allies. There have been continuous bilateral and trilateral efforts in the defense area between the United States, ROK, and Japan so far. New sanctions' designations against North Korea have also been announced by the United States and hence, response to the provocations is multifaceted. Ambassador Kim then concluded by highlighting that the US will not be deterred in making efforts to resolve this issue through diplomatic means despite having failed to engage in a dialogue with Pyongyang.

Professor Tokuchi Hideshi, a Professor at Research Institute for Peace and Security, stated that there is a growing popularity on the topics of Taiwan and Japan contingencies when asked about Japan's perspective on North Korea's expanding nuclear capability and threat. Japan's
perception on North Korea’s nuclear threat is also apparent in Japan’s newly released National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. He shared some opinion polls in Japan that have been conducted in 2022 whereby the results show: (1) There has been an increase in Japanese public concerns vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear development compared to 2021, (2) The amount of Japanese who find North Korea as a threat and those who find China as a threat are almost similar, and (3) majority of the Japanese population deems it unlikely for North Korea to denuclearize. Basically, there has been a growing concern on North Korea’s nuclear development, especially after its long-range missile launch that landed within proximity to Japan in last year’s November.

On the Russian government’s perspective towards North Korea’s WMD program, Dr. Georgy Toloraya, Professor at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted that North Korea’s nuclear doctrine law from last September was a watershed event. Denuclearization is very unlikely to happen as there is barely enough room for negotiations. Dr. Toloraya shared his opinions on the purpose of the current build-up of North Korean nuclear weapons in a more optimistic light which are to deter in aggression, prevent any interference, and to endure pressure, especially after the breaking up of the Soviet Union. He also added that there is a low possibility for military conflict to occur in the Korean peninsula, and suggested that it might be rational to start a dialogue for arms’ limitation, reduction, and prevention of North Korea’s military expansion. Freezing the military buildup of both sides can be a start for this, which then can be slowly followed by arms’ reduction and confidence-building measures. With regards to sanctions as brought up by the moderator, Dr. Toloraya positively affirmed that Russia has been prudent and cautious in keeping the sanction regime except for some cases where the sanctions were broken due to certain situations but not on intentional purposes.

Finally, Dr. Toloraya mentioned that there has been a past historical record of some Russian professors and experts being asked to deliver lectures on the theories of nuclear weapons and admitted that North Korea got some knowledge about it from Russia, and even from Ukraine. To add, Mr. Tae commented that the Russian government’s policy on North Korea, particularly on sanctions, is more of a sentimental matter in which the rapid development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons is due to them stealing technology from Russia and Russia’s lack of control on this matter. Mr. Tae also pointed out that he thought the reason North Korea has not run some nuclear tests is because Kim Jong-un wants to use this nuclear test card with Xi Jinping, having been found that these two are involved in a strategic communication.
Ahn Ho-Young
Former Korean Ambassador to the United States

Bruce W. Bennett
Adjunct International/Defense Researcher, RAND Corporation

John R. Bolton
Former U.S. National Security Advisor; Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Kent E. Calder
Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Maria Castillo Fernandez
Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea

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1st Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

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