A Thought on the North Korean Nuclear Problem

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Gradual Deterioration of the Situation
- Despite all the efforts over the past two decades, North Korean nuclear problem and security situation have deteriorated, maybe fundamentally changed, and become more serious. Now it claims itself a nuclear power.
- The creation of the Six-Party Talks aimed for a peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue and negotiation. However, since December 2008, the Six-Party Talks has been in hibernation.
- We have already “bought the same horse” three times: The Geneva Agreed Framework, September 19 Declaration (and February 13 Agreement), and the Leap Day agreement.
- North Korea is determined to keep and further develop its nuclear weapons capabilities:
  - It claims nuclear-weapons state and has announced its Byeongjin policy (parallel pursuit of nuclear and economic development).

Enhancement of North Korea’s WMD Capabilities
- The North Korea nuclear crisis started with plutonium program at the Yongbyun Radiochemical Lab in 1992.
- In 2002, we discovered a clandestine nuclear program of North Korea: that is, uranium enrichment program. This was a clear violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework.
- Now North Korea has two programs: plutonium and uranium enrichment program. While we know plutonium program relatively well, we don’t know much about the current status of uranium program
  - There could be more uranium enrichment facilities than North Korea revealed.
  - UEP is believed to be a product of A.Q. Khan-North Korea connection.
- Up to now, North Korea has staged three nuclear tests: 2006, 2009, and 2013.
- In parallel, North Korea has developed diverse delivery capabilities over the years (medium and long-range missiles: Rodong, TD 1, TD 2, and the mobile Musoodan). The pace of missile capability development has been much faster than we estimated.

Changes of North Korea's Claims and Position: Inconsistency and justification
- North Korea is the only one country who walked away from the NPT.
- Initially, North Korea claimed it had no intention to develop nuclear weapons: Their programs were for research only.
And then it claimed it was designed to produce electricity and asked for the compensation for stopping the nuclear programs (provision of LWR and heavy fuel oil was agreed to by a coalition of other countries).

Initially, North Korea denied the existence of uranium enrichment program and then acknowledged it.

North Korea has been arguing that, due to the hostile and oppressive policy of the United States, North Korea inevitably developed nuclear deterrent capabilities. With the beginning of the 2nd North Korean nuclear crisis from 2002, North Korea claimed that North Korea is entitled to develop and have deterrent capabilities even greater nuclear weapons.

North Korea has demanded the U.S. guarantee of regime security in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons programs.

Today, North Korea claims its status of de-factor nuclear weapons state being reflected in its Constitution: recognition and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state.
- One of the greatest achievements of the KIM family is the nuclear program.

**North Korea's Understanding of Denuclearization**

- When North Korea says denuclearization, it means the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, not denuclearization of North Korea.
  - **No U.S. nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis South Korea:** no combined military exercises between the U.S. and the ROK, withdrawal of USFK, and termination of the ROK-US alliance.
- North Korea has demanded nuclear arms control with the United States, not talks for denuclearization of North Korea, to be recognized as a nuclear power state.
  - Its demand is designed to change the nature of game and talks and to set new rules.
- North Korea has generally demanded for peace-regime talks first.
  - “First peace regime (peace treaty or non-aggression treaty), then denuclearization”: peace regime as the condition for denuclearization
- Most recently, North Korea under the Kim Jung Un leadership has introduced **Byeongjin** policy: parallel pursuit of nuclear and economic development.
  - No interest in denuclearization
  - No interest in establishing full diplomatic relationship with the United States.

**Responses and Positions of the Concerned Parties**

- Everyone agrees on peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear problem through dialogue.
  - The momentum of dialogue isn’t there: “strategic patience,” waiting for North...
Korea’s concrete action of denuclearization

Differences over the details and approaches

- sanctions (U.N. sanctions) vs. flexibility/engagement
- peace talks or regime: condition for denuclearization or outcome of denuclearization
- Difficulties in enforcing punitive measures

Different priority among the concerned parties.

- U.S.: non-proliferation
- China: regime stability
- Korea and Japan: denuclearization.

The U.S. and China have begun to perceive the North Korean problems from U.S.-China relationship

- The U.S. is emphasizing the role of China, especially in enforcing sanctions.
- China sees that the U.S. uses the North Korean nuclear problem as a means to contain China

How to Deal With the North Korea’s Nuclear Challenges: Principles

- Sense of urgency:
  - Time is not on our side and possibility of proliferation (completion of uranium program) will increase.
  - North Korea’s nuclear as well as delivery capability will continuously increase: It will be able to target the U.S. mainland. If so, it will challenge and invalidate the underlying assumptions of ours responses and concept of extended (nuclear) deterrence.
  - Kim Jung Un’s North Korea is more unstable and unpredictable. Replacement of the old guards with young generation is going on.
    - The relationship and structure between KPA and KWP are unclear.
    - Policy failure and confusion (lack of achievement) are witnessed.
- North Korea nuclear challenges are North Korea problem itself
  - To deal with the North Korean nuclear challenges, it is necessary to address the root cause of the problem: that is the nature of North Korean regime.
  - It will take relatively long time to solve North Korea problem.
  - It is necessary to think about how to manage and improve the situation with various means from various directions and fields: comprehensive approach being focused on the regime transformation.
- Shared Objective(s) and Establishment of Common approach
  - Five countries should be on the same page of history.
  - Clear consensus on objectives and priority must be there: the denuclearization of North Korea and the establishment of a permanent peace regime (unification of) on the Korean Peninsula

메모 포함[cpt2]: You might consider discussing the origins of this. How much stems from concerns regarding preserving a buffer state and how much to avoiding refugees, etc.?

메모 포함[cpt3]: You mean proliferation beyond NK? Again, this would be a helpful area. Why does a more viable HEU program raise deeper concerns than Pu programs? What are the likely directions that such proliferation might take?

메모 포함[cpt4]: These seem like reasonable points to me. It would be most helpful to emphasize to the group that this means we are talking about an extended period (1-2 decades) of dealing with NK as a de facto nuclear power (with expanding capabilities, as you have noted). My goal at the conference is to discuss the implications of such trends...

Anyhow, any speculation you can provide there would be much appreciated.
Comprehensive road-map and action-plan must be adopted.

Recommended Approach

- Basic Directions: Comprehensive Integrated Denial Approach
  - Denial of North Korea’s pursuit of Byeongjin by utilizing various means and tools in an integrated manner
  - Consistency and durability of policy toward North Korea are very necessary.
  - Proactive, not reactive, approach is desirable.
- Strengthening Extended (nuclear) Deterrence Posture
  - Study of North Korea’s military strategy and capabilities
  - Tailored deterrence with full spectrum dominance (escalation controllability) → all options are on the table (strategic ambiguity): deterrence, dissuade, and defense
- Smart sanction strategy
  - Identification of areas where North Korea is vulnerable
  - Targeted/tailored sanction measures
  - Cooperation with the major parties, especially China.
- Conditioned Engagement
  - Keeping the door for dialogue open, not asking dialogue for the sake of dialogue: multi-channel of dialogue is preferable
  - Seeking of tension reduction or military stabilization: mil-to-mil dialogue (South Korea should go beyond and expand the current trustpolitik)
  - Provision of humanitarian assistance: soft and indirect approach
  - Focusing on small, not big, exchange and cooperation projects. In parallel, education and training programs in technical areas can be sought
  - Utilization of other multilateral fora
- Maintaining the Coalition among the Concerned Parties
  - Agreement on the desirable end state of the Korean Peninsula and Its implications for Northeast Asia
  - Separation of North Korea problem from US-China context and utilization of North Korea challenge as a common agenda for cooperation, not competition.

Conclusions

- North Korea has no interest in giving up its nuclear weapons: nuclear weapons are not for negotiation.
- North Korean nuclear problems will not be solved in short period of time.
- To solve North Korean nuclear problems, we must try to solve North Korea problem: North Korean nuclear problem is a part of North Korean problem as a whole.
Gradual transformation of the North Korean regime may be the only solution for North Korean nuclear problem.

Denial strategy must be sought more actively: for that, a well-calculated balanced mix of carrot and stick is very necessary.

Robust and reliable deterrence is the starting point.

Coalition and cooperation among the concerned parties are very essential.