South Korea in a Changing World: Foreign Affairs

Results of the Asan Institute’s 2012 Annual Survey of South Korean Public Opinion
South Korea currently finds itself in the geographic middle of the most dynamic region in the world. However, unlike the past, South Korea is now one of the most important and most influential players in the region. Faced with a hostile North Korea to its immediate north, a rising China to its west, a declined Japan to its east, and a re-committed United States to Asia, South Korea’s role in the region, and the public’s understanding of that role, is a topic of increasing importance.

To say that South Koreans’ views on foreign affairs are complicated is an understatement. North Korea is the South’s biggest security threat, but its people are seen as brethren. The United States is the primary security partner, but is also seen as being responsible for the division of the Korean Peninsula. There are long running historical feuds with Japan, but both South Korea and Japan are allied with the United States and face a common threat in North Korea. As for China, it remains South Korea’s biggest trading partner, but South Koreans consistently identify it as the biggest threat in a post-unification scenario.

Making sense of these complicated relationships, and the public perception of them, requires a broad understanding of history, economics, security, politics, and Korean identity. This report aims to provide an overview of how South Koreans view issues related to foreign affairs, as well as to put them into context. After all, the context around these numbers may be the most important part of understanding why the results look as they do, and to understand how they may trend into the future.

## Regional Relations

*United States still viewed most positively, Japan still most negatively.…*

For the third straight year, South Koreans ranked the United States as the most favorable nation included in the survey (Figure 1).\(^1\) This is hardly a surprise. Over the past 60 years the two countries have been close allies, and in that time have grown to share common interests and values. That is not to say that there has not been trouble in the relationship—there certainly has. Despite the setbacks along the way, the two countries remain close and are set to remain as such well into the future.

The index remained largely steady for North Korea and China from 2011, while the favorability of Japan experienced significant declines in each of the past two years. Tensions between South Korea and Japan have been palpable with continued spats over the Dokdo islets, the allegations of the misrepresentation of historical fact in Japanese text books, and the ongoing unresolved issues regarding the sexual enslavement of Korean women by Japanese military forces during colonization. It is safe to say that 2012 marked the worst year of relations between Korea and Japan in recent memory.

---

\(^1\) Respondents are asked to rank each country on a scale from zero to ten, with zero representing no favorability. Mean scores are then calculated for each country to create the index.
China remains an interesting case for South Koreans. On one hand, China is by far South Korea’s largest trading partner, and the growing Chinese market will play an integral role in South Korea’s own economic growth. The countries are in the beginning stages of pursuing an FTA and both will benefit greatly from continued stability in the region. At the same time, China is growing militarily, an aspect of China’s rise that worries South Koreans. Not only that, but it remains the prime benefactor of North Korea—the greatest potential source of instability in the region and a country which routinely threatens South Korea.

Of course, favorability ratings are always subject to prevailing winds. A serious incident involving U.S. forces in Korea always has the potential to spark anti-Americanism and drive favorability down. However, in the past ten years no such incidents have occurred as both the United States and South Korea now seem much more adept at managing potential trouble spots. For its part, North Korea will likely hold relatively steady as well. There is little more it could do to worsen its reputation, and thus far South Koreans have been remarkably forgiving overall of the North’s bad behavior.

While there could be volatility for any of the countries included, the most likely countries to be affected are China and Japan. For Japan, that volatility is likely to be positive in nature. After all, there is very little room for its favorability to erode further. With new administrations in both countries, and a long established cultural exchange between the two, a surge in favorability is plausible should they avoid antagonizing one another. For China, any volatility will likely be negative. There is a growing mistrust of China among South Koreans, and this could serve to further depress positive assessments of the country.

**U.S.-China relations highly competitive, ambivalence on ROK-China relations…**

To many living in Asia the U.S. pivot is somewhat puzzling. This is especially true in South
Korea where U.S. Armed Forces are stationed on a large swath of the geographic center of Seoul. However, the pivot has reigned in the discussion on national competition in the region. While some argue that the U.S. move will be a calming influence on recent tensions, many others see this rebalancing as a driver of increased tensions. China is certainly a part of the latter group, believing that the U.S. initiative is an attempt to contain a rising China—a claim that the United States has attempted to refute. Whatever the case may be, South Koreans largely see the relationship between China and the United States as competitive, with 81% stating as such (Figure 2). Of course, this puts South Korea in an awkward position. While the ROK-U.S. alliance is the foundation of South Korea’s national security, its close economic ties with China are increasingly important.

While 89% see the ROK-U.S. relationship as one of cooperation, there is division about the South Korea-Sino relationship. While a slim majority (54%) cited this relationship as cooperative, 47% cited it as competitive. It is difficult to know which direction public opinion on this matter will go. Breaking down the results into age cohorts is of little help. While 46% of those in their 60s or older state that the ROK-China relationship is competitive, 50% of those in their 20s state the same. It seems that most South Koreans would prefer South Korea to have its cake and eat it too—to maintain its security alliance with the United States as well as continue its incredibly profitable economic relationship with China.

**South Korean, Chinese influence on global affairs on the rise, influence of the United States in decline….**

Of course, the rise of China coupled with the financial turmoil in the United States has largely dominated strategic thinking in the region for the last several years. With a restricted U.S. budget, how exactly will the United States be able to continue to meet its significant commitments not only in Asia, but around the world? This has amplified the narrative of a rising China and the need for China to become a responsible stakeholder in global affairs. These trends have resonated with the South Korean public.

In assessing global influence, the United States was identified as the country with the most influence among those included in the survey (Figure 3).² Trailing the United States were

---

² Respondents were asked to rate influence on a scale of zero to ten, with zero representing no influence. Mean
China, Russia, and Japan. Among the countries included, South Korea was seen as the least influential with a mean score of 4.8—the only country to score below 5.0.

Figure 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Current Influence</th>
<th>Future Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, over the next ten years the South Korean public expects the influence of the United States to wane and the influence of China to wax. In ten years time, China is expected to be more influential than the United States, and likely the most influential country in the world. This reinforces the sensitive position in which South Korea currently finds itself. However, with all of this change expected among great powers, the changes happening within East Asia itself have been largely overlooked.

The past five years were incredibly productive for South Korea. It has risen on the global stage in a way that many never expected, and in a way South Koreans themselves never really anticipated. In doing so, both the confidence and pride of the South Korean public has reached new heights, and for the first time East Asia has a powerful Korea. This is reflected in the influence that South Koreans expect to wield on global affairs in ten years time. At 6.0, this is equivalent to the influence South Koreans think Russia will have ten years from now. Will South Korea really reach that level of influence? That is doubtful. However, it is largely unimportant. What is important is the expectation. That expectation, coupled with the decline of Japan’s influence, helps to explain the renewed tensions between the two countries.

South Korea views itself as newly powerful, influential, and ascendant. It is now, and will continue to bring those expectations to bear on relations with Japan. South Korea may still be the smallest country in the region—excluding North Korea—but it no longer perceives itself to be the weakest. This new perception will play an important role in how South Korea and Japan relations play out over the coming years. Understanding this change will be key to interpreting that relationship.

scores were then calculated for use in Figure 3.
Public Opinion on China and Japan

Establishing a new partnership with China more important…

With regional relations and expectations in mind, perhaps it is not surprising that South Koreans perceive the importance of China to South Korea’s future. If the public had to choose, a clear majority (61%) thought it more important to forge a new cooperative relationship with China than to maintain the alliance with the United States at the risk of damaging relations with China (Figure 4). Of course, part of this is explained by the fact that the U.S. alliance has long been the center piece of South Korean security, and there is very little hope or expectation that it will soon dissipate.

However, the growing sense that China’s influence will continue to rise puts South Korea in a situation that could become more difficult over time. If expectations for China’s rising influence are met, and U.S. influence declines as the South Korean public expects, South Korea may need to re-examine the balance between its economic interests and its security interests. This will force South Korean leaders to deal with questions they would rather not answer as remaining on good terms with both China and the United States is of prime importance. These results again highlight the growing role China is taking on in the collective conscious of the South Korean public. While China is not particularly favored, its growing importance requires adequate planning.

But China seen as biggest threat to a unified Korea…

Despite the well-publicized tensions with Japan throughout 2012, Japan is not seen as the primary threat should the two Koreas reunify. While Japan was the only country included in the survey to have its threat perception increase—from 21% to 26%—it remains a distant second to China (Figure 5). On this, a clear majority continued to perceive China as the primary threat to a unified Korea. This creates an interesting contrast, and illustrates the difficult policy position that Korea will find itself in over the coming years. While a majority think it important to pursue a cooperative relationship with China, as already illustrated, many also find good reason to be wary.
South Koreans remain divided on potential alliance with Japan if China continues to rise…

One of the key findings of the 2011 Asan Annual Survey was that 54% of South Koreans viewed a military alliance with Japan to be necessary if China continues its rise (Figure 6). At the time, this was a novel finding given the historical tensions and periodic flare-ups in the relationship between the two countries. However, in 2012 the numbers reversed with 55% saying that such a military alliance would be unneeded. Even though there is a 10pp gap between the responses in 2012, the fact that it is not wider is also remarkable. Relations between Japan and Korea deteriorated seriously in 2012, and were at their lowest point in recent history. However, 45% still thought such an alliance to be necessary. This reinforces just how uneasy South Koreans are with the rise of China.
**Dokdo remains the largest stumbling block to Korea-Japan relations…**

Despite the fact that 45% think an alliance with Japan is in order if China continues its rise, it should not be understood that South Koreans see the relationship with Japan as positive. The relationship is full of historical tensions and it is not clear how the two nations will address those tensions moving forward. Among the South Korean public, 50% cite the issues related to Dokdo as being the biggest stumbling block to improving relations between the two countries—an 11pp decline from the previous year. The next biggest issue seen as preventing Korea-Japan ties from improving was the issue of history textbooks. South Korea has long decried Japan’s portrayal of its wartime past as whitewashing the facts, and the 39% that cited it in 2012 was a 7pp increase from 2011. Finally, the issue that has caught the most attention was that of Korean women forced into sexual slavery—known as comfort women. But this was only cited by 11% as being the biggest obstacle to improving relations. This was a 4pp increase from 2011.

**Public Opinion on the United States**

**ROK-U.S. alliance seen as indispensable…**

The ROK-U.S. alliance forms the cornerstone of South Korean security. In the past it has come under fire for various reasons, most notably in 2002 when anti-Americanism was high following the deaths of two young girls during U.S. military training exercises. However, a decade later public support for the alliance is at an all-time high, with 94% citing it as necessary.
Even after reunification, ROK-U.S. alliance seen as necessary…

In the past, common knowledge held that the alliance was most important due to the threat posed to South Korea by North Korea. If that threat were to dissipate, or even disappear, it was not clear what would become of the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, the region is now a much different place, primarily due to a weakening Japan and a rising China. Accordingly, the South Korean public does not think that the alliance with the United States will have run its course should reunification take place. In both 2011 (75%) and 2012 (84%) there was high support for the alliance to continue even after South Korea’s primary security threat had been eliminated via reunification. This hints at the risks that South Koreans perceive in the region, and given previous findings, further highlights the wary view of China taken by South Koreans.

However, Koreans still of two minds on the United States…

The fact that support for the alliance, with or without unification, is high should not be taken to mean that South Koreans are completely supportive of the United States and the role it has played in modern Korean history. That is certainly not the case. In reality, the South Korean public is of two minds on the United States, as shown in Figure 10.
In each year since 2010 a majority has stated that the United States was responsible for the division of Korea. In 2012, 63% stated as such, a 7pp increase from 2010. Obviously, this would suggest a significant amount of resentment towards the United States should it be interpreted alone. However, at the same time three-quarters stated that it was aid from the United States that made economic development possible for South Korea.

But one of the most important areas to watch is how South Koreans evaluate the common interests they hold with the United States. Since 2010, when 59% stated that South Korea and the United States had common interests, there has been a 5pp decline. Should that continue to erode, and the South Korean public perceives that there are more differences than commonalities, it could signal coming turbulence for the alliance. What form that turbulence would take remains to be seen, but a decline in the perception of common interests will not be a positive development.

*Most important issue for the ROK-U.S. relationship to address is nuclear North Korea…*

Clearly, the ROK-U.S. alliance has more on its plate than dealing with North Korea. It is a relationship that works across multiple levels and deals with multiple issues. This is what has made it so successful. For the South Korean public, this kind of cooperation remains important, with the most important being to deal with a nuclear North Korea, as cited by 89% (Figure 11).

![Figure 11](image)

**Issues for the Alliance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Completely Unimportant</th>
<th>Somewhat Unimportant</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change in North Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining KORUS FTA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear North Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checking Growth of China</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One surprising finding was the percentage (77%) of those who identified effecting regime change in North Korea as being an important issue for the alliance. This issue is regularly left out of discussions because regime change in North Korea is a murky topic. While both sides may ultimately like to see this happen, neither is willing to accept the instability that such
change may entail. The potential ugliness of regime collapse is enough to lead both South Korea and the United States to prefer the status quo.

This report has repeatedly discussed the perception of China among South Koreans. That perception is one of caution at the moment, despite the economic benefits, and that caution is evident here as well—77% cite checking the growth of China as an important issue for the ROK-U.S. alliance to address.

**Two-thirds of South Koreans support the long-term stationing of U.S. troops…**

![Figure 12](image)

Of course, if the alliance is a long-term commitment between the two countries, one of the key features of that alliance will be the long-term stationing of U.S. troops in the country. The U.S. military has already been present in the country for more than 60 years, and there is always talk in progressive circles that the U.S. military should leave. However, this is out of line with public sentiment. Not only is there high support for the U.S. alliance, but 68% support the continued long-term stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea (Figure 12). This falls largely in-line with what the 2012 Asan Annual Survey has revealed about current feelings toward the United States. Namely, that the anti-Americanism of a decade ago has long since receded.

**Public Opinion on North Korea**

**Attitudes on North Korea more favorable in 2012…**

One of the long-standing assumptions behind the rationale for reunification is that it is inevitable due to the fact that South Koreans and North Koreans are “one people”. Thus, the division of the peninsula is only temporary. Of course, if that feeling of one-ness deteriorates over time, it could also dampen the calls for reunification.

In 2011, respondents were asked for the first time how they viewed North Korea, and the results were striking. At that time, a plurality (26%) stated that they viewed North Korea as a neighbor, with 22% stating North Korea was an enemy, and 21% citing the North as “one of us” (Figure 13). By 2012, 33% cited North Korea as a neighbor, 32% as “one of us” and 19% as an enemy.
These results cast doubt on the assumption that reunification will be achieved simply because the two countries are composed of the same ethnicity.

**Figure 13**

Perceptions of North Korea

![Perceptions of North Korea](image)

It is particularly important to investigate this result by age cohort, shown in Figure 14. It stands to reason that older Koreans, who may still have close family members living in North Korea, are more likely to cite North Korea as “one of us” than are younger Koreans. This is precisely what the results show.

**Figure 14**

Perceptions of North Korea: By Age

![Perceptions of North Korea: By Age](image)

Those in their 40s (39%), 50s (36%), and 60s (34%) were much more likely to see North Koreans as “one of us”. Among those in their 20s, only 18% stated the same. The worry is, of
course, that as these young Koreans age the cultural distance will not shrink, and interest in reunification will simply begin to evaporate. Indeed, it was South Koreans in their 20s who were most likely to cite North Korea as being a neighbor.

Much like the results for each Asan Annual Survey, the youngest Korean cohort identified as security conservative, sharing a much closer opinion of North Korea with those in their 60s than with those in their 30s. In terms of identifying North Korea as an enemy, it was those in their 20s and 60s who were most likely to do so—24% of each cohort.

**South-North relations bad, North to blame…**

Since 2010, fully 93% of South Koreans have identified the relationship between South Korea and North Korea as “bad”. This is unsurprising given the fact that the two sides have done very little in the way of any meaningful exchanges, and that South Korea is still smarting from the 2010 provocations which left scores of South Koreans dead. However, one subtle shift that has taken place is in how South Koreans assign responsibility for the state of relations between the two Koreas.

**Figure 15**

As shown in Figure 15, there has been a 13pp decline in the percentage who blame North Korea for the state of relations between the two Koreas. To be sure, a clear majority still sees North Korea as the prime culprit, but there has been a three-fold growth in the number of respondents who cite China as the country most responsible for poor inter-Korean relations. This will be an interesting number to continue to track, as there is no end in sight to the North Korea problem.

**Growing interest in reunification, in whatever form it may take…**

Since 2010, interest in reunification has continued to grow. In the first year of Asan’s Annual Survey only a slim majority expressed interest in an eventual reunification with North Korea (Figure 16). Given the violent provocations of that year it is not difficult to understand why. (It should be noted that the 2010 survey was conducted after the sinking of the Cheonan but before the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.) Since that time, interest in reunification has steadily increased. In the absence of lethal provocations, fully 84% of South Koreans stated
that they were interested in reunification in 2012, a 14pp increase from 2011.

**Figure 16**

![Interest in Reunification](image)

However, interest in reunification is not the only change that has taken place with regard to attitudes on North Korea and reunification. It has long been assumed that any reunification would take place on South Korea’s terms—that is, South Korea would absorb North Korea. In both 2010 and 2011, a majority of South Koreans stated that this was their preferred method (Figure 17). However, this majority was not as robust as expected. In both years 42% stated that they would prefer a federation between the two states as opposed to the South absorbing the North.

**Figure 17**

![Preferred Method of Reunification](image)

However, in 2012 this preference flipped, and a majority suddenly stated a preference for reunification to take place through a federation—the two states co-existing peacefully. It is still too early to tell if this trend will hold, but it seems likely to reverse should there be further North Korean provocations. Regardless, the old assumptions about the views of South Korea on North Korea and reunifications need to be recalibrated.
Despite the more favorable attitudes on North Korea, this has not led to an increased demand for a speedy reunification. While South Koreans are now more willing to entertain the idea, they remain cautious on how fast such reunification should take place. In fact, the calls for reunification to take place as soon as possible have remained virtually unchanged over the last three years (Figure 18). However, there has been a sharp decline in the percentage of South Koreans who see no need for reunification whatsoever. While that number stood at 12% in 2010, by 2012 it had declined 8pp to reach 4%. Instead of rushing ahead quickly, South Koreans are taking a wait and see approach, with 62% in 2012 saying that reunification should be “dependent on circumstances”. That was a 15pp increase from 2010. This wait and see approach likely makes these numbers highly influenced by the actions of North Korea. Should there be a repeat of lethal provocations, expect a reversal in both attitudes towards North Korea itself and on the pace of reunification.

Of course, one of the circumstances that willful reunification will depend most highly on is the economic impact both on the nation and on the individual. In any scenario, given the large differences in wealth and development, South Korea can expect a large, negative impact on its economy.

Clearly, South Koreans expected exactly this. While more than three-quarters stated as such in 2010, in both 2011 and 2012 roughly two-thirds agreed (Figure 19). Moreover, in 2012 71% expected reunification to have a negative impact on their own personal financial situation. This was an 8pp increase from 2011.
Beyond the immediate economic impact, Koreans do perceive some positive outcomes from reunification. First and foremost, as cited by a plurality (28%), was the alleviation of the threat of war. The next largest segment (22%) cited the economic advantages of combining the South’s technological know-how with the North’s labor. However, these expectations were tempered by concerns, with a plurality (45%) stating their primary concern was how unification would be funded and 24% concerned about the mismatch between the two people’s ideologies and values.

**Possibility of war seen as increasing…**

Despite the overall improvement of attitudes towards North Korea in the absence of lethal provocations since 2010, South Koreans viewed the possibility of a renewal of the Korean War as more likely. Even with the sinking of the *Cheonan* in 2010—the shelling of *Yeonpyeong* Island came after the 2010 survey was conducted—only 40% thought there was a possibility that war would once again break out on the Korean Peninsula (Figure 20). By 2011 that number had increased to 50%, and in 2012 it stood at 59%. This increased worry stands in stark
contrast to the almost non-existent role that North Korea played throughout the election campaigns in 2012. These focused entirely on domestic policy issues with North Korea playing only a minor role.

Interestingly, and perhaps worryingly, in each of the three years it was South Koreans in their 20s who were most likely to see the renewal of open hostilities as possible. This is consistent with the findings across all three surveys that the youngest Koreans, while much more progressive on a host of social issues, are decidedly security conservative.

If a war were to break out, there is very little public confidence that the South Korean military could win the war alone. Fully 74% stated that the South alone could not prevail, largely unchanged from 2011. Conversely, if war does break out between the two Koreas, there is widespread belief that China will intervene on behalf of North Korea with three-quarters of respondents stating as such. This was also largely unchanged from the previous year.

**North Korea not giving up nuclear weapons…**

While much of the world takes it for granted that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, 73% of the South Korean public agrees, down from 81% in 2011. However, that question acted primarily as a control question to more clearly ascertain whether or not South Koreans believe North Korea will give up those weapons. In all three years that the survey was conducted, more than 90% of respondents who believed North Korea had nuclear weapons stated that the North would not abandon those weapons. Further, three-quarters of all respondents in each year stated that they felt threatened by the North’s possession of nuclear weapons.

Of course, the possession of nuclear weapons and the use of those weapons are two different things. In 2011 (54%) and 2012 (53%), a majority believed that North Korea would use its nuclear weapons if there were a renewal of the Korean War.

**Economic cooperation best way to resolve North nuclear problem…**

Over the past three years there has been a shift in what South Koreans see as the best policy option to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. However, it should be stated clearly that this policy option does not refer specifically to South Korea, but to all countries with an interest in resolving this issue. While no majority previously emerged on the four policy options laid out in the survey, in 2012 a majority did emerge which favored increased economic cooperation (Figure 21). There has long been little taste for increased military pressure, likely due to the fear that such increased pressure would lead to increased conflict and more deaths of South Koreans. There was also little appetite for the United States to give North Korea assurances on the survival of the North’s regime should it give up nuclear weapons. Instead, a majority favored increase economic cooperation as a means to entice North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and its nuclear weapons program.
In light of the growing threat from North Korea, there were quiet calls throughout 2012 for South Korea to take increased responsibility for its own defense. Ultimately, those in favor argued, the ultimate defense would be a domestic nuclear weapons program for South Korea. These calls were not out of line with public sentiment. In 2012, 66% supported a South Korean domestic nuclear weapons program. This was a 10pp increase from 2010 when 56% voiced support.

However, what has been most striking is the change in intensity in support for such a program, as illustrated in Figure 22. While those who support and those who strongly
oppose such a program remained largely unchanged, there was a dramatic rise in those who stated that they strongly supported a domestic nuclear weapons program.

It remains unclear what will become of the calls for a nuclear weapons program in South Korea. However, it seems unlikely that South Korea would take such a bold step in the near-term. It would deal a severe blow to international arms control regimes as well as embarrass the United States. Not only that, but it would likely bring a range of repercussions, the scope and severity of which are not yet well understood.

Conclusion

South Korea increasingly finds itself an influential player in both the region and in the world, and the results from the 2012 Asan Institute Annual Survey reflect this in many ways. But the new found confidence of South Korea has not led to abandoning older precedents. The alliance with the United States is still seen as the foundation for South Korea’s security. However, the rise of China has greatly complicated that relationship. It used to be that the ROK-U.S. alliance dealt almost exclusively with North Korea. That is no longer the case. Instead, the South Korean public perceives China to be both a benefit and a threat, and the country will continue to watch China carefully while trying to benefit from its growth as an export destination. At the same time, the South Korean public perceives that it is no longer of a lower rank than Japan. Instead, South Koreans project their country to be more influential in the coming years, fundamentally altering the relationship between the two.

In terms of foreign affairs, South Korea finds itself in a difficult position—something very well captured by the survey data. It views the region as primarily competitive, and it is caught between two great powers. Its traditional ally is in perceived decline, and its historically powerful neighbor is on the rise once again. These are waters which South Korea must navigate carefully in the coming years, a situation on which the public has a strikingly keen understanding.
Methodology

Annual Survey 2010: The Asan Annual Survey 2010 was conducted from August 16 to September 17, 2010 by Media Research. The sample size was 2,000 and it was a Mixed-Mode survey employing RDD for mobile phones and an online survey. The margin of error is ±2.2% at the 95% confidence level.

Annual Survey 2011: The Asan Annual Survey 2011 was conducted from August 26 to October 4, 2011 by EmBrain. The sample size was 2,000 and it was a Mixed-Mode survey employing RDD for mobile and landline telephones. The margin of error is ±2.2% at the 95% confidence level.

Annual Survey 2012: The Asan Annual Survey 2012 was conducted in two parts. The panel survey portion was conducted from September 5 – 14, 2012. The second portion was conducted from September 25 – November 1, 2012 employing RDD for mobile and landline phones. The sample size was 1,500 and the margin of error is ±2.5% at the 95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by Media Research.