One of the main difficulties in my discussion of Russian foreign policy in Asia—indirectly alluded to in Elizabeth Wishnick’s comments—is a sense of uncertainty about Russia’s direction. While my analysis registers the undeniable closing of ranks between Beijing and Moscow, I fall short of proclaiming the death of multilateralism and highlight sources of tension between China and Russia that work against long-term prospects for a political, much less a military, alliance. My uncertainty is also a reflection of the contingent nature of Russian policymaking, which markedly differs from China in this respect. For all of Xi Jinping’s display of assertiveness and resolve, which, in the eyes of many analysts, has imbued Beijing’s foreign policy with hitherto unseen dynamism and direction, China’s foreign policy is fundamentally shaped by forces of inertia and institutional interests. This is not to say that it lacks imagination—though occasionally that, too. Rather, it operates on the basis of certain principles that were formulated at least thirty years ago, when Deng Xiaoping first inaugurated an “independent foreign policy,” which simply mean that China cannot and will not become anyone’s ally. These principles, though not immutable, serve as a ballast of a kind, preventing rapid changes of direction.

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